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Abstract

This is a theoretical dissertation about the psychology of returning to the past. The purpose of
this work is to examine the growth potential of psychological returns and to clarify and
contribute to psychoanalytic theory. Special attention is given to involuntary memories, or
integrative returns, which are illustrated by four vignettes taken from a mixture of sources.
These experiences provide a contrast to familiar pathological returns, such as the return of the
repressed and the repetition compulsion. Accordingly, generative returns are differentiated from
non-generative returns. With this distinction in mind, psychoanalytic theories are reappraised. A
variety of psychoanalytic concepts and practices are reinterpreted as instances of generative
returns, including (but not limited to) Freud’s early cathartic method, transference repetition,
regression in the service of the ego, and regression to dependence. Other psychoanalytic
concepts, particularly those stemming from the theories of Klein and Bion, are applied to the
psychology of returning in general. The literature converges on some basic themes that cohere in
each of the two classifications of returns, generative and non-generative. The following themes
are prevalent in generative returns: expanded range of experience; rediscovery and resumed
development; open interaction between different levels of organization; disorganization and
reorganization; recognition; continuity; sense of individual truth; and reflective distance. By
contrast, non-generative returns tend to eclipse meaning and have a non-elaborative character;
these are experiences of discontinuity and fragmentation; they have a quality of “itness,” and
occur outside the borders of self-feeling, or the “I.” Based on the complementary study of both
experience and theory, it is possible to identify a typical sequence in generative returns. This
sequence or progression constitutes a basic model of generative returns. Throughout this study,
many generative returns follow a general progression from an initial phase of receptivity, to one
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of reimmersion and reexperiencing, to a concluding phase of self-reflection and reconfiguration.
This mode of returning in the psychological sphere is representative of a basic principle of
psychological growth. The electronic version of this dissertation is freely accessible through the
OhioLINK ETD center (http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/).
Keywords: psychoanalysis; repetition; regression; involuntary memories; transitional
phenomena; generative returns.
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Preface

“The psyche is that which comes back, returns and reproduces itself” (Green, 2002, p.
160).
This dissertation is about the psychology of returning, which naturally features the past in
one form or another. One can only return to or repeat something that has been. The central
thesis of this work is that returning is a basic principle of psychological growth and well being;
however, this is far from being always the case. As Green’s (2002) aphorism suggests, returning
is ubiquitous in the psychological realm and encompasses a vast area of experience. It is an
activity that may be volitional or involuntary, conscious or unconscious. This work explores
these important distinctions as well as others to examine the growth potential of psychological
returns.
In the sphere of the mind, returning primarily has to do with the retrieval, reproduction,
and preservation of the past. In memory, for example, we may revisit the past through mental
imagery and emotional reexperiencing. Returning is also a core ingredient of regression, which
typically implies a return to earlier stages of development. In these forms, returning is a
backward movement. The opposite is true in cases of repetition, however, as the past is repeated
or enacted in a forward direction.
It is common for groups and societies to facilitate psychological returns, such as by
creating memorials (Young, 1993). Many traditions and rituals bring a shared past to life in the
context of an ever changing and sometimes unpredictable present. When successful, these
practices hold groups together, generate meaning, and provide a basis for collective identity
(Volkan, 2004). In our private lives, the past is often a silent presence that saturates daily
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experience, according to our individual histories. We feel its effect, perhaps in a sensation of
familiarity or in moments of recognition, but remain focused on the demands of the present.
The psychological importance of keeping our history alive is perhaps more evident when
we are separated from our origins. Consider that thoughts of return are common to many
Diasporas (Safran, 2005). The Jewish Diaspora has the return to the homeland as well as the
continuation of a cultural and religious heritage that derives from the ancestral home; the
continuation of that heritage depends on many returns. More recently, the African Diaspora is
adopting the concept of Sankofa, which derives from the Akan people of West Africa. Literally
translated, according to the Dubois Learning Center (n.d.), Sankofa reads, “It is not taboo to go
back and fetch what you forgot.” The symbol for Sankofa is a mythological bird that
paradoxically, “flies forward while looking backward with an egg (symbolizing the future) in its
mouth” (Dubois Learning Center, n.d.). This idea speaks to the virtues of returning to our
origins to revive and preserve the past in the interest of learning and growth.
Returning to origins is a central idea within psychoanalytic theories, particularly in the
context of psychological pain. Historically, psychoanalytic theories seem to emphasize the
pathological nature of returns to the relative neglect of their generative potential, though there
are noteworthy exceptions. Despite this outward appearance, a close reading of the literature
shows that these theories also provide a careful study of generative returns. In generative
returns, the psychic past reoccurs in a manner that facilitates psychological growth, such as by
expanding creativity and insight. In contrast to historical attention to pathological returns, this
dissertation examines and builds on psychoanalytic theories to develop the thesis that
psychological development and health often involves returning to our origins. Psychoanalytic
literature, beginning with Freud, seems to support this thesis. Hence, in addition to examining
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contributes to psychoanalytic theories. Finally, this contribution on the generative potential of
returns reveals similarities across psychoanalytic theories.

5

DISAPPEARANCE AND RETURN

6
Section I
Generative Returns

Section I includes two chapters that ultimately serve to distinguish generative from nongenerative returns. The first chapter surveys psychoanalytic concepts about returning and
repetition; these are contrasted with Proust’s (1982a, 1982b) descriptions of involuntary
memories. The second chapter consists of several vignettes that exemplify integrative returns, a
special category of generative returns. The vignettes provide the experiential groundwork for
later theoretical chapters.
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Chapter 1: Origins

We exist only by virtue of what we possess, we possess only what is really present to us,
and many of our memories, our moods, our ideas sail away on a voyage of their own until
they are lost to sight. Then we can no longer take them into account in the total which is
our personality. But they know of secret paths by which to return to us. (Proust, 1982b,
p. 497)
In his novel, Remembrance of Things Past,1 Proust (1982a, 1982b) gives countless,
eloquent renderings of involuntary memories. Strikingly clear images and sensations are evoked
and return in full through secret paths. Proust’s narrator, Marcel, for example, finds that many of
his childhood memories are restored by the particular taste of a madeleine cookie soaked in tea.
Such memories are distinct in their vibrant presence; we reexperience a living past with
emotional vividness. In this way, we may recapture forgotten memories and moods. Proust
emphasized that this form of remembering and reexperiencing is not the product of will or desire.
It is precisely because chance encounters revive these memories (rather than personal volition)
that he considered them authentic, or true memories. One could describe Proust as nostalgic. He
emphasized the fruits of rediscovering lost time (i.e., of being freed from the order of time),
proclaiming that, “true paradises are the paradises we have lost” (Proust, 1982b, p. 903). From
this perspective, we experience paradise by recapturing the living presence of the past. Proust
prized more than rapture, however; he was convinced that involuntary memories captured
something of his essence and brought greater unity to his being (Bell, 2003). From this
perspective, psychological returns have a generative quality.

1

An alternative, more suitable translation of the title is In search of lost time.
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Psychoanalytic Views on the Psychic Past
The persistence of the past in the sphere of the mind is also a central theme in
psychoanalytic thought. Generations of psychoanalysts, beginning with Freud, have been
concerned with how the past pervades and influences our present lives, especially in hidden
ways. Freud (1930/1961) maintained that nothing in mental life truly expires; we preserve the
past in the mind and “in suitable circumstances (when, for instance, regression goes back far
enough) it can be once more brought to light” (p. 69). Much earlier, Freud (1900/1953)
remarked on the indestructibility of the contents of mental life, “they are only capable of
annihilation in the same sense as the ghosts in the underworld of the Odyssey—ghosts which
awoke to new life as soon as they tasted blood” (p. 553n.). Freud’s (1937/1964) thoughts on
reconstruction are also relevant. In comparison to the archaeologist, Freud writes, “the analyst
works under better conditions and has more material at his command to assist him, since what he
is dealing with is not something destroyed but something that is still alive” (p. 259).
Psychoanalysis as a whole, it seems, is predicated on the idea that we are destined to reproduce
past experiences throughout our lives, particularly those long lost to sight.
There is general agreement that the past endures in both conscious and unconscious
mental life. The continuity of the past is most evident in conscious remembering, or declarative
memory, whereby we reproduce the past in the mind (Loewald, 1971/1980). In this ordinary,
representational memory, the past remains distinguished from the present. But beyond this, we
recreate the past in less recognizable forms, such as in habitual, repetitive actions,
characterological moods, dreams, and by returning to earlier modes of thought and perception.
Here, there may be a sensation of familiarity born of repetition and revival, but without
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knowledge of the origins of this feeling (as in procedural knowledge or memory). Still, the
psychic past infuses the present, potentially expanding meaning and emotional depth.
A brief survey of some of Freud’s central formulations reveals a dynamic psychic past
that continually returns; rather than decay, the psychic past affects and pervades the present. For
example, conceptions of psychopathology and symptom formation (e.g., the return of the
repressed, deferred action, and regression) all portray the continued, though hidden, presence of
the psychic past. Recall, for example, Breuer and Freud’s (1893/1959) early formulation,
“hysterical patients suffer principally from reminiscences” (p. 29, italics in original), that is,
from the return of repressed, noxious memories and ideas. And on the role of regression in
symptom formation, Freud (1917/1963), comments,
If reality remains relentless … then [the libido] will finally be compelled to take the path
of regression and strive to find satisfaction either in one of the organizations which it has
already outgrown or from one of the objects which it has earlier abandoned. (p. 359)
Later, following World War I, Freud (1920/1955) would link regression to his speculative death
instinct in an effort to explain the repetition of painful experiences. In Schafer’s (1976) words,
this neurotic repetition expresses conflict “blindly and in infinite variety . . . [giving] emotional
life a static quality” (p. 44). The result is that nothing changes, Schafer continues, “the
analysand lives essentially out of time” (p. 45). Here, returns signal a loss of life and growth. In
the return of the repressed, libidinal regression, and neurotic repetition, returns tend to be
involuntary and unconscious. The individual experiences symptoms rather than conscious
memories, reexperiences without remembering, and repeats without recognizing that it is
repetition.
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Contemporary psychoanalytic theories, while a heterogeneous collection of distinct and
sometimes conflicting theoretical outlooks, perpetuate Freud’s emphasis on the preservation of
the past in the mind. In general, contemporary analytic theories (e.g., object relations theories,
relational theory, or control-mastery theory) have displaced Freud’s emphasis on drive discharge,
or stimulus reduction, with the establishment and maintenance of relationships, specifically,
object relationships (Eagle, 2011). In Mitchell’s (1988) language, “relationships with others, not
drives [are] the basic stuff of mental life” (p. 2).
Contemporary models tend to ascribe the etiological core of psychopathology to the
persistence of early modes of relating, an important aspect of which is attachment to old object
ties. These early modes of relating might have been adaptive at one point, in that they enabled
the individual to live through difficult circumstances, but they are maladaptive in later life
insofar as they interfere with enriching and gratifying relationships (i.e., new object ties). In
psychopathology, people largely experience later relationships in terms of early relationships,
primarily to caregivers, which were in some respects harmful and traumatic. That is,
psychopathology stems from excessive reliance on archaic modes of relating. The repetition of
outdated, stereotyped modes of relating is often (though far from always) unconscious, or
unformulated, despite being familiar.
In Eagle’s (2011) review of contemporary analytic theory, the persistence of earlier
modes of relating is a function of both learning (including procedural learning) and clinging to
early object ties. In learning, we form general representations of self and other through repeated,
prototypical interactions with primary objects; in turn, these representations inform our
experience of and expectations for subsequent relationships. This relational learning, or implicit
relational knowledge (Stern et al., 1998), has the added weight of emotional attachment. The
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persistent clinging to early object ties, according to Mitchell (1988), provides a sense of needed
“familiarity, safety, and connectedness” (p. 172). This general formulation of psychopathology
(i.e., learning and clinging) is evident in Fairbairn’s (1952) internalized objects and object
relations, Bowlby’s (1973) internal working models, Weiss’s (1993) unconscious pathogenic
beliefs, and Mitchell’s relational configurations, for example. To be clear, these concepts are not
identical, but do share the basic assumption that a significant aspect of psychopathology is due to
continued and inflexible reliance on earlier modes of relating, or ways of being.
Comparing Proustian and Psychoanalytic Views
Proust and psychoanalysis both display a retrospective impulse, specifically with respect
to the persistence of the past. At first glance, however, Proustian and psychoanalytic
perspectives on the return of the past appear to be at odds. For Proust, the secret paths that
enable isolated fragments of experience to return to life provide a happy reunion. In
psychoanalysis, such secret paths form the basis of psychopathology. The return of the
repressed, libidinal regression, and attachment to archaic object relations are the products of a
fragmented mind, not an integrated personality. Rieff (1979), for example, argues that “the past,
for [Freud], is condemned as permanency, burden, neurosis” (p. 187). This discrepancy between
Proust and psychoanalysis reflects their different vantage points. Unlike Proust, psychoanalytic
attention has tended to concentrate on the pathological nature of returns. Because
psychoanalysis inevitably deals with disturbing experiences (i.e., with clinical material) the
continuity of the past will acquire meaning and significance that is often unlike that of Proust’s.
Psychoanalytic emphasis on neurotic forms of regression and repetition is reasonable given that
analysts mainly developed their theories through treating patients.
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Still, conceptualizations of treatment reveal commonalities between Proust and
psychoanalysis. Consider that psychoanalytic treatment tends to rely on notions that depict
various returns (e.g., abreaction, transference, and reconstruction). These returns lead to greater
freedom and integration in the personality. To begin with, the fundamental rule or method of
free association is a practice that enables unwanted or hidden thoughts and memories to re-enter
conscious awareness, often with the aid of interpretation. The past also returns in the
transference, where the analysand’s hidden and forgotten impulses come to life and are
reexperienced in relation to the analyst. Optimally, the analyst helps the analysand recognize her
familiar experience as a reflection of the forgotten past, effectively transforming unconscious
repetition into conscious recollection and so, bringing greater unity to the analysand’s
personality. Freud’s (1912/1953) memorable remark on the transference conveys its significance
to analytic treatment, “it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigie” (p. 108). The
reference to destruction symbolizes freedom from a past that haunts and constricts the present.
Reconstructing or redescribing the analysand’s experience ultimately allows her to reexperience
and remember differently, that is, as informed by psychoanalytic understandings (Schafer, 1983,
p. 194). In psychoanalytic treatment, what was hidden finds the light of recognition. In time,
involuntary and unconscious returns are transformed into volitional and conscious actions,
including acts of re–collection.
In the end, we may be surprised to find a fair degree of commonality between Proust and
psychoanalysis. Both hope to reclaim the past, the former in search of paradise and unity, and
the latter in search of freedom and integration. Both seek to cure the malady of lost time, the
former through reexperiencing a living past in the present, and the latter through discovering the
unacknowledged past in the present. In either case, a felt link between present and past is
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restored, and a fragmented self is restored to a unitary being, more capable of true self
experiencing (Winnicott, 1965).
Discovering and describing the ways in which the past is kept alive and how it continues
to influence our present lives, particularly in terms of disrupting or interfering with our ability to
live well, has been a central theme in psychoanalysis from the beginning and continues to this
day. In many ways, to think psychologically is to think historically, to see the ways in which
“what was, is, and what is, was” (Schafer, 1983, p. 196); and even when we are (trying) not to
think psychologically, we seem unable to escape living historically. On the whole, it seems that
if one could garner a psychoanalytic perspective on psychological returns, namely repetition, it
would likely convey the following: involuntary (or disowned) and often unconscious repetition
of difficult aspects of the past plays a central role in the formation and continuation of
psychopathology; however, that very repetition may be put to use in a psychoanalytic treatment
that transforms blind repetition into meaningful communication and change. In a printed version
of a talk, “Waiting for Returns: Freud’s New Love,” Phillips (2006) writes, “the medium of the
so-called cure of psychoanalysis is the patient’s capacity for repetition” (p. 209). In this way,
repetition yields psychological growth.
The Search for Clarity and Common Ground
Multiple voices within psychoanalysis have described beneficial aspects of returns. In
addition to considering regression as a pathogenic agent, Freud thought regression was an aspect
of ordinary life, including dreaming and daydreaming, jokes, and creativity. Other examples
include the notion of regression in the service of the ego (Kris, 1952), repetition as re-creation
(Loewald, 1971/1980), benign regression (Balint, 1968), and regression to dependence (Bollas,
1987; Winnicott, 1955/1975). Although these formulations represent a range of theoretical
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perspectives, there is a common thread: All suggest that under the right conditions returns may
signal a (normal) process of mental growth and creativity.
Despite these important contributions, psychoanalysis has yet to adequately articulate an
explicit theory or model of generative returns, which would counterbalance historical emphasis
on those that are destructive. As it happens, we sometimes overlook similarities in novel
theoretical developments, particularly when they arise in isolation from one another and from
competing perspectives. This seems to be the case with respect to various contributions on the
generative potential of returns. It is possible that the continued dispersal of these contributions
has delayed full appreciation and systematic study of generative returns with respect to
psychoanalytic theories (Inderbitzin & Levy, 2000; Knafo, 2002). Furthermore, continuing to
subsume various returns under familiar terminology that have historically signified or
emphasized psychopathology (e.g., regression and repetition) seems to muddle rather than clarify
psychoanalytic theories; these concepts have perhaps been overloaded in this respect. A
preference for conceptual consistency (that is, constancy) can sometimes obscure subject matter
over time. One can imagine that well established connotations or definitions, like fixation
points, might exert a retrograde pull on these concepts. Hence, we may benefit by coining a few
new terms.
While there are reviews and studies on specific varieties of returns (e.g., Blum, 1994;
Loewald, 1971/1980, 1981), there have been no previous attempts to take stock of what
psychoanalytic theories have contributed to our understanding of returns in general, particularly
with respect to their generative potential. It seems valuable to gain further clarity on a topic that
cuts across so many typical distinctions (e.g., between psychopathology and health, old and new,
replication and creativity, et cetera). A thorough study on this complex area should yield
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important theoretical clarification, particularly on the place of returns in psychological growth
and well being. Moreover, common ground in an otherwise diverse theoretical milieu will
become more evident.
Two courses of action are useful at this point: first, to explore detailed experiences of
returns, and second, to examine psychological theories that are particularly relevant to returns.
With respect to the field of experience, a special category of returns (henceforth integrative
returns) will help illuminate their generative potential. Proust’s (1982a) involuntary memories,
described at the start of this introduction, exemplify these integrative returns; this type of
experience is particularly intriguing precisely because it provides a contrast to historical
emphasis on pathological returns. In the next chapter, several vignettes portray examples of
integrative returns, bringing greater clarity and life to our topic, without oversimplifying it.
After detailing the essential features of integrative returns, there follows a study and
interpretation of pertinent literature, including Freudian theories, British Object Relations
theories, as well as some contemporary American perspectives. This reappraisal involves two
basic undertakings: the interpretation and application of theory. Several familiar psychoanalytic
concepts and practices are reinterpreted as examples of generative returns. The application of
psychoanalytic theories, such as those of Klein and Bion, to the psychology of returning will
help to clarify and differentiate these phenomena. The complementary actions of exploring
experience, on the one hand, and literature on the other, supports a general classification of
generative and non-generative returns.
There is general uniformity in the progression of generative returns that various
psychoanalytic theories describe. That is, regardless of theoretical perspective, generative
returns follow a basic progression from an open, receptive frame of mind, to a period of
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involuntary retrieval and reimmersion in the original frame of mind and sensibility, to a third
reflective state, conducive to mental growth, creativity, and integration. Several psychoanalytic
ideas convey this progression in generative returns, including (but not limited to) early
formulations of catharsis, the transference, generative moods (Bollas, 1987), and historical sets
(Bollas, 1989). In the end, we have a more balanced articulation of returning in the
psychological sphere, one that can account for both generative and non-generative returns.
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Chapter 2: Integrative Returns
In this chapter, several vignettes illustrate a special category or type of returning, that is,
integrative returns. This category falls within the larger classification of generative returns.
Defining this subclass (i.e., integrative returns) will help elucidate the nature of generative
returns. The examples will both evoke some well-known psychoanalytic concepts and hint at
some contemporary ones. However, with very few exceptions, theoretical terms are absent here
as that will be the focus of later chapters. The term integrative highlights the meaning and
understanding that these returns convey; through them, we relive essential moments in time, feel
again the impact of emotions, desires, and ideas, but with the necessary reflective distance for
learning. They are integrative, unifying experiences. Thus, integrative returns are distinct from
those that are nonreflective, defensive, and degenerative. The latter are disintegrative.
After the vignettes, there follows an analysis and outline of the essential features of
integrative returns. To my knowledge, integrative returns have yet to be identified or
differentiated from others, such as regression or the repetition compulsion, in the psychoanalytic
literature; however, Bollas’s (1987, 1989, 1992) thinking on conservative objects, mnemic
objects, and historical sets comes very close. I apply Bollas’s (1992) categories of simple and
complex selves to the defining features of integrative returns to add further clarification.
To be clear, the examples are well defined and distinct, perhaps even dramatic, but this
does not mean that integrative returns must meet such criteria. Rather, intense experiences
merely seem to present the clearest picture of our subject. Thus, it is certainly likely that more
common, ordinary experiences will also be relevant. These vignettes will serve as a reference
point throughout this paper, and will help to clarify distinctions and similarities across theoretical
perspectives.

DISAPPEARANCE AND RETURN

18

Wild Strawberries
Ingmar Bergman’s classic film, Wild Strawberries (Ekelund & Bergman, 1957), is replete
with a variety of returns, too many in fact to review here, which are well suited for our purposes.
Importantly, the film and hopefully this vignette will provide opportunities to identify with the
kinds of experiences that fall under the category of integrative returns. This familiarity of
experience should provide a useful reference point during later theoretical chapters. To be sure,
the vignette is not intended to demonstrate the actuality of these experiences; if that were the
case, then a fictional character would be wholly misguided. Cognitive research on involuntary
memories suggests that they are common enough (Berntsen, 1996, 1998).
This vignette shows a general progression in integrative returns, from a state of
receptivity to vivid reexperiencing and then, to a reflective state that seems to facilitate
integration. Some plot summary is necessary before portraying the integrative return in order to
appreciate the progression of these experiences and how they may affect the person. On
occasion, I reference Erik Erikson’s (Erikson, Erikson, & Kivnick, 1986) analysis of the film to
support and develop my representation. Erikson used the film to teach the human life cycle in a
college course, “because of the totally convincing way in which it presents an old man’s
survey–in memories, fantasies, and dreams–of the stages and the places of his development”
(Erikson et al., 1986, p. 239). Overall, Erikson considers Bergman’s film as the story of an old
man in search of the transcendental meaning of his life. More specifically, it is about his
struggles to recognize and change his lack of vital involvement. One integrative return in
particular (to a wild strawberry patch) seems instrumental to his transformation, as Erikson’s
subtitle suggests, Revisitation and Reinvolvement.
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Background. Wild Strawberries (Ekelund & Bergman, 1957) is the story of an aging
man, Professor Isak Borg, who is deeply immersed in recollecting his past while en route to
receive an honorary degree from his alma mater. The award is a tribute to his 50-year career as a
physician. One might expect him to reminisce about his professional life on such an occasion,
but he is compelled to revisit past experiences of a more personal nature.
We are introduced to Dr. Isak Borg in the opening scene. He sits alone in his home
study, reflecting on his life and the preceding days. Writing at his desk, he explains that he has
withdrawn from his social life, which has left him rather lonely in his old age. Still, he has
worked hard, and has had a fulfilling professional career. He has one child, his son Evald, also a
doctor, who happens to live in Lund where he is to receive his honorary degree. His son has
been married for several years, but has no children. His mother, 96-years-old, is still alive and
vibrant. Dr. Borg’s wife has been dead for many years, but he is “lucky” to have a good
housekeeper, Agda. Finally, he introduces himself, a 78-year-old professor, Isak Borg, the only
surviving child of 10 brothers and sisters. One gets the impression of a solitary, proud man2,
who is unusually reflective about his feelings and relationships. Erikson et al. (1986) detect
self-isolation and a lack of involvement; yet, “something seems to have made him acutely
curious” (p. 241). Soon, he is narrating the events of the preceding day, beginning with the
uncanny dream that preceded his return to years past, with “a special sense of self-awareness” (p.
242).
A strange dream. In the dream, Isak is taking his regular morning walk, and is troubled
by a series of unusual happenings. The streets and buildings are empty. Isak appears befuddled
and disoriented. There is a large clock on the street, but as he gets closer, he finds that it has no
2

See Robert May’s (1981) book Sex and Fantasy for an enlightening and comprehensive study
of pride in male development as well as alternative patterns in female development.
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hands. He reaches for his pocket watch, but it too has no hands. The hot sun beats down on him,
and he places his hand on his forehead. Isak turns; he notices a man down the street and
approaches him. He places his hand on the man’s shoulder to get his attention, but is alarmed to
see that the man has no face; it is distorted, caved in. The man collapses on the street and
disappears in his clothes as dark fluid flows out. Next, with the clock bells ringing, a horse and
carriage come down the street in the direction of Isak. It is a hearse with no driver. The carriage
catches a wheel on a lamppost and repeatedly bangs into it, eventually losing the wheel. The
free wheel moves menacingly towards Isak, forcing him to move out of its path. The coffin
slides out onto the street, and the horses run off dragging the disabled carriage behind. Seeing an
arm exposed Isak approaches and peers into the coffin. He finds a corpse that appears to be his
double, which startles him. The corpse reaches out, grabs a hold of Isak’s arm, and he awakens.
The dream’s manifest content and, in particular, the overall mood portray Isak’s deep
distress over his isolation, loss, and mortality. Isak is portrayed as feeling lost, directionless, and
confused. His attempts to orient himself are frustrated: he locates a clock with no hands and a
man with no face. The carriage has no driver. Isak’s confusion and helplessness turns to fear
and terror as he comes face-to-face with death: A man with no face (no identity) collapses on the
street and vanishes in his clothes; a corpse resembling Isak eerily comes to life and reaches to
pull him into the coffin. The dream depicts a confused and strange arena. There seems to be no
order or direction. Even categories of life and death are variable.
A change in plans. The following morning, Isak decides that rather than flying to Lund
to receive his award as planned, he will drive. This deeply irritates Agda, his housekeeper, and
they argue like an old married couple, prompting Isak to say, “We are not married.” For this,
Agda thanks her god. Soon, however, she submits and offers to help him pack. Isak warms, and
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resolves to make it up to her with a present. At breakfast, a beautiful woman enters, Marianne,
the wife of Isak’s son Evald. She has been staying with Isak due to some marital discord, of
which we have learned nothing. Marianne asks if she may accompany Isak to Lund to return
home to Evald, and he agrees.
In the following scene, Isak and Marianne are in the car. Here, we learn something of his
character. Marianne goes to light a cigarette, but Isak asks her not to smoke, saying there should
be a law against women smoking. He speaks highly of cigars, a vice suitable for men only.
Marianne recounts, “and what vice may women have?” “Weeping, giving birth, and speaking ill
of her neighbors,” Isak replies. One begins to get a sense of his insensitivity and rigidity. Soon
they are discussing Evald’s financial debt to his father. Isak feels it is a matter of principle that
Evald pay him back in full, and is sure that Evald respects their agreement. Marianne rejoins
that Isak is “filthy rich” and does not need the money. Her resentment breaks free as she informs
Isak that while his son shares his principles, “he also hates [him].” Once more, Isak is startled.
Soon after, Isak wants to know what Marianne has against him. She does not hold back,
coolly stating that he is “selfish, utterly ruthless, and [that he] never listens to anyone,” all the
while hiding it beneath his “old world manners and charm.” She reminds him that when she
approached him a month ago for help regarding her marriage, he said, “don’t draw me into your
marital squabbles, I don’t give a damn; I have no respect for mental suffering, so don’t come
lamenting to me.” In addition to being withdrawn and isolated, Isak can be harsh and scornful,
particularly of others’ feelings, for which he seems to have no patience. Yet, one also has the
sense that Isak is newly receptive and accessible. He tells Marianne that he liked having her at
the house and says she is a “fine woman.” Isak seems to make a reparative gesture, perhaps
indicating that he is approaching a more reflective state. He gingerly informs Marianne that he
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had a dream last night. But, she treats him with the same indifference that he had afforded her,
saying she has no interest in dreams.
A daydream. Isak veers off the main route; he wants to show Marianne something.
They park the car and wander down an overgrown pathway. It is the summerhouse of Isak’s
childhood. Marianne leaves him to take a swim at the lake. Nostalgic, Isak settles at a familiar
wild strawberry patch. He sits down to eat the berries, “as if they contained some consciousnessexpanding essence” (Erikson et al., 1986, p. 247). “Perhaps I got a little sentimental . . . a little
tired . . . a bit sad,” says Isak, as he begins to let his mind wander. He does not know how it
happened, “the day’s clear reality dissolved into the even clearer images of memory . . . with the
strength of a true stream of events” (Ekelund & Bergman, 1957). Erikson et al. describe it thus,
“the real scene and dreamlike images now begin to fuse” (p. 247).
In his reverie, Isak sees Sara, the lighthearted, blond sweetheart of his youth, picking wild
strawberries for her Uncle Aron’s birthday present. He tries speaking to her, admitting that he is
now quite old, but then, to Isak’s disappointment, his brother Sigfrid appears, wooing his Sara.
She tries to resist him, saying that she and Isak, the nicest of the brothers, are secretly engaged;
Sigfrid is not deterred. They kiss, and her basket of strawberries falls to the ground. Sara
regains her composure and collapses to the ground, leaving her apron stained red with
strawberries. She asks fearfully, what will Isak, the one who “really loves [her]” say?
A gong rings signaling brunch. But little Isak and his father are out fishing, and will not
be present. The Isak of today enters the house, witnessing the brunch, deeply entranced. The
aunt scolds each of the children in turn, for having dirty hands, neglecting chores, and so on.
Then, the twins deviously ask, “What were Sara and Sigfrid doing in the wild strawberry patch?”
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They shout, “We saw you! We saw you!” Brought to tears, Sara leaves at once, exclaiming they
are “liars.”
In the stairwell, (with our present-day Isak observing) Sara confides in her female cousin,
close in age. “Isak is so fine and good, so moral and sensitive,” she explains, “he wants to read
poetry, talk of the next life, play four-handed piano, and only kisses in the dark.” Yet, “He’s on
such a terribly high level,” and this leaves Sara feeling beneath him. Our Isak looks on, admiring
Sara with affection. As he relives his love for her, he also touches upon his loss. Soon he is
overwhelmed with feelings of emptiness and sadness. He is awakened from his reverie only to
meet a present-day Sara, much like the one of old, who along with her two suitors, will
accompany Isak and Marianne to Lund.
Discussion. Isak’s reverie evokes vivid memories, images, fantasies, and feelings from
years long past. Erikson et al. (1986) write, “Isak obviously made himself relive events typical
for his crisis of intimacy (versus isolation)” (p. 247). We later learn that his brother Sigfrid will
marry Sara; they have six children. Isak loses his first love and it seems more, likely
contributing to his lack of vital involvement. As Isak peers into his past, he reexperiences the
full emotional impact of formative events. It is not a replication of the past, but a “new old
world” (Erikson et al., 1986, p. 248). Isak is able to expand on his prior experience, which
assumes greater meaning in the context of his extended life. Hence, his psychic past evolves and
changes as it marinates in his psychic present. As he feels the reverberations of his psychic past,
he is reunited with aspects of himself long since departed. Isak was sensitive, romantic,
sentimental, and even read poetry and spoke of the next life. This is not at all like our present
Isak, who we have learned is uncompromising, cold, and determined.
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Following the dream, Isak appears to be in a more receptive frame of mind. In the car,
Marianne presented Isak with a bold, pointed account of his character, one that appeared to
startle him. Yet he did not deny it, but instead seemed to want to change her opinion, offering
her compliments, such as that he liked having her at his home. In his daydream, he is able to
hear the testimony of Sara, who portrays him in a more positive light, though he is “too high.” It
seems that when he lost Sara to his brother, he disowned or alienated rather large categories of
his subjective life or self experience–those more sentimental, intimate, affectionate, and
forgiving.
To review, just prior to his award ceremony, Dr. Borg has a frightening dream that
reveals his deep distress over his isolation and mortality. The dream seems to instill some doubt
and confusion in Isak, altering his usual frame of mind. He is unusually receptive to being
guided by his feelings rather than his intellect, as for example, when he decides on a whim to
drive to Lund rather than fly as planned and to pull off the main route to visit his former
summerhouse. By returning to a place of origin and being open to receive years long past
through remembering, feeling, and imagining, he makes renewed contact with parts of himself
that were lost. Here and later in the film, we observe Isak “mourning for an abandoned part of
his identity” (Erikson et al., 1986, p. 252). This integrative return is set in motion by the sight,
touch, and taste of wild strawberries. As Isak and his company continue on to Lund, he expands
on these experiences and allows them to evolve in ways that bring greater unity to his
personality. For example, he has several dreams that help him better recognize “the distant
rigidity of which Marianne accused him” (Erikson et al., 1986, p. 256). Isak admits that through
the dreams, he seems to be saying something to himself that he does not want to hear; but Isak is
able to hear these things. Through revisiting the self in past relationships, Isak gains insight
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about himself and his current relationships, allowing him to get involved in his life in new ways;
he is more tender and affectionate. In essence, we observe in Isak “a tempering of Pride with
Caring” (May, 1981, p. 147). This development in men represents a resolution to challenges
usually associated with mid-life, such as confrontation with one’s mortality and other personal
limitations (May, 1981). Of course, Isak is dealing with just this, despite being well into the
second half of life.
The next vignette will help to clarify the nature of integrative returns by further
differentiating them from typical autobiographical memories. In particular, it is not so much the
memories per se, but the accompanying recovered emotional states that typify integrative returns.
Proustian Memory
Proust’s (1982a, 1982b) Remembrance of Things Past (alternatively translated, In Search
of Lost Time) is a seven volume novel that is at once autobiographical, philosophical, and
psychological. I will not, by any means, be offering an analysis of Proust’s work, which is
obviously beyond the scope of this paper and likely, my capability. Instead, Proust’s lucid and
imaginative descriptions of involuntary memories serve to further illustrate integrative returns.
Background. The overture of the first volume, Swann’s Way (Proust, 1982a), culminates
with the madeleine episode: the narrator Marcel’s childhood memories of Combray3–impervious
to conscious and willful efforts of retrieval–are dramatically revived by the taste of a madeleine
cake soaked in tea. The overture begins with Marcel’s account of his difficulties falling asleep,
and soon he is discussing dreams, memory, and time. He recalls his strong desire for a
goodnight kiss from his mother, for her to stay in his room throughout the night, and his great
difficulty settling down for rest without the comfort of her kiss.

3

Combray is the fictitious name given to the village of Marcel’s youth.
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Later, Marcel reveals his inability to recall much of Combray despite his great efforts.
His attempts at voluntary memory, “an exercise of the will” (Proust, 1982a, p. 53), bring little
satisfaction. “The pictures which that kind of memory shows us of the past preserve nothing of
the past itself,” Proust (1982a) explains, “to me it was in reality all dead” (p. 53). This is an
important observation for Proust, that is, the static, dead quality of voluntary memory.
The madeleine episode is preceded by Proust’s (1982a) appreciation of a Celtic belief:
“the souls of whom we have lost are held captive in some inferior being, in an animal … plant …
[or] some inanimate object” (p. 54). These souls are imprisoned until by chance, “we happen to
pass by the tree or to obtain possession of the object … they call us by our name, and as soon as
we have recognized their voice the spell is broken” (Proust, 1982a, p. 54). Recognition frees
them from the prison of neglect and invisibility, and allows them to return to life. Marcel
suggests that this is also the case with respect to our past experiences. Our active, conscious
attempts to recapture the past prove futile:
The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach of intellect, in some
material object (in the sensation which that material object will give us) which we do not
suspect … it depends on chance whether we come upon it. (Proust, 1982a, p. 54)
In some sense, Dr. Isak Borg’s past was hidden (and preserved) in the wild strawberry patch, in
the sight and taste of the berries (Ekelund & Bergman, 1957).
Madeleine episode. Many years pass during which Marcel recalls nothing about
Combray apart from the drama of going to bed, mentioned above. While visiting his mother one
cold winter day, she offers tea to warm him. He declines at first, as he does not ordinarily drink
tea. Then, for no clear reason, he changes his mind. Marcel takes a spoonful of tea soaked with
the cake:
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No sooner had the warm liquid and the crumbs with it, touched my palate than a shudder
ran through my whole body, and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary changes that
were taking place. An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, but individual,
detached, with no suggestion of its origin. And at once the vicissitudes of life had
become indifferent to me, it disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory–this new sensation
having had on me the effect which love has of filling me with a special essence; or rather
this essence was not in me, it was myself … I was conscious that it was connected with
the taste of tea and cake … Whence did it come? What did it signify? How could I seize
upon and define it? (Proust, 1982a, pp. 54-55, italics in original)
Intent to recapture this experience, Marcel drinks a second and third mouthful, but to no
avail. He resolves to search his mind for what the tea has invoked in him, “this unremembered
state” (Proust, 1982a, p. 55). This “unremembered state” refers to the memories that Marcel
presumes are connected to the “special essence” that the madeleine cake has evoked. He works
to make it reappear, clearing his mind of all distractions, but the source of this sensation, this
special essence, eludes him. Unsuccessful, he grows fatigued and allows his mind to wander and
“think of other things” (Proust, 1982a, p. 56). Once more, he meditates on the taste of that first
mouthful, “I feel something starting within me, something that leaves its resting-place and
attempts to rise” (Proust, 1982a, p. 56). Again, his conscious efforts are fruitless. Marcel tires,
My natural laziness … has urged me to leave the thing alone, to drink my tea and to think
merely of the worries of today and of hopes for tomorrow, which let themselves be
pondered over without effort or distress of mind. (Proust, 1982a, p. 57)
And from this relaxed and receptive state, the memory suddenly returns.
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The taste was that of the little crumb of madeleine which on Sunday mornings at
Combray (because on those mornings I did not go out before church-time), when I went
to say good day to her in her bedroom, my aunt Leonie used to give me, dipping it first in
her own cup of real or of lime-flower tea. (Proust, 1982a, p. 57)
Marcel is astonished as images of Combray blossom into vivid recollection: “the whole
of Combray and its surroundings, taking their proper shapes and growing solid, sprang into
being, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea” (Proust, 1982a, p. 58). All that his conscious
efforts could not recapture was revived by that distinct and familiar taste. Like the Celtic souls
held captive in objects awaiting recognition for their release, involuntary memories lie hidden,
resistant to voluntary attempts at recollection; they come to life by secret paths, the familiar
sensations afforded by chance encounters. These familiar sensations evoke memories that are
vibrant, fresh, and emotionally vivid, as though no time had passed; such qualities distinguish
them from memories we consciously, or intentionally, choose. Involuntary memories allow for a
recognition that goes beyond the familiar sensation, to that of a “special essence.”
Inspiration. Proust (1982b) elaborates numerous examples of involuntary memories
throughout the novel, and it is through recording these particular memories that lost time is
recaptured. Yet, it is not until the final volume, Time Regained, that Marcel shares the
inspiration for his life’s work. Following a long absence from Paris, Marcel is absorbed in
contemplating his “lack of talent for literature” (Proust, 1982b, p. 886), all despite his best
efforts. Upon his return, he finds an invitation to an afternoon party with music at the house of
Prince de Guermantes. Marcel decides to attend. The name Guermantes (Marcel’s longtime
friends) reminds him of his childhood at Combray and arouses, “a longing to go to the
Guermantes party as if in going there I must have been brought nearer to my childhood and to
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the depths of my memory” (Proust, 1982b, p. 888). Still, Marcel was convinced of his lack of
skill for description and was utterly without enthusiasm, his first criteria of literary talent.
Disheartened, he resigns himself to the “frivolous pleasure” (Proust, 1982b, p. 897) of attending
an afternoon party with old friends.
By chance, Marcel finds that not all is lost. As he approaches the Guermantes mansion,
he fails to see a car coming towards him. The driver shouts, and as Marcel retreats, he stumbles
on the uneven paving stones. Marcel recovers his balance, stepping on a slightly lower
neighboring stone:
Just as, at the moment when I tasted the madeleine, all anxiety about the future, all
intellectual doubts had disappeared … the difficulties which had seemed insoluble a
moment ago had lost all importance. The happiness which I had just felt was
unquestionably the same as that which I had felt when I tasted the madeleine soaked in
tea. (Proust, 1982b, p. 899)
The sensation of moving about uneven paving stones brings forth memories of Venice
accompanied by joy. He recalls standing on uneven stones at St Mark’s and these impressions
are suddenly linked to countless others experienced at that time. Marcel is determined to
understand this experience, which like the madeleine episode both evokes vibrant memories and
a distinct happiness that seems to make even death a matter of indifference.
Soon after, Marcel enters the Guermantes mansion. He hears a spoon rattle against a
plate, and a second involuntary memory is brought to life, “again that same species of happiness
which had come to me from the uneven paving-stones poured into me” (Proust, 1982b, p. 900).
Marcel describes the sensations as “heat combined with a whiff of smoke and relieved by the
cool smell of a forest background” (p. 900). The sound of clanging dishes remind him of the
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reverberations coming from a railway worker’s hammer, clanging against the wheel of a train
that he had traveled in. The sensations evoke images of the forest he observed as the train was
repaired, but which had failed to move him. Moments later, a server brings Marcel some
refreshments. He wipes his face with a napkin, “a new vision of azure passed before my eyes …
so strong was this impression that the moment to which I was transported seemed to me to be the
present moment” (p. 901). Vivid, sensory memories of Balbec come to mind, causing him to
swell with happiness.
Discussion. Like Isak, Proust (1982a, 1982b) had to be in a receptive state of mind
before he could experience the integrative returns that were so meaningful to him. Involuntary
memories are somehow incompatible with conscious intent or acts of will. They arrive
unbidden, without choice or effort.
The sensation of uneven paving stones, a metallic sound, the stiffness of the napkin, the
taste of a madeleine cake soaked in tea, bring forth special memories, real impressions that were
not at all like Marcel’s conscious, or intentional, memories. His involuntary memories could
induce a feeling of renewal and joy, whereas their voluntary counterparts seemed to preserve
nothing of life or feeling. Real impressions, as Proust (1982b) called them, are experienced both
in the present moment and in the context of a distant moment; “they had in them something that
was common to a day long past and to the present, because in some way they were
extra–temporal” (p. 904). With the psychic past somehow inhabiting the present moment,
culminating in an experience outside time, Proust experienced himself an “extra-temporal being
… unalarmed by the vicissitudes of the future” (p. 904). For Proust, these resurrections revealed
the essence of things through vivid recollection. The involuntary nature of these vibrant
impressions, led Proust to consider them as authentic imprints or isolated fragments of reality
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that were freed from the order of time. To transform these sense impressions into thought, their
psychic equivalent, he would have to create a work of art. Proust concludes that an artwork is
the only way to recapture lost time, and his experiences of time regained would become the
material for his work of literature.
Presently, it should be evident that both involuntary memories and recovered emotional
states are defining features of integrative returns. In fact, it seems that an emotional state cannot
be remembered without also being reexperienced qua emotional state. It is a reimmersion in the
original frame of mind and sensibility, with all the senses of vulnerability, desire, and feeling that
accompanied them the first time. Hence, any effective or adequate representation of deeply felt
emotion must evoke said emotion. Of course, reimmersion comes in degrees. At the deepest
level one momentarily forgets that one is not actually in the original experience; this is more of a
visceral reliving, or return. At the surface, there is little to no detectable reimmersion in the
original frame of mind and sensibility. Instead, one has a cognitive representation and account
of a past event, with little to no accompanying affect.
The Artist
A freshman college student, Miss A, is an art major at a competitive school in the
Northeast. She is suffering greatly from social anxiety and depression, and is just coming to
grips with a recent separation from her boyfriend of about 4 years. In addition, Miss A misses
her parents greatly, and is beginning to acknowledge their marital problems. To say the least, it
has been a challenging transition to college. In her studio art class, she is working on a painting
with autobiographical themes. Miss A first sketches out the basic shapes and figures, including
scenery from her birthplace (e.g., several tall buildings), an image of her having sex during her
adolescence, and finally, an image of her being embraced by a larger, motherly figure, perhaps
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an archetype of sorts. There are no family members in this painting. Ready for the next phase of
this work, Miss A begins mixing paints. She has acquired a strong affinity for deep reds, such as
alizarin crimson and cadmium red. The shade of red is not yet right, and so, Miss A adds a blot
of white paint. The texture of the paints and the arrangement of red and white pigments
mesmerize Miss A, and she has a transformative recollection: Miss A is at her parents’ home,
16-years-old, and sitting alone in the bathroom. She is suffering greatly with stomach cramps,
and has been bleeding from her vagina for about 30 minutes. There are small clumps of blood in
her fingers; she inspects what looks like a white bean amidst the red fluid and substance. She is
frightened and in a state of disbelief. She tells no one of what she has found, or of her
experience.
When Miss A finds herself, once more, in art class, she fears others have noticed her lack
of presence. There is no evidence of this, however. The disbelief and shock from her past
transfers to her present experience. She is stunned that she has lived without her memory for
several years; however, Miss A does not doubt the veracity of her memory. She believes that she
had a miscarriage (although, we cannot be sure of this). Miss A has no conscious feeling of loss
or sadness connected to her presumed miscarriage–it was what she had anxiously wished for.
She feels ashamed and frightened, and chooses not to inform her family or anyone else of her
experience, at least not in words.
Miss A’s finished painting clearly represents her pain in layers of deep reds and browns,
and with little mental effort, an observer cannot help but be struck by Miss A’s portrayal of her
frightening experience. Miss A depicts herself as passive (underneath) during sexual intercourse.
In the following sequence (to the right), Miss A represents herself as actively inducing a
miscarriage by clawing at her abdomen, blood flowing down her body and legs, while being
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embraced by a larger, warm, female figure. The move from passivity to activity perhaps is
representative of Miss A’s efforts to master what had been an overwhelming experience. When
asked, Miss A replies that she had not thought of her artwork in these terms, but she believes it is
true. The motherly figure embraces Miss A as she desperately claws at her abdomen. To Miss
A, the mother’s presence is oppressive. Still, the motherly figure may also represent a
disavowed wish for a good-enough mother; we might consider that the mother’s embrace helps
to contain Miss A’s experience, allowing for better integration. The image of Miss A clawing at
her abdomen portrays the wish to miscarry as well as intense self-loathing and regret. Miss A’s
action is both a rejection of motherhood and a display of her refusal to sacrifice her budding
autonomy. Although Miss A is averse to discussing her miscarriage, she makes little effort to
disguise her artistic representation of the event.
In this example, Miss A’s present activity (the production of an artwork) enabled her to
regain a meaningful piece of her history in the form of a transformative, involuntary memory
(i.e., an integrative return). It is transformative in the sense that she relives the original frame of
mind and sensibility that she experienced the first time. In the present context, it becomes more
than pure repetition. The artwork itself is representative of her making use of her experience,
both as a form of communication and to further integrate her experience. This seems to allow
her to achieve some degree of mastery over her experience, allowing for a more expansive future
and less dependence on repression.
Miss A did not consciously go searching for this memory when she began her painting.
Rather, she followed her intuition when selecting the subject matter and paints. While the
particular circumstances that brought about Miss A’s integrative return are not evident, it seems
that her choice of subject matter, life events, and pigments were integral to this revival. When
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she saw the small white blot of paint mixed in with the red, all of the corresponding elements
coalesced to incite a transformative memory.
To summarize, Miss A had an involuntary memory of what she believes was a
miscarriage, which she had repressed for several years. She regained more than mental images;
she also experienced a return of feeling and sensation. Her experience was one of returning to,
or reexperiencing an earlier, original frame of mind and sensibility that she had put at a distance.
This prior self state reemerged, replete with feelings, sensations, thoughts, wishes and fears, and
images. The movement was back to something true4 and personally meaningful. One final note
seems worthwhile. As a college freshman, Miss A is in a transitional phase of her life. She is
unsettled, and in the midst of moving from late adolescence to emerging adulthood. Moreover,
she is an isolated young adult, who just lost a highly important and stabilizing romantic
relationship. It is possible that being in a state of transition or separation will make one more
susceptible to returns. Recall that Isak had an unsettling dream about mortality and isolation,
and that Marcel was deeply troubled by his inability to recall Combray.
Choosing an Object
In Being a Character, Bollas (1992) narrates a personal story that has parallels with the
previous vignettes. In particular, he discusses his choice to study Moby Dick for his Ph.D. thesis;
“by choosing Melville’s book I selected an object that allowed me to be dreamed by it, to
elaborate myself through the many experiences of reading it” (Bollas, 1992, p. 57). Bollas writes
that the selection was an intuitive choice based on unconscious knowledge that it would “bring
something of [him] into expression” (p. 57). The book was associated with two upsetting
experiences that Bollas had as a boy, both of which were lost to him. At the age of 11, while

4

It was true in the subjective sense, not necessarily in any historical, objective sense.
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swimming far off shore at his favorite cove, he saw “what initially looked like a large reef . . . it
was a whale and it passed by me so closely that although it did not touch me I could still feel it”
(Bollas, 1992, p. 57). And before that, when just 9-years-old, he rides “over a wave to collide
with the bloated body of a woman who must have been dead at sea for some time” (Bollas, 1992,
p. 57). These memories, linked in his unconscious, resurfaced after writing his dissertation.
Bollas concludes, “I selected an object that I could use to engage in deep unconscious work, an
effort that enabled me to experience and articulate something of my self” (p. 58).
Bollas’s experience has several features in common with the experiences of Isak, Marcel,
and Miss A. Each had involuntary memories and moved back to self experiencing that was true
and personally meaningful. Furthermore, none of them went consciously searching for such
experiences or memories, but instead seemed to follow their intuition. The specific objects they
encountered and selected seemed to enable them to regain meaningful pieces of their respective
histories, which they could then make psychological use of.
Essential Characteristics of Integrative Returns
The above vignettes provide a starting point for identifying the essential features of
integrative returns. These include: relaxed frame of mind; autobiographical memories with
reimmersion in the original mood or feeling states; features common to present and past; a
sensation of familiarity or recognition; the feeling that the experience arrived spontaneously or
without choice, that is, involuntarily; self observation and reflection; and learning or making use
of such experience. These features represent interacting phases of receptivity, reimmersion, and
reflection.
Relaxed frame of mind. The presence of a relaxed frame of mind is most evident in the
integrative returns of Isak and Marcel. Recall that as Isak sat down at the wild strawberry patch
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he began to let his mind wander, perhaps owing to a feeling of drowsiness. Marcel (Proust,
1982a) eventually lets his mind drift aimlessly without effort or distress. One can imagine that
Miss A too had entered a free-floating meditative state, as she prepared and mixed her paints.
Finally, Bollas’s (1992) description of being dreamed by Melville’s Moby Dick through many
readings intimates a relaxed, receptive frame of mind as well.
Memory with reimmersion in mood and feeling. A particular form of memory is
noticeable in integrative returns. These memories are vivid, unusually clear, and convey a
sensory quality. For example, Erikson et al. (1986) describe Isak’s half-waking fantasies as
“exceptionally vivid in every sensory detail” (p. 268). Freud (1937/1964) described some of his
patient’s memories in a similar fashion as “ultra-clear” (p. 266). Miss A’s memories have a
transformative quality, in the sense that the accompanying feelings and sensations (i.e., self state)
generate a change in her time sense; specifically, she is reimmersed in a prior state of being,
feeling, and thinking. What seems essential here is the revival of an earlier form of self
experiencing, a reimmersion in the original frame of mind and sensibility. Repression seems to
be a major factor; however, it is not a necessary feature of integrative returns. These returns may
include revived feelings and vivid memories that have not been repressed, per se, even if it has
been a long time since they have been recalled. Dr. Isak Borg’s reverie seems to be a case in
point (Ekelund & Bergman, 1957). Still, the arrival of familiar moods and feelings are likely
associated with involuntary memories that have yet to be fully represented or formulated.
Memory, mood, and feeling are essential, seemingly interdependent features of integrative
returns.
Features common to present and past. Integrative returns include specific features that
are common to both present and past situations. Isak, for example, settles at a familiar
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strawberry patch and eats berries containing “some consciousness-expanding essence” (Erikson
et al., 1986, p. 247). Marcel tastes the Madeleine cake soaked in tea; Miss A observes a blot of
white paint in a mass of red pigment and feels the fluid consistency. The common features
provide a felt link between present and past that evokes a spontaneous revival.
Sensation of familiarity. A sensation of familiarity accompanies the revived memories,
moods, and feelings. The sense that “I have been in this position before” persists throughout
integrative returns. The sensation of familiarity is also evident in the experience of déjà vu.
However, in the vignettes, returns are unlike déjà vu experiences in that each person is able to
recollect the source of the familiarity (i.e., the original experience). They experience a revival
along with knowledge about the source of the return and opportunity for further learning.5
Spontaneous feeling. It seems that returns arise in a spontaneous or unexpected fashion.
To be sure, this is a phenomenological description, and thus does not speak to the absence of
possible unconscious determinants. In retrospect, one may connect the return to present
circumstances or perhaps see evidence of intuition, but this occurs after the fact. For example,
recall that Bollas (1992) considered his choice of Moby Dick to be largely intuitive in retrospect.
The subjective experience is one of passive, or choiceless, reception.
Self-observation. There is certainly a strong experiential component to integrative
returns, including, for example, heightened imagination and self experiencing. Yet, there is also
a degree of self-observation and reflection. It is not that one simply delves into experiencing.
There is also space for reflection, elaboration, and curiosity. Hence, it is receptivity and

5

Freud (1919/1955) provides an interesting account of how the return of something that was to
remain secret and hidden–though in some sense still familiar and recognizable–creates an
uncanny feeling.
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reexperiencing along with enough psychological distance for higher levels of organization to
remain intact.
Learning or making use of returns. As stated, integrative returns appear to arrive
spontaneously or by chance. In a sense, the experiencer may feel herself to be in a passive,
receptive position. This is temporary, however, as the experiencer is also intent on making some
sense out of the return. Perhaps owing to the sensation of familiarity and the capacity for self
observation and reflection, integrative returns invite further learning and processing; they allow
the individual a rich self experience that she may then make use of. For example, Miss A’s
return allowed her to communicate her frightening experience and generate meaning through an
artwork; Bollas’s (1992) intuitive choice of Moby Dick brought something of himself into
expression and allowed him to “engage in deep unconscious work” (p. 58). Proust (1982a,
1982b) memorialized his involuntary memories in his literary works.
Simple and Complex Selves
The essential features of integrative returns may be clarified further by Bollas’s (1992)
concepts of the simple self and the complex self as well as his stages in the “dialectics of self
experiencing” (p. 31). Bollas’s simple self refers to that part of us that is immersed in
experience. As examples, Bollas points to the experiences of falling in love and getting lost in
conversation; one could add many sorts of play to the list. The simple self is linked to Bollas’s
notion of the true self6 in that this deep experiencing is informed by one’s personal idiom. Bollas
considers this area of experiencing in terms of Winnicott’s third area, or the intermediate area,
located between inner reality and external, actual reality. This is the space where one’s
subjective reality and the object world meet, or come together, in play, imagination, and

6

Bollas (1987, 1989) has expanded on Winnicott’s True Self concept.
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creativity. In contrast to the simple experiencing self, the complex self is reflective; its aim is to
“objectify as best as possible where one has been or what is meant by one’s actions” (Bollas,
1992, p. 15). The simple and complex selves oscillate and, “enable the person to process life
according to different yet interdependent modes of engagement: one immersive, the other
reflective” (Bollas, 1992, p. 15).
The essential features of integrative returns may be organized according to the simple self
and complex self. The simple self is more prominent for the following: the relaxed frame of
mind; memories with reimmersion in the original mood or feeling states; features common to
present and past; the sensation of familiarity and recognition; and the feeling that the experience
arrived spontaneously or without warning. The complex self occupies the area of self
observation, learning from experience, and / or making use of such experience.
Bollas (1992) identifies four stages in what he calls, “the dialectics of self experiencing”
(p. 31): (a) The use of an object, (b) being played by the object, (c) being lost in self
experiencing, and (d) observing self as object. As an example, consider Miss A’s experience:
she selects a medium, paints, subject matter (object choice); she is affected by such object
choices (is played on); subsequently she is lost in a transformative memory or return (lost in self
experiencing); and finally, she emerges from such experience and reflects on where she has been
(observes self as an object). According to Bollas, the simple self occupies the third stage, that of
being lost in self experiencing, and the complex self the final stage, observing the self as an
object.
At this point, the following formula appears to capture integrative returns: Through
encounters with various objects in the objective present, we involuntarily retrieve related,
meaningful experiences from the psychic past, thereby allowing us to reconnect with or return to
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reflection.7

7

This formula is similar to Freud’s (1908/2003) formulations on creativity, which I discuss
below.
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Section II

Reappraisal of Returns in Psychoanalytic Thought
In the preceding chapter, we identified a special type of returning, integrative returns,
which falls within a broader classification of generative returns. Thus, all integrative returns are
generative, by definition, but the same cannot be said for the reverse. For example, we will see
that there are generative returns that do not include the essential features of integrative returns.
In this section, we will explore a diverse range of psychoanalytic perspectives that are relevant to
psychological returns. These include, for example, Freudian theories, British object relations
theories, and some American perspectives as well. Some of these theories may strike the reader
as outdated. While true, it does not follow that the ideas are thus without value to us now. For
example, Ogden (1986) argues that returning to earlier, pivotal moments of the psychoanalytic
dialogue, not to replicate the thinking of past analysts but to generate new understandings, is
integral to the growth of psychoanalytic thought. Ogden notes that, “each act of interpretation
preserves the original (experience and idea) while simultaneously generating new meanings” (p.
3). Creative dialogue with our ancestors can safeguard us from the superficiality and repetition
that results from intellectual and cultural isolation as well as enliven contemporary
conversations.
Psychoanalytic theories have attended to the various ways in which the enduring psychic
past returns and informs the present. A reappraisal of these theories will enable us to view
returns from multiple perspectives and different angles. We will see that some familiar
psychoanalytic concepts and practices are interpretable as instances of generative returns.
Moreover, the application of these theories to returns will help to clarify and differentiate
generative and non-generative returns.
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Chapter 3: A Return To Origins
Freud’s Early Trauma Theory
This section traces some early developments in Freud’s thinking on the etiology and
treatment of psychopathology to clarify important returns that Freud conceptualized in his
theorizing, such as the return of the repressed. In more general terms, we will consider the
interaction of past and present, primarily within the bounds of psychological time. In this realm,
we are less constricted by the arrow of time, that is, by the order of events as they unfold in real
time or objective reality. Thus, the ‘psychic past’ may be active in present experience, and the
‘psychic present’ may influence or activate the psychic past.8
In collaboration with Breuer, Freud (1893/1959) put forth the notion that “hysterical
patients suffer principally from reminiscences” (p. 29, italics in original). In other words, they
traced the cause of hysterical symptoms to the return of the repressed, namely, to disavowed
memories of early psychical trauma. To be sure, these returns are not conscious memories of
traumatic experiences, but rather, unconscious memory traces that have been reactivated by some
recent event.9 While under the influence of hypnosis, patients recount these otherwise hidden
memories with “wonderful freshness … full affective tone … [and] hallucinatory vividness”
(Breuer & Freud, 1893/1959, pp. 30-31).
From the beginning Breuer and Freud (1893/1959) define trauma as “psychic” rather than
external. They propose that the determining quality in a psychic trauma is the affect of fright:
“Any experience which rouses the distressing affects of fright, apprehension, shame, or psychical
pain can have this effect” (p. 27). These early “exciting experiences” (or traumas) continue to be

8

Loewald (1962/1980) used these terms (psychic past and psychic present) in his paper,
Superego and time.
9
This is explored further below under the heading, Deferred Action.
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active years later: “The psychical trauma, or the memory of it, acts as a kind of foreign body
constituting an effective agent in the present even long after it first penetrated” (p. 28).
One question that arises from this formulation is how these distressing, traumatic
experiences persist and remain active with such intensity. According to Breuer and Freud
(1893/1959), a psychic trauma interrupts the normal reactions that allow memory and affect to
fade. This normal reaction includes two processes: first, a direct discharge of feeling equal to the
intensity of the event, and second, associative absorption into “the great complex of
associations” (p. 31). The associative absorption allows for greater perspective and appraisal as
the memory “undergoes correction by means of other ideas” (p. 31). If these normal reactions
are inhibited or suppressed, the quota of affect retains its intensity and the memory is cut off
from the rest of the personality, where it remains unintegrated.
Breuer and Freud (1893/1959) describe the interruption of the normal processes of
abreaction and associative absorption as follows. First, there is the wish to forget the experience,
or deliberate repression. Here, the individual voluntarily excludes the psychic trauma from
conscious thought (often automatically or unconsciously). The other cause, which Freud would
later reject, has to do with the mental state of the individual during the traumatic event. If the
person were in a hypnoid state, as in dissociation or the “half-hypnotic twilight state of daydreaming” (p. 33), for example, the memory would remain cut off from associative connection
with the rest of the personality. These two processes result in a “splitting of the personality.”
Soon after, Freud (1894/1962) developed further the role of defensive processes, namely
repression, in neurosis. He again emphasized that repression is instituted by an “effort of will”
(p. 46) as protection against extremely painful experience. The individual determines to forget
the distressing idea because, “he had no confidence in his power to resolve the contradiction
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between that incompatible idea and his ego by means of thought-activity” (p. 47). Of course,
repression does not succeed in eradicating the experience. The memory trace and the
corresponding quota of affect persist, albeit in isolation. The repression, Freud continues,
“amounts to an approximate fulfillment of the task if the ego succeeds in turning this powerful
idea into a weak one, in robbing it of the affect—the sum of excitation—with which it is loaded”
(p. 48). The isolation of affect weakens the noxious idea, effectively keeping it out of
consciousness.
In hysteria, the unbound or free roaming affect is transmuted into bodily form. The
symptom represents a compromise between the need to release the quota of affect, or excitation,
and the wish to remain unaware of the repressed idea. Spared from the pain of conscious
recollection, the ego is now burdened with a symptom, or “mnemic symbol” (Freud, 1894/1962,
p. 49). In cases where there is little capacity for conversion, the detached affect becomes
associated or connected to other ideas, thereby causing obsessions or phobias. Each of these
symptoms represents the return of the repressed, as unwanted thoughts and memories return in
disguised form. Essentially, the action of deliberately turning away from painful experiences has
the effect of keeping them alive or active.
In Freud’s early trauma theory, he expressed the view that symptoms stem from the
return of the repressed, namely, the indirect emergence of an unwanted idea or traumatic
memory. It is not a conscious return, but rather a return that the ego resists or fails to recognize.
When we have been unable to react normally10 to a distressing experience through feeling (or
abreaction) and talking (or associative absorption), the psychic past persists, is kept alive, in
disguised form. Thus, a psychic past that has not been sufficiently recognized and represented
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I am referring here to Freud’s description of the normal process of reaction.
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persists in disguised form in the psychic present, as though untouched by time. Repression, or
more generally defense, keeps the psychic past alive in disguised form by inhibiting the normal
process of reaction, or by forestalling full recognition or knowledge of that experience.
Deferred Action
In Further remarks on the defense neuro-psychoses Freud (1896/1959a) adds the notion
of deferred action11 to his theory of the neuroses. In addition, he has since narrowed his
conception of the traumatic origins of hysteria to infantile seduction. Freud (1896/1959b)
refined his theory in response to the disappointing finding that some patients did not fully
recover after the supposed traumatic memory was uncovered. Moreover, these seeming traumas
failed to meet Freud’s pathogenic criteria: first, that the traumatic event possessed a “determining
quality” in relation to the symptoms, and second that it had sufficient “traumatic power.”
According to Freud, the inquiries that yielded the requisite determining quality and traumatic
power infallibly led to infantile sexual experiences (Freud, 1896/1959b, p. 186).
With respect to deferred action, Freud (1896/1959a) remarks, “it is not the experience
itself which acts traumatically, but the memory of it when this is re-animated after the subject
has entered upon sexual maturity” (p. 157). These memory traces are not conscious memories,
but rather are registered in the symptoms; “this memory-trace does not become conscious but
leads to a liberation of the affect and to repression” (Freud, 1896/1959a, p. 159). And elsewhere,
“every case of hysteria displays symptoms which are determined not by infantile, but by later,
often by recent experiences” (Freud, 1896/1959b, p. 211).

11

Freud used this concept earlier, as well, in his Project for a scientific psychology (1895/1966)
and in Studies on hysteria (1893-1895/1955).
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How is it that the re-animated memory is traumatic and not the original experience itself?
Freud (1896/1959a) describes this as an inverted relation between the real experience and the
memory. In a footnote, he explains it thus,
If the sexual experience occurs at a time of sexual immaturity and the memory of it is
aroused during or after maturity, then the exciting effect of the recollection will be very
much stronger than that of the experience itself … The traumas of childhood act
subsequently as fresh experiences–then, however, unconsciously. (pp. 160-161, italics in
original)
Thus, we have the psychic past becoming active or re-animated in the present as a fresh
experience. It seems that the present, however, adds significantly to this psychic past and
contributes to its force; specifically, the second scene adds meaning and thus, emotional impact
to the first. The heightened effect or power of the memory traces is due to the maturity of the
sexual system. Thus, psychic past and psychic present are mutually influencing.
This raises another question. When does the actual repression occur? The memory
traces of the infantile seduction presumably persist out of awareness owing to the sexual and
cognitive immaturity of the infant, which seems to prevent associative absorption or psychic
elaboration. Loewald (1955/1980) argues that this bears resemblance to the idea that hypnoid
states may lead to the “splitting of consciousness.”12 He continues,
Repression … occurs on the basis of the reactivation of unconscious memory traces. The
original unconscious nature of the memory trace, however, is not in itself already due to
“repression” but to the infantile condition of the psychic functions and of the sexual
system. (p. 36)
12

The appeal to sexual immaturity to account for repression holds in Freud’s later theory of
infantile sexuality as well, since it is this immaturity that contributes to the original infantile
neurosis.
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Thus, traumatic experiences are laid down as unconscious memory traces, not because of
repression, but because the “immature ego is yet unable to cope by abreaction or associative
absorption” (Loewald, 1955/1980, p. 37). This formulation leads Loewald to regard repression
as an instance of the repetition compulsion–that is, as a regressive repetition of an earlier
inability to cope with, or reconcile with, distressing experiences and ideas. The ego repeats this
earlier process by way of actual repression.
The concept of deferred action has some implications for our understanding of
psychological time. It is not simply that the past shapes our present and future experience. Our
present experience can activate the psychic past and shape how it is remembered and
experienced, “the modification of the past by the present does not change ‘what objectively
happened in the past’, but it changes that past which the patient carries within him as his living
history” (Loewald, 1972/1980, p. 144).
Thinking of deferred action apart from symptom formation will allow us to apply it to our
integrative returns. Recall Isak’s reverie, for example (Ekelund & Bergman, 1957). He did not
merely reexperience an old love relationship as it originally transpired. That is, it was not an
actual repetition. His greater life experience, maturity, and openness helped establish the
necessary reflective distance that would enable him to revisit his past with a greater range and
depth of feeling and understanding. Thus, it was a new experience. In this way, deferred action
may be a mechanism that provides new opportunities for growth.
The Return to Origins
Returns would also prove to be pivotal in the psychoanalytic treatment of neurosis. Early
descriptions of the cathartic method demonstrated the curative results of returning to the original
trauma (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1959). More specifically, symptoms disappeared after the patient

DISAPPEARANCE AND RETURN

48

clearly recollected the exciting event with the accompanying affect. In addition, the patient had
to relate the occurrence in great detail and with full expression and identification of feelings.
Thus, the cathartic method comprises the arousal of affect, the expression of feeling in words,
and the clear recollection of the exciting event. Memory of the event alone, without feeling, is
insufficient: “the original psychical process must be repeated as vividly as possible, brought into
statum nascendi [born again] and then ‘talked out’” (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1959, p. 28). We
may notice here a resemblance to integrative returns.
Is this curative repetition simply a reproduction or duplication of the exciting event?
Eagle (2011) writes,
Simply making the unconscious conscious is not sufficient … if the material that has
been made conscious continues to be fraught with intense anxiety … pathogenic defenses
will remain in place … symptomatic compromise formation will continue or recur. (p.
95)
Thus, making the unconscious conscious is only curative to the extent that it is integrated into the
ego and contributes to greater unity in the personality. Similarly, and long before, Loewald
(1955/1980) argued that Freud’s description of the cathartic method goes beyond undoing
repression. It involves a transformation of primary into secondary process, thus achieving a
higher level of integration. Both Loewald and Eagle compare the process of associative
absorption to Freud’s (1914/1958) later concept of working through. These concepts speak to
the gradual assimilation of previously disavowed experience into the great complex of
associations. Loewald (1955/1980) concludes that the recovery of such memories and ideas
never yields a copy or recording, “but a new version of something old … a creative event in
which something for the first time can be put into words” (p. 41).
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In some sense, the notion of deferred action also applies to the return to origins, as this
second scene (the therapeutic recollection) also adds something new to, or enhances, the psychic
past, primarily in terms of meaning and perspective. In the usual sense, deferred action refers to
the increased force or intensity that the first scene (i.e., the “exciting event”) acquires during the
second scene (when re-animation of the memory trace occurs). Likewise, therapeutic
recollection is a deferred re-action to the original scene (a return to the normal processes of
reaction, i.e., abreaction and associative absorption, as described by Breuer and Freud
[1893/1959]).13 In deferred reaction, the normal reaction that was defensively sidestepped is
recommenced, allowing higher levels of organization and representation. Hence, we may
consider deferred action in terms of symptoms and deferred reaction in terms of therapeutic
recollection or catharsis.
From this early formulation, the task of analysis was to return the “pent-up affect”
(Breuer & Freud, 1893/1959, p. 40) to its source, or origins, by uncovering the original psychic
trauma. This reconnection recommences abreaction and enables the anxiety provoking idea, or
memory, to be integrated through “associative readjustment” (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1959, p.
28). For Freud, cure was predicated upon the return to the original psychic trauma, that is,
conscious recollection or repetition of the exciting event involving both full expression of affect
and narration of the details. Both the exciting event and the normal process of reaction operate
in a deferred manner, the former en route to symptom formation (deferred action) and the latter
to cure and integration (deferred reaction). Hence, deferred action is a non-generative return,
and what I have referred to as deferred reaction is a generative return.

13

For a description of this normal reaction, see above heading, Freud’s Early Trauma Theory.
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Chapter 4: Repetition
Remembering and Repeating
In Remembering, Repeating, and Working–Through, Freud (1914/1958) briefly reviews
the evolution of psychoanalytic technique and concludes that, despite significant changes in
method, the aim has always been the same, “descriptively speaking, it is to fill in gaps in
memory; dynamically speaking, it is to overcome resistances due to repression” (p. 148). When
a patient is unable to remember the past for self protective purposes, he “acts it out … repeats it,
without of course, knowing that he is repeating it” (Freud, 1914/1958, p. 150, italics in original).
Green (2008) expresses this as “a power of actualization, of making things not remembered by
being present” (p. 1037). Thus, we have reproduction not in memory, but rather in behavior and
without knowledge that it is a repetition.
An Analysand will typically reproduce the forgotten past in relation to her analyst. Freud
(1914/1958) explains that the transference is “only a piece of repetition,” continuing that, “the
repetition is a transference of the forgotten past not only on to the doctor but also on to all the
other aspects of the current situation” (p. 151). Freud figuratively describes the compulsion to
repeat as the patient’s way of remembering, but one that resists conscious recollection. It is
worth quoting Freud further, “while the patient experiences it as something real and
contemporary, we have to do our therapeutic work on it, which consists in a large measure in
tracing it back to the past” (p. 152). This seems to be a move from implicit, or procedural
memory to declarative, autobiographical memory. Here repetition is contrasted with conscious
recollection.
Loewald (1971/1980) makes several useful distinctions with respect to the psychoanalytic
concept of repetition. Following Freud, Loewald proposes that repeating in behavior and feeling,
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as in transference repetitions, is an unconscious form of remembering, a reproduction. Recall
that Freud (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1959) described symptoms in terms of reminiscences, or
unconscious memory traces (i.e., the return of the repressed). Insofar as the transference is a new
edition of a nuclear neurosis, it too seems to qualify as a manifestation of unconscious memory
traces. Loewald argues further that conscious recollection is also a form of repetition; it is a
reproduction in the mind. Thus, we may have passive or automatic repetition in action and
feeling (i.e., unconscious, enactive memory), or active and re-creative repetition in conscious,
representational recollection. Whereas Freud linked repeating and remembering by referring to
the former as the patient’s way of remembering, albeit unconsciously, Loewald links repeating
and remembering by referring to the latter as a form of repetition; hence, repetition now includes
remembering. The original distinction between repeating unconsciously in action versus
consciously by remembering holds, the latter being the aim of psychoanalytic treatment14. The
implication, however, is that it is not a question of repeating or remembering, but rather of
passive, automatic repetition versus active, re-creative repetition. In Loewald’s (1971/1980)
words:
In analysis the conflict is reactivated, is made to be repeated and, through the work of
interpretation, to be repeated in an active way, that is actively taken up by the ego’s
organizing capacity an important element of which is remembering. (p. 89)
In this way, psychoanalysis does not aim to supplant repetition with remembering, but rather
passive, unconscious reproduction with active, re-creative repetition that allows for a higher level
of organization. Unconscious reproduction is a non-generative return, and re-creative repetition
is a generative return. With respect to the latter, we may consider a compulsion to repeat that
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The aims of psychoanalytic treatment have since expanded (see Eagle, 2011; Fonagy, 1999).
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includes active, re-creative repetition (Loewald, 1971/1980, p. 92). Thus, repetition would seem
to transcend, or go beyond, categories of sickness and health. Remembering does not displace
repetition, but rather, allows one to live more comfortably with the living presence of the past:
Those who know ghosts tell us that they long to be released from their ghost life and led
to rest as ancestors. As ancestors they live forth in the present generation, while as ghosts
they are compelled to haunt the present generation with their shadow life. (Loewald,
1960/1980, p. 249)
Proust’s (1982b) involuntary memories are unlike neurotic repetitions, which feature the
past as a hidden force that haunts the present; rather, involuntary memories are more akin to
active, re-creative repetitions (generative returns). In neurotic repetition, there is a failure to
distinguish present from past due to insufficient reflective distance and, in Freud’s language,
repression; hence, the two time periods are fused. In Proust’s involuntary memories, present and
past are linked by common sensations (e.g., the clang of a spoon hitting a plate or the taste of the
madeleine cookie), and these linking sensations resurrect the past. Proust describes the
impressions that are common to past and present as in some way “extra-temporal.” By
experiencing the present moment “in the context of a distant moment, so that the past was made
to encroach upon the present,” Proust is himself an “extra-temporal being” (p. 904). This is less
a fusion of two time periods than an experience outside time. Proust’s narrator, Marcel, is aware
of his dual experience of two corresponding time epochs, and this awareness allows him to exist
in between present and past without questioning which one is real. We may liken this area of
experiencing to Winnicott’s (2008) notion of transitional phenomena.
Proust’s (1982b) “true self,” or extra-temporal being, “made its appearance only when,
through such identification of the present with the past, it was to find itself in the one and only
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medium in which it could exist and enjoy the essence of things, outside time” (p. 904). The past
comes to life in the present in an experience of integration and unity, not fragmentation and
confusion. If psychoanalysis hopes to reclaim history by remembering, it is through
experiencing the living past with greater clarity, mastery, and ownership. In this way, it seems
that psychoanalysis is reaching towards Proust–or towards a mode of reliving that integrates
disparate self states into a unitary being, one free from terror and thus able to consciously receive
the reverberations of the past.
The Compulsion to Repeat
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/1955), Freud gave his fullest attention to the
repetition compulsion, or the tendency to repeat painful experiences in life, as this posed a
significant theoretical dilemma for psychoanalysis. Namely, the repetition of painful
experiences appears to conflict with the pleasure principle, a core tenet of Freudian theory. Yet
if we follow the logic of Freud’s essay, the repetition compulsion does not in fact oppose the
pleasure principle. It is, as promised, beyond it. Freud provides two distinct rationales at
differing conceptual levels for this position (Pine, 1985, p. 65). First, he offers the clinical
formulation that repetition involves a specific way of mastering trauma. Second, in an
admittedly, highly speculative venture, Freud recasts his theory of the instincts: “It seems, then,
that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things” (p. 36,
italics in original). In the end, Freud concludes that the death instinct alone tends towards a
return to an earlier state, while Eros preserves life and holds all things together. To be clear
about the implications of Freud’s thought on returns, it is useful to treat these two lines of
thought separately.
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Repetition in dreams, play, and transference. Freud (1920/1955) begins with a
discussion of the pleasure principle, that is, the notion that the mental apparatus is regulated by
the avoidance of unpleasure or the production of pleasure. As a regulatory principle, pleasure
and unpleasure are not meant to denote conscious affective or feeling states. In Freud’s words,
“We have decided to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is present in
the mind … unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a
diminution” (pp. 7-8, italics in original). Soon after, Freud equates the pleasure principle to the
principle of constancy, “the mental apparatus endeavors to keep the quantity of excitation in it as
low as possible or at least to keep it constant” (p. 9). Thus, the pleasure and constancy principles
are merely different expressions of the same basic concept. At the outset, Freud acknowledges
that there are exceptions to the pleasure principle, or rather, circumstances that inhibit it. For
example, the ego’s instincts for self-preservation may postpone gratification or pleasure in the
interest of safety, that is, according to the reality principle. Moreover, in the course of
development certain instinctual desires are repressed and held back at lower levels of
development, where they remain ungratified. If these repressed wishes are satisfied through
circuitous paths, the ego will experience unpleasure (e.g., anxiety or symptoms). Still, Freud
concludes that these exceptions do not contradict the pleasure principle, as pleasure is merely
postponed or reached in a roundabout manner. In the latter case, what is unpleasure for one
system, the ego, will be felt as satisfaction for the other.
Freud (1920/1955) observed the compulsion to repeat unpleasant experiences in widely
divergent events, including traumatic dreams, children’s play, and the transference. His initial
treatment of traumatic dreams is brief and incomplete. He observes that in such dreams the
individual is brought back to the traumatic situation (i.e., to a state of fright). This is not what
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we would expect according to the theory that dreams are wish fulfillments, which would predict
dreams of cure or better times. Following Freud, we return to this quandary at a later point.
Next, Freud (1920/1955) considers the repetitive play of a young child he observed for
several weeks. He termed the boy’s game, “fort” (gone) “da” (there), or “disappearance and
return” (p. 15). Freud was initially puzzled by the game. The boy repetitively tossed small
objects and toys into the corner of the room or under his bed, in effect playing “gone,” and
followed this by recapturing them. The meaning of the game became clearer as Freud observed
the boy playing with a wooden reel with a string attached to it. While keeping hold of the string,
the boy threw the reel over the edge of his curtained cot, thereby making it disappear.
Subsequently he pulled on the string and so caused the reel to reappear. Now, the boy was rather
remarkable in that he would allow his mother to leave (i.e., disappear) for hours without protest.
The game seemed to represent the boy’s compensation to himself, Freud reasoned, for his
instinctual renunciation (i.e., the lack of protest at his mother’s absence). Freud asks, “How then
does his repetition of this distressing experience as a game fit in with the pleasure principle?” (p.
15). The underlying motive, Freud reasoned, was not in fact pleasure, but mastery.
Being left by his mother for a few hours time was a passive experience, as it was not the
boy’s doing or choice; he was overpowered by it. By repeating his experience, he took an active
part or role. Thus, the repetitive play allowed the boy to change his experience from passive to
active, thereby providing him with sense of control and mastery. Still, the play seems to yield
pleasure in the outcome, and so Freud (1920/1955) is not ready to concede that there are
tendencies beyond or independent of the pleasure principle.
Freud (1920/1955) next considers the repetition compulsion in psychoanalytic treatment.
Even with the help of interpretation, analysands are not able to recall all that they have repressed.
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Freud continues, “[the patient] is obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary
experience instead of … remembering it as something belonging to the past” (p. 18, italics in
original). Here, the patient acts out the nuclear conflict in relation to the analyst, thereby
establishing a transference neurosis. Freud distinguishes between the higher strata of the mental
apparatus, or ego, and the unconscious repressed. Resistance arises from the ego, whether
conscious or unconscious, and operates according to the pleasure principle: “it seeks to avoid the
unpleasure that would be produced by the liberation of the repressed” (p. 20). The repetition
compulsion, on the other hand, is associated with the unconscious repressed. Now, the ego
experiences the repetition as unpleasure. But recall that this does not in itself contradict the
pleasure principle, as what is felt by the ego as unpleasure may in fact gratify instinctual
impulses long since repressed. However, the repetition compulsion revives essentially painful,
ungratifying experiences from the past that never brought satisfaction, such as feelings of
rejection, or of being replaced and humiliated. Thus, what is repeated is seemingly
unpleasurable in entirety. This observation gives Freud the “courage to assume that there really
does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure principle” (p. 22).
This is not without reservation, however, as it is rare to see the repetition compulsion in pure
form, that is, without other visible motives. In psychoanalytic treatment, for example, Freud
notes that the repetition compulsion may be used in the service of resistance (as when repetition
precludes painful remembering).
Mastery: from primary to secondary process. To conclude this line of thought, Freud
(1920/1955) examines traumatic excitations, first those arriving from outside and then those
from within. External trauma is, by definition, powerful enough to breach the protective shield.
In such cases, the pleasure principle is essentially out of order, the primary task being the
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mastery or binding of large quantities of excitation that have overwhelmed the mental apparatus
(i.e., the protective shield). To counteract the excessive influx of energy, a large scale
anticathexis is established around the breach: “a system which is itself highly cathected is
capable of taking up an additional stream of fresh inflowing energy and of converting it into
quiescent cathexis, that is of binding it psychically” (Freud, 1920/1955, p. 30).
Earlier in the essay, Freud (1920/1955) contrasted states of anxiety, fear, and fright:
Anxiety refers to a state of expecting danger, even if it is unknown; fear requires a definite object
of worry or trepidation; fright refers to a state of being in danger without the benefit of
preparation, and so, has the added element of surprise. The anticipatory state of anxiety protects
against fright, specifically surprise, and thus, against “fright-neurosis” (Freud, 1920/1955, p. 12).
Freud reasons that a lack of preparation for danger, that is, anxiety, results in greater harm from
the breach in the protective shield or trauma. Thus, preparation for danger in terms of anxiety
and countercathexis bolsters the protective shield and constitutes a defensive effort.
Recall that traumatic dreams repeatedly bring the person back to the state of fright. Freud
(1920/1955) infers that these dreams serve to “master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing
the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis” (p. 32). Thus, Freud is
postulating a function of the mental apparatus that is independent and more primitive than the
pleasure principle, which serves to master excessive stimulation retrospectively.
We have yet to consider the excitations that impinge from within, namely, the instincts.
According to Freud (1920/1955) instinctual impulses operate according to the primary process
mode of thinking and are freely mobile, or unbound. The instincts press towards discharge
without consideration of consequences or reality. In contrast to the primary process, the
secondary process is bound. Insofar as the instinctual impulses are freely mobile or unbound,
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there is the danger of a buildup of excessive excitation from within, which would theoretically
reach traumatic levels. Some perception of reality is in fact necessary to effect successful drive
gratification, as demonstrated by the fact that a hallucinated breast does not satisfy hunger. In
short, drive gratification and the prevention of excessive stimulation (in other words, self
regulation) largely depend upon secondary process modes of thought (Eagle, 2011, p. 31).
This leads Freud (1920/1955) to conclude that the higher strata of the mental apparatus,
or the ego, have the initial task of binding instinctual excitation. Thus, binding the instinctual
excitation is a necessary precursor to the dominance of the pleasure principle (or in modified
form, the reality principle). “Till then,” Freud writes, “the other task of the mental apparatus, the
task of mastering or binding excitations would have precedence–not, indeed, in opposition to the
pleasure principle, but independently of it” (p. 35, italics in original). One may observe here that
this entire process is consistent with the constancy principle, or the tendency of the mental
apparatus to keep the quantity of excitation as low as possible or constant. Here, Freud
highlights the importance of replacing the primary process with the secondary process, that is, of
binding freely mobile energy. This demonstrates that the repetition compulsion, as a
retrospective attempt at mastery, is a further effort at (or repetition of) the primary task of
binding. As such, it represents a self regulatory mechanism and a generative return.
In summary of Freud’s (1920/1955) clinical formulation, the repetition compulsion is
analogous to a function of the mind that is more primitive than and independent of the pursuit of
pleasure–that of mastering or binding instinctual excitations impinging upon the mental
apparatus. In some sense, the repetition compulsion is a callback, or return to this initial task.
Freud notes, “only after the binding has been accomplished would it be possible for the
dominance of the pleasure principle” (p. 35). Again, the absence of binding would result in
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excitations reaching traumatic proportions. The repetition compulsion proper begins with a
trauma–an experience that is excessive and beyond the ego’s capacity to comprehend or bind. In
response to such excessive stimulation, the compulsion to repeat serves to master the stimulus
retrospectively.
In this formulation, the repetition compulsion is not a constant presence or force, but only
a last line of defense set in motion by a trauma. While the task of binding instinctual excitations
is a constant precursor to the pleasure principle, this is not an instance of the repetition
compulsion per se. Rather, the repetition compulsion is observable only after these initial
attempts to bind have failed, or when the ego has been overwhelmed.
A New Theory of the Instincts
Freud’s (1920/1955) consideration of the repetition compulsion also led him to revise his
instinct theory significantly. The feeling of urgency (i.e., the instinctual character) of the
repetition compulsion impressed Freud, leading him to ask, “How is the predicate of being
‘instinctual’ related to the compulsion to repeat?” (p. 36). This question signifies an interesting
shift in Freud’s thinking, as he infers that all instinct involves repetition. As such, “an instinct is
an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things” (Freud, 1920/1955, p. 36,
italics in original).
Prior to this, Freud (1915/1957) defined instinct as an inner stimulus, a need arising from
within, to which the mental apparatus responds according to the constancy principle–or pleasure
principle (p. 120). This was the state of things above as well, in Freud’s (1920/1955) clinical
formulation of the repetition compulsion as a specific mode of mastering trauma. Loewald
(1960/1980) describes this change in Freud’s thought:
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He defines instinct in terms equivalent to the terms he used earlier in describing the
function of the nervous apparatus itself … Instinct is no longer an intrapsychic stimulus,
but an expression of the function, the “urge” of the nervous apparatus to deal with
environment. (p. 234)
In other words, “instinct now means regulatory principle” (Loewald, 1971/1980, p. 62); these
two concepts are now coterminous. In contrast to Freud’s clinical formulation of mastery, the
repetition compulsion now represents a constant force or presence owing to his new definition of
the instincts as an inherent urge to repeat or return to an earlier state. Bibring (1943) describes
this in terms of restitution, or the urge to restore an original state. It is worth noting, as Freud
(1920/1955) himself did, that this formulation is speculative, “what follows is speculation, often
far-fetched speculation … an attempt to follow out an idea consistently, out of curiosity” (p. 24).
As Freud (1920/1955) considers the implications of his newly defined instinct (i.e., as an
urge to restore an earlier state of things) he infers that it ultimately must lead back to an
inorganic state, as this precedes life. Freud thus terms this the death instinct, perhaps an
unfortunate title, as it seems to be not in fact so much about death, but rather a state of quietude
or rest. Following much consideration, Freud admits that he cannot square the sexual instincts
with his newly formulated death instinct. While sexual instincts are conservative in that they
restore an earlier state of the organism, they ultimately preserve life and press towards higher
levels of development. Hence, the life instincts are set in opposition to the death instincts. Freud
ultimately includes both the self-preservative and the sexual instincts within the category of the
life instincts, or Eros. This is because he now treats the self-preservative instincts as libidinal
owing to his notion of primary narcissism (Freud, 1914/1957).
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If Eros comprises both the self-preservative and the sexual instincts, then what may we
ascribe to the supposed death instincts. Here Freud (1920/1955) revises his views of sadism and
masochism. Previously, Freud viewed sadism as an expression of the sexual instincts and
masochism as sadism turned against the self. In his revised formulation, masochism and sadism
are attributed to the death instincts. As an expression of the death instinct, masochism is primary
and subsequently turns to an object in the form of sadism. The move from sadism back to
masochism, which is present in super-ego formation, represents a regression to primary
masochism (Freud, 1930/1961, pp. 91-92). Essentially, Freud ascribes our destructive and
aggressive impulses to the death instincts15.
Yet Freud (1920/1955) does not consider sadism to be his most compelling evidence of
the death instincts. Rather, he is most convinced by his constancy principle, or Nirvana
principle, “which finds expression in the pleasure principle” (p. 56); again, these regulatory
principles all refer to the dominant function of the mental apparatus, that of eliminating
excitations, or internal tension, or reducing them to the lowest possible level. Recall that in
Freud’s new theory, instinct means regulatory principle (particularly the death instincts). If in
fact these concepts are now coterminous, then appealing to the inertia or constancy or pleasure
principle as evidence for the death instincts will not be of any use; it is a tautology. “In this
sense,” Loewald (1971/1980) writes, “the death instinct is really nothing new” (p. 62).
It is possible that Freud did not think of the death instincts and the regulatory principles
as coterminous–despite their considerable, if not complete, overlap. In this case, the death
instincts take the regulatory principles one step beyond rest or quietude, to an inanimate state.
Here one can logically appeal to the regulatory principles, as Freud does, in support of the death
15

Freud elaborated on this formulation in chapter 4 of The ego & the id (1923/1961) and in
chapter 6 of Civilization and its discontents (1930/1961).
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instincts. However, this seems inconsistent with the larger part of Freud’s (1920/1955) essay.
Later in the text, for example, Freud states that the pleasure principle itself is “concerned with
the most universal endeavor of all living substance–namely to return to the quiescence of the
inorganic world” (p. 62). This reaffirms that the death instincts do not extend or add anything
new to the regulatory principles; however, as a definition of instinct, it is a significant change in
Freud’s thinking. Of course, Freud’s speculation that the regulatory principles imply an
instinctual urge to return to an inorganic state is new as well. Bibring (1943) has noted that it is
problematic to conflate such restitution with repetition, as one cannot continually return to (that
is, repeat) death. It is, after all, a dead end.
Freud (1920/1955) comes to the following conclusions on the relationship between the
instinctual processes of repetition and the pleasure principle. One of the primary functions of the
mental apparatus is to bind impinging instinctual impulses, and thus, to replace the primary
process mode of thought with the secondary process in the service of mastery and drive
gratification. This binding is a necessary precursor to the dominance of the pleasure principle
and occurs on its behalf. The pleasure principle, like the constancy principle, operates to free the
mental apparatus from excitations or stimulation, that is, to keep levels of excitation constant or
as low as possible. This function implies an innate, universal need “to return to the quiescence
of the inorganic world” (Freud, 1920/1955, p. 62). In this sense, the pleasure principle is
ultimately in the service of the death instinct.
Concluding Remarks
I presented Freud’s (1920/1955) theory of the repetition compulsion in two sections,
which correspond to two distinct formulations in Beyond the pleasure principle. In his clinical
formulation, Freud’s depiction of the repetition compulsion as a specific mode of mastering
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trauma represents a growth process. Even if it is unsuccessful, or leads to further pain, it is an
attempt at growth and self regulation. A primary function of the mental apparatus is to bind
impinging instinctual impulses, and thus, to replace the primary process with the secondary
process. This binding process is a necessary precursor to the dominance of the pleasure
principle. The repetition compulsion proper begins with a trauma–an experience that is
excessive and beyond the ego’s capacity to comprehend or bind. In response, the compulsion to
repeat is initiated to master the stimulus retrospectively. Here, the repetition compulsion means
subsequent attempts to master or bind overwhelming excitations. In this case, the repetition
compulsion is not a constant force, but rather, a last line of defense against traumatic experience.
In his second formulation, Freud (1920/1955) treats the repetition compulsion as
instinctual, and redefines the instincts in terms equivalent to those that he used to define the
regulatory principles. The instincts and regulatory principles are now coterminous. He expands
his motivational theory to include the death instinct, which operates along side the life instinct,
or Eros (Freud, 1920/1955; Freud, 1923/1961). Both Eros and the death instincts are
conservative in nature (Eros conserves life). According to Freud’s revised instinct theory, the
ego operates according to the life instinct, or Eros, which comprises both the sexual and
self-preservative instincts. Eros operates to preserve life and aims to hold all things together; it
is a binding or integrating force that establishes greater unities. (As a binding force, Eros and the
clinical formulation of the repetition compulsion [as an attempt to master stimuli retrospectively]
bear resemblance.) In opposition, the death instinct is responsible for our destructive and
aggressive impulses; in other words, both masochism and sadism are expressions of the death
instinct. The death instincts aim to undo connections and to return to an earlier state of things,
ultimately to an inanimate or quiescent state. Freud reasons that Eros does not ultimately aim to
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return to an earlier state of things (in contrast to the death instincts), as this would presume that
living substance was once an original unity, later separated.16 Although the life and death
instincts are in conflict, Freud (1920/1955, 1930/1961) considered them to be deeply mixed or
alloyed. Freud was initially hesitant about this revision, but he proved committed to it (see, for
example, Freud, 1930/1961, pp. 78-79).17
In Freud’s (1920/1955) revised instinct theory, returns (such as the repetition
compulsion) take on new meaning by their association with the death instincts. In this
formulation, returns tend towards an earlier state of things, ultimately reverting to an inanimate
state. However, it seems wholly consistent with Freud’s regulatory principles to conclude that
this restoration ends in a state of calm or rest or quietude, rather than death. While the return to
an inanimate state, or death, is in marked contrast to the clinical formulation of mastery–where
returns operate in the service of mastering or binding excessive stimuli, seemingly in line with
Eros–the return to a state of rest or calm is consistent with the clinical formulation of mastery. In
the latter case, one can imagine elements of Eros in the repetition compulsion manifesting as a
wish to redo the past, to experience it in a way that leads to growth through binding and mastery.
However, Freud’s (1920/1955) death instincts offer something crucial to our formulation,
namely the wish to undo connections and break things down or apart. As we will see in chapter
6, Bion’s thinking suggests that fragmentation can lead to new forms of thought and higher
16

In the first chapter of Civilization and its discontents (1930/1961), Freud does hypothesize an
original unity, or undifferentiated state. See also Balint’s (1968) formulation that the ultimate
aim in life is the restoration of primary love, or an interpenetrating harmonious mix-up. Loewald
(1960/1980) argues that in proposing Eros, an essentially integrating force, Freud moves away
from the view that the instincts and ego are in opposition (p. 235). Eros manifests on both levels
of organization, the drives and ego, as an integrating force.
17
According to Greenberg and Mitchell (1983), Freud never suggested that the life and death
instincts have a phenomenological basis, “life and death instincts were conceived of as properties
of biological tissue” (p. 141). Thus, according to their interpretation, psychological experience
begins with libido and aggression–not the life and death instincts.
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levels of organization. This is not always the case, however, as undoing or blocking connections
can surely forestall growth, particularly when trauma is a factor.
In the end, we have a dizzying array of returns. “It may be said,” writes Green (2002),
“that the psyche is that which comes back, returns and reproduces itself” (p. 160). We began
with the observation that people often repeat unpleasant experiences. In Freud’s (1920/1955)
clinical formulation, this represents an attempt at mastery that involves replacing the primary
process with the secondary process, or of binding freely mobile energy. As a retrospective
attempt at mastery, the repetition compulsion is a further effort at the primary task of binding.
As such, it represents a self regulatory mechanism that may serve well being. When Freud
altered his instinct theory, he formulated an unbinding, disintegrating force in opposition to an
integrating, uniting force. As we move forward, this fundamental opposition will reappear in
various forms. We may settle on the following two categories: There are returns that are
conservative in nature, which seem to replay the same state of things without the possibility of
change or growth (under the dominance of the death instincts), as well as returns that are
generative, which repeat in such a manner as to provide new opportunities and reorganization
(under the dominance of the life instincts).
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Chapter 5: Paranoid-Schizoid
and Depressive Modes of Experiencing
As in Freud’s work, returns play a pivotal role in the theories of Klein. However, Klein’s
thinking will primarily be used to elucidate psychological returns, not to exemplify them. In
particular, her formulations on the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions add clarity to how
various returns may hinder or contribute to mental growth. Ogden’s (1986) interpretation of
Klein’s work is particularly relevant to this discussion.
In brief, this chapter highlights the following points. The unity and integration achieved
in the depressive position involves the recovery of aspects of the self and objects previously cut
off or dissociated. The recovery (i.e., return) of split off aspects of object relations is essential
for establishing continuity, historicity, and mental growth. This is perhaps most evident in
projective identification, which provides a means of moving from the paranoid-schizoid to the
depressive position (Ogden, 1986). Conversely, movement from the depressive to the paranoidschizoid position involves a return to an earlier, more primitive organization. From a Kleinian
perspective, this constitutes a regressive flight from danger. Later we will see that Bion has a
more nuanced view of this movement. Psychological returns will look rather different depending
upon whether one is operating from a paranoid-schizoid or depressive position. In the former
case, returns are largely unconscious as in the repetition compulsion where people repeat in place
of remembering (Freud, 1914/1958). In the latter case, returns have conscious quality, and lead
to greater understanding, integration, continuity, and historicity. Thus, generative returns seem
to depend on a mode organizing psychological experience that is characteristic of the depression
position.
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Background and Theoretical Revisions
After discovering Freud’s (1900/1953) Interpretation of Dreams, Klein sought out a
personal analysis with Ferenczi in 1914 (Mitchell & Black, 1995). With his encouragement,
Klein began observing and treating young children from a psychoanalytic perspective. Klein
believed that she could grasp the hidden, unconscious mental life of children through their play.
In this respect, children’s play is comparable to the adult’s dream world as a disguised
expression of unconscious mental life. Klein considered play to be equivalent to free association
as a method of gaining access to unconscious life.
After World War I, Klein began presenting her findings and captured the admiration of
Karl Abraham (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Soon after, she relocated to Berlin to work at the
Psychoanalytic Institute under the tutelage of Abraham. This ended in 1925 due to his
unexpected illness and death. Thereafter, Klein would accept Ernest Jones’s invitation to move
to London. Klein’s method of treating children, that is, through candid psychoanalytic
interpretations of their play, was in direct conflict with Anna Freud’s techniques. (Anna Freud
was also an influential figure in London, and along with her father would relocate there to escape
from the Nazi invasion.) As is well known, these and other disagreements would eventually lead
to a divide within the British Psychoanalytic Society. The “A Group” was loyal to Klein, the “B
Group” to Anna Freud, and the “middle” or independent group did not take sides (Kohon, 1986;
Mitchell, 1986; Mitchell & Black, 1995).
Klein’s direct work with children and later with very disturbed adults led her to modify
and extend much Freud’s thinking. For example, she argued that the Oedipus complex and
superego were present much earlier than Freud alleged, albeit in a form that is more primitive.
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Klein also broadened the meaning of phantasy18. For Klein, phantasy is the basic substance or
primary content of mental life. Phantasy is the unconscious psychological representative of the
instincts, which are biological in nature. Recall that for Freud, fantasy is the result of frustration.
Here, phantasy is not a substitute for drive gratification, but rather, complements it (Greenberg &
Mitchell, 1983). Phantasy life, as the psychic representative of the instincts, contains
unconscious images and knowledge. In particular, Klein held that objects are inherent to
instinctual impulses. Accordingly, infants possess a priori categories of thought, or
“phylogenetic inheritance” (Klein, 1952a, p. 117 fn.). Unlike Freud, Klein holds that there are
internal, rudimentary objects from the beginning that shape our conscious experience. Ogden
(1986) suggests that the Kleinian notion of inherited knowledge or ideas is best understood as “a
powerful predisposition to organize and make sense of experience along specific lines” (p. 15).19
Following Freud, Klein was committed to a dualistic conception of the instincts, namely
the life and death instincts. These instincts and their psychological manifestations are in direct
conflict. The core problem in Klein’s developmental scheme has to do with the containment and
management of destructive impulses emanating from the death instincts (Mitchell & Black,
1995). Klein (1946) described how these opposing instincts are managed in terms of two
fundamental positions, the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions. The term position
refers to a mode of organizing psychological experience–particularly with respect to the position
of the ego, or self, in relation to objects. Developmentally, the paranoid-schizoid position
precedes the depressive position, elements of which theoretically begin to emerge between the
fourth and seventh month of infancy. The former represents a more primitive mode of
18

The ph designates that the phantasy contents are unconscious.
This is similar to the Kantian notion that our experience of the natural world is limited by the
mind’s organization, specifically with respect to the a priori forms of sensibility (space and time)
and concepts of understanding (the categories of thought).
19
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experience and organization. In Klein’s (1957) model, both positions persist throughout life (i.e.,
co-exist) and are characterized by particular types of anxiety, modes of defense, object
relatedness, and forms of symbolization.
The Paranoid-Schizoid Position
The paranoid-schizoid position (Ps) represents a primitive mode of organizing experience
in reaction to the anxieties associated with the death instinc20 (i.e., fears of annihilation and
persecution). According to Klein (1946, 1948), early infant life is characterized by
overwhelming aggressive and destructive phantasies emanating from the death instinct. Klein
(1946) describes the resulting anxiety as the fear of annihilation. In defense, the infant projects
the destructive impulse outwards where it attaches to an external, part object (i.e., “the bad
breast”) in an effort to separate from it. For example, when the infant has not had a good feed or
has been deprived, he experiences the breast as bad. While projecting aggressive impulses
provides a sense of distance from danger as it is now outside, the infant’s anxiety remains and
takes on a persecutory quality. The Ps position is “paranoid” because the infant’s reliance on
projection and projective identification keep him on the lookout for danger.
In contrast to this overwhelming anxious state, the life instincts lead to pleasurable
feelings of safety and satisfaction. These impulses are associated with good objects, such as “the
good breast” after a good feed. Early on, the infant keeps his good and bad experiences separate
by actively splitting objects and his self in relation to them (that is, by splitting the self).
According to Klein (1946), with cognitive maturation and continued good experiences, the infant
soon develops a capacity to integrate both good and bad experiences of self and other.

20

Alternatively, Ogden (1986) suggests that splitting is the psychological form of an otherwise
biologically determined mode of managing danger–simply the inborn tendency to flee from (and
thus, gain separation or distance from) danger (p. 44).
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The “schizoid” of the Ps position refers to the infant’s use of splitting as a defense and
way of organizing his experience. According to Klein (1946), splitting the object–both internal
and external–coincides with splitting the ego. Thus, the bad object is in relation to a hostile,
aggressive self (as object), and the good object is in relation to a loving aspect of the self (as
object). Because these objects are not integrated or whole, Klein (1957) refers to them as part
objects. Splitting affords some equanimity by keeping the loving and hating aspects of
experience (part-object relationships) separate from one another. This allows the infant to
experience his desire and love without fearing that his hate will contaminate the experience; it
also allows the infant to hate without the fear that it will damage the good object.
In the Ps position, the self is experienced primarily as an object, as opposed to a subject
(Ogden, 1986). Symbol and symbolized are treated as identical. Thoughts, feelings, and
sensations have a quality of “it-ness” to them, as though they are happening to the individual;
reactions are automatic, and occur without reflection. In some sense, the individual is lived by
his experience. In line with this, there is little sense of “I-ness” or subjectivity, as there is “no
interpreting subject mediating between perception of danger and response” (Ogden, 1986, p. 45).
The Ps position lacks a truly historical perspective, giving the present a sense of
immediacy and certainty. Splitting makes the shift between loving and hating aspects of self and
object discontinuous; that is, these opposing feelings and relations are cut off, or dissociated,
from one another. Otherwise memory of the opposing experience would contaminate the
present, causing unbearable anxiety. The individual operating from the Ps position relies on both
denial and omnipotent thought to obliterate the opposing object relation (Klein, 1946). Ogden
(1986) describes this discontinuity as “the continual rewriting of history” (p. 65). In other words,
without the perspective of the past that continuity affords, present experience takes on a quality

DISAPPEARANCE AND RETURN

71

of (untested) reality, “the present is projected backward and forward, thus creating a static,
eternal, nonreflective present” (Ogden, 1986, p. 62).
One can see that returns from the Ps position will have an unconscious, automatic quality.
The conditions of the Ps position (e.g., the absence of self reflection or sense of being an
interpreting subject, discontinuity, dissociation, et cetera) prevent awareness that present actions
and experience may reflect the distant past. The individual does not reflectively ask, “Why do I
continually put or find myself in this predicament?” but feels as though there is no other way to
be because experience is happening to him. The prototypical example may be the (passive or
automatic) repetition compulsion, as the individual repeats instead of remembering (Freud,
1914/1958). Any sense of familiarity fails to evoke self reflection or related, conscious
memories. Here, the past is reproduced in action rather than by representation. Green (2002)
explains, “the non-elaborate character of what is repeated is such that, in reproducing itself, it is
as if it had never existed and was occurring each time as if it were the first time” (p. 41, italics in
original). These experiences are marked by the absence of recollection and time perspective. In
the Ps position, we seem to have partial returns as whatever is driving the repetition remains split
off. The past is reproduced in action and escapes representation.
Projective Identification
In the beginning, Klein asserts, the infant’s experience is wholly a reflection of the
instinctually derived phantasy life. All experience is shaped according to the infant’s
phylogenetic inheritance, thereby creating a closed system of meaning. Yet, how does the infant
escape from this predetermined system of meaning and learn from experience? According to
Klein, the infant’s psycho-physiologic maturation and continued experiences of satisfaction and
comfort (e.g., through projecting good feelings and parts of the self into the mother, or
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introjection of the good breast) lead to a diminution of anxiety stemming from the death
instincts. The reduction of persecutory anxiety coincides with the infant’s growing belief that
love outweighs hate–presuming a predominance of good experience.
As Ogden (1986) rightly points out, this explanation is not completely satisfying as it
leaves unanswered how or why the infant stops relying on his inherited system of meanings. In
other words, why does the infant stop interpreting his (good) experiences according to his
phantasy life (namely the death instincts)? Moreover, it seems that Klein’s (1957) notion of
envy would undermine this process, as the infant allegedly destroys the good object under the
sway of the death instinct. Ogden argues that Klein’s notion of projective identification provides
a plausible means by which the infant may break out of his closed system of intrapsychically
generated meanings. Klein (1946, 1955) conceptualized projective identification as an
intrapsychic process. Essentially, the infant projects unwanted aspects of the self (ultimately
stemming from the death instinct) into the object, where he can vigilantly watch and
unconsciously identify with them. From Klein’s (1946) viewpoint, this could intensify inner
persecution as the reintrojected object now contains dangerous aspects of the self.
Later theorists (e.g., Bion, 1962a, 1962b; Ogden, 1979) developed projective
identification as an interpersonal concept. In addition to being a defense, projective
identification is a form of communicating difficult states (feelings, wishes, needs, impulses) in a
manner that can transform each participant. The projected elements of unprocessed experience
induce a corresponding feeling or state in the recipient. The recipient processes or metabolizes
this state (in other words identifies it and gives it meaning) and thus, is able to experience it
without recourse to primitive defenses. Optimally, the projector (infant) recovers previously
intolerable aspects of the self in a modified, more manageable version that he can experience
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(Ogden, 1979). Ogden (1986) argues that this hinges on the creation of a mother-infant entity,
which requires the mother to allow herself to be used (p. 34). The point, or distinction, that
Ogden makes is that the infant is not passively recovering the processed experience; instead,
there is “a change in the infant’s way of experiencing his perceptions” (p. 35). Establishing an
emotional link with the recipient (mother) in this process presumably changes the infant. This
interaction with the mother transforms the infant’s instinctual preconceptions, thus, enabling the
shift to the depressive position and mental growth (Bion, 1962).
In projective identification, an unwanted or intolerable aspect of the self is projected into
an object and unconsciously identified with. The unconscious identification is an
unacknowledged return, as the projector unconsciously recognizes something as belonging to
him. “What has been abolished in the inside comes back from the outside” (Green, 2008, p.
1035, italics in original). This is more consistent with Klein’s version.
The interpersonal conception of projective identification, however, results in the mental
growth of the projector. In this case, the return is more akin to conscious re-collection.
Optimally, the recipient (i.e., mother-infant entity) is able to process or metabolize the
projection, and thereby make sense of it and generate meaning. The projection, thus
transformed, is available for recovery and experiencing in the projector’s conscious mind.
Projective identification provides one way of thinking about returns in terms of mental growth
and learning. We will expand on this idea in the following chapter on Bion’s thinking.
The Depressive Position
The depressive (D) position is characterized by sadness and remorse following the
recognition that one’s aggression and hate has been directed towards the loved object. This
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recognition leads to a drive to make reparation. Consider actor Peter Coyote’s reflections on the
emotional scars from his past (after a 10-year analysis):
There were people I hurt by not being sensitive; by being exploitative; by using my
charisma to get what I wanted; by not being as kind as I could have been. Once you
wake up and see your own behavior clearly, it is a kind of wound, because it makes it
impossible to reflexively think of yourself as a “good person.” [It is no longer possible to
rewrite history.] It has taught me to be very cautious. It has taught me that we all have
within us the potential to do great damage to the world and to other people, and the only
thing that saves us from doing it is our self-awareness. (Kupfer, 2011, p. 11)
The recognition that one has harmed (even if only in phantasy) the good object is only
possible when one grasps that the bad, depriving object is also the good object. Klein (1946,
1948) held that this capacity (i.e., to introject whole objects) begins during the second quarter of
the first year of life.21 As the separation of the good and bad aspects of the mother diminishes,
the infant’s emotional life undergoes marked changes. The fear of annihilation or persecution is
replaced with the fear of object loss, as the infant fears he has harmed and driven mother away.
Feelings of sadness, guilt, and concern follow the realization that one has attacked the loved
object; this is the “depressive” aspect of the D position. The culmination of this realization is the
desire to make reparation, that is, in efforts to restore the good object. These experiences further
integrate the ego, or self, as the infant’s loving and hating experience gains in proximity.
Ogden (1986) refers to the shift from the Ps to the D position as, “a monumental
psychological advance … a new state, built upon, but qualitatively different from that which
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Many authors (Ogden, 1986; Rayner, 1991) have cogently critiqued Klein’s timetable.
However, we are considering these positions as fundamental background states of being–and are
less concerned with the specifics of a developmental timeline.
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preceded it” (pp. 68-69). The ego functions at a more advanced, complex level in the D position.
Recall that in the nonreflective state of being characteristic of the Ps position, danger is
reflexively managed through eradicating or splitting experience (via denial, splitting, projection,
introjection, and omnipotent thinking). These severe maneuvers are supplanted in the D
position. Enhanced capacities for synthesis, integration, self-object differentiation, symbol
formation, delay, reality testing, and memory are under way. It is important to note that the D
mode continually develops over one’s lifetime. Moreover, even if the D mode is dominant in
conscious experience, the Ps position continues to operate, often unconsciously.
The move from part-object relatedness to whole-object relatedness coincides with the
move from split, discontinuous self experience to continuity in self experiencing (Ogden, 1986,
p. 71). Ogden (1986) positions the emergent subjectivity (or the experience of “I-ness”) between
the now distinguishable symbol and the symbolized. That is, the I, or self, refers to the
“interpreter of one’s symbols, the mediator between one’s thoughts and that which one is
thinking about, the intermediary between the self and one’s lived sensory experience” (Ogden,
1986, p. 72). Thought becomes less concrete and increasingly open to interpretation. The infant
gains the perspective that others too are subjects with their own, often dissimilar, feelings and
experiences. As subjects, others are beyond the infant’s omnipotent control. This allows the
infant to experience concern and guilt for another, as well as to experience the desire to make
reparations.
The new vantage point of the D position, particularly continuity in self experiencing,
amounts to the creation of history (Ogden, 1986). The individual no longer magically rewrites
the past in accordance with present circumstances nor does he omnipotently revive what has
been annihilated. Instead, he works to repair the damage he has done. Ogden (1986) describes
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this as the birth of the historical subject, or the “historical self” (p. 79). The historical
perspective of self and others requires the capacity for self-reflection, as the ability to think of
oneself over time, particularly with respect to changes in oneself and others. Without this
capacity, “each new event radically changes all previous ones. The present is immediately
projected on all previous experience thus nihilating the past” (Ogden, 1986, p. 80). The
historical perspective makes mourning possible, as there is recognition that things are not what
they used to be, or that relationships change or come to an end altogether. All of this contributes
to the historicity of the individual, who now possesses the ability to symbolize and generate
meanings of past and present experience through an historical lens.
Returns
Returns in the Ps position (partial returns) differ considerably from those experienced in
the D position, which are more complete or whole. Ogden’s (1986) description of transference
analysis is particularly relevant. Recall that Freud held that we sometimes repeat as a way of
resisting conscious recollection. In psychoanalysis, repetition takes form or is enacted in the
transference. The analysis of transference, whereby the present (repetition) is retold as a
reflection of the forgotten past, “is aimed at expanding the historicity of the depressive position”
(Ogden, 1986, p. 82). In other words, transference analysis transforms passive repetition (Ps
position) into conscious recollection, or history (D position).
The historical position22, while acknowledging the passing of time and loss, makes
(conscious) revival or reexperiencing possible. According to Ogden (1986), “the form of
transference possible in the depressive position allows one to perpetuate, to have again,
important parts of what one has experienced with people whom one has lost” (p. 90). The past is
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Following Ogden (1986), I use this term interchangeably with the D position.
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not magically restored, as though one has actually time traveled; however, “one experiences with
the new person feelings like those one felt with the previous person” (Ogden, 1986, p. 90). In
this way, the past is preserved–both in memory and feeling–by its emotional proximity to present
circumstances. Ogden aptly writes, “transference in the depressive position is an attempted
preservation of a feeling state from a past relationship; transference in the paranoid-schizoid
position is an attempted preservation of the lost object itself (p. 90, italics in original). In the D
position, reality perception is intact.
Another way of stating this is that the D position allows for reflective distance, or what
Scheff (1979) has termed “optimal aesthetic distance.” Scheff explains,
When we cry over the fate of Romeo and Juliet, we are reliving our own personal
experiences of overwhelming loss, but under new and less severe conditions. The
experience of vicarious loss, in a properly designed drama, is sufficiently distressful to
awaken the old distress. It is also sufficiently vicarious, however, so that the emotion
does not feel overwhelming. (p. 13)
Thus, both literature and psychotherapy provide opportunities to reexperience and perpetuate
important past experiences. Optimally, this occurs with the requisite, reflective distance for
understanding these experiences and emotions from an historical viewpoint. Both Loewald
(1955/1980) and later, Eagle (2011) have discussed the similarities between Freud’s early
formulation of catharsis and associative absorption and his subsequent notion of working
through. That is, working through seems to involve both the reexperiencing of affect
(abreaction) as well as understanding in terms of one’s life history (associative absorption).
Optimal aesthetic distance appears to be a necessary condition for working through.
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Segal’s (1952) work on aesthetics is also relevant. She argues that the reparative wishes
present in the D position play a central role in the creation of an artwork. Here, the creation
symbolizes the restoration (i.e., re-creation) of a complex and organized internal world, after it
has been destroyed or damaged in phantasy. Segal pays particular attention to Proust, who is
explicit about his wish to recover his lost past through the creation of an artwork, namely, his
literary work, Remembrance of things past (1982a, 1982b). To recapture his past in vivid, living
memory, “to give them permanent life, to integrate them with the rest of his life, he must create a
work of art” (Segal, 1952, p. 490). She describes his work as an effort to restore his past object
life, “all his lost, destroyed and loved objects are being brought back to life” (pp. 490-491).
This mode of preserving the past seems unique to the D position. Here is Segal (1952)
quoting Proust, “it is only by renouncing that one can re-create what one loves” (p. 491). Hence,
one must first acknowledge that there has been a loss and to some extent have mourned that loss,
to have the reparative wish that leads to the creative impulse. (These processes are central to the
D position.) Otherwise, there is no need to return to the psychic past; in the Ps position one can
alter reality, deny loss, and rewrite history. The sustained, conscious desire to have again, with
its recognition of loss, means that one has renounced (for the time being) the omnipotent thought
characteristic of the Ps position. When Proust writes that he re-creates or recaptures his past, he
is emphasizing the emotional and vivid nature of his memories and experience–not declaring that
he has magically restored, or brought his past back to life. Accordingly, the conscious wish to
recreate the past is rooted in the D position. In this way, the creation of an artwork, similar to
reading fiction or partaking in an analysis, is a way of preserving past feeling states (the psychic
past) and for generating integrative returns.
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In agreement with Klein (1940), Segal (1952) contends that when the adult mourns he is
simultaneously reliving early depressive anxieties and the loss of early objects. Segal continues
that successful mourning results in the formation of symbols. That is, if the lost object can be
assimilated by the ego, then it becomes a symbol. Once we create the symbol, we may use it
freely. Hence, mourning leads to the creative act of symbol formation, a form of mental growth,
and the extension of which is an artwork. To conclude, the creation of an artwork can be thought
of as a commemorative gesture in that it preserves the past. It is a reparative act involving the
restoration of one’s internal object world and the revival of past experiences with significant
others. Segal concludes that the creation of a successful artwork restores internal objects,
leading to re-integration and enrichment.
Manic Defense
Klein’s notion of the manic defense will allow us to see an instance of returning that
seems antithetical to mental growth. When the anxieties of the D position (e.g., threat of object
loss) overwhelm the ego, one means of regaining psychic equilibrium is through the manic
process, or the (defensive) regression to Ps modes of defense. Such regression compromises
aspects of the D mode, such as the sense of subjectivity, historicity, and reality perception. For
example, the individual confronted with the difficult reality that he has harmed another through
his insensitivity or carelessness, may cope with the fear of object loss by relying on selfaggrandizement to deny his dependence on other people (Klein, 1935). Splitting factors in as the
other is defensively devalued, perhaps hated and considered worthless. According to Klein
(1935), the specific feature for mania is the “utilization of the sense of omnipotence for the
purpose of controlling and mastering objects (p. 133, italics in original).

DISAPPEARANCE AND RETURN

80

The loss of various functions sets this return apart from those experienced from the D
position. Rather than learning to live with the difficulties of life, the individual flees for cover in
earlier modes of thought and perception. This maneuver provides temporary relief, but at the
cost of adaptation and reinforcement of paranoid anxieties.
Both Klein and contemporary Kleinians emphasize that the Ps and D positions co-exist
and are ever-present. Ogden (1992) discusses these positions in terms of a dialectical interplay
between psychic organizations. Thus, it is important to resist thinking of these positions as
linear. Moreover, the idea of regression suggests a linear formulation. That is, regression
suggests going back to a previous, earlier point in development. In Kleinian thought, we do not
relinquish the Ps position. Again, it is ever-present–though at varying degrees of consciousness.
Still, the term regression seems apt (Klein herself used it) as it emphasizes the loss of function
that is evident during shifts from the D position to the Ps position. What seems important is to
recognize that the Ps position is not actually given up or rendered inactive despite evidence of D
modes of organization and functioning. Lastly, Ogden (1992) has pointed to the benefits of deintegration, that is, of Ps modes of functioning, which he contends are necessary for considering
new possibilities, remaining open, and non-arrogance (p. 616). This idea leads us to Bion’s
theorizing.
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Chapter 6: The Thinking of Bion
The work of Bion adds perspective to the relationship between returns and psychological
growth. Bion’s (1962a, 1962b) theory of thinking describes various processes that impede and
facilitate mental growth. In Bion’s model, the central difficulty that plagues people has to do
with tolerating painful truths. Eliminating emotional experience in an effort to escape frustration
and pain impedes the development of thought and thinking, as well as the capacity to experience
a full range emotions and impulses. Thus, mental growth coincides with developing a capacity
to bear emotional truths. Without this, learning from experience is not possible. As we will see,
returning to previous experiences or self states provides a (re)exposure to emotional truths that, if
converted into meaningful experience, leads to learning and understanding. The artist’s vignette
provides one example. Additionally, Bion’s (1965, 1970) thinking on transformations,
especially with respect to evolutions of O, has implications for our special category of integrative
returns. In this area, the area of faith, we will gain clarity on receptive states, dream-like
memories, and approaching one’s essence.
The Growth of Thought
A theory of thinking. Bion (1962a, 1962b) regards thinking as dependent upon two
distinct developmental processes. The first is the development of thoughts, and the second, is the
development of an apparatus to cope with them, namely, thinking. Thus, the existence of
thoughts precedes the thinking apparatus, or the thinker, and so it is possible, inevitable in the
beginning, for there to be thoughts without a thinker. For Bion (1962a), “thinking has to be
called into existence to cope with thoughts” (p. 110).
Thoughts undergo three developmental stages: pre-conceptions, conceptions or thoughts,
and concepts. Pre-conceptions refer to inborn expectations, or a priori knowledge. This is
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similar to Klein’s notion of phylogenetic inheritance. The prototypical example is the inborn
expectation of the breast. Prior to actual experience of the breast, the pre-conception is an
“empty thought” (Bion, 1962a, p. 110). Conception refers to the mating of a pre-conception with
a realization; hence, we would have the expectation of a breast mating with the realization of the
breast in experience. It is also an emotional experience of satisfaction. Conceptions may be
refined or purified further to form concepts, which eventually may be used in a scientific theory,
for example (Bion, 1963).
For Bion (1962a), the term thought means something rather specific. In contrast to a
conception, thought represents the mating of a pre-conception with a frustration, or negative
realization. Continuing with our example, the expectation of breast is frustrated, or met with an
absence, a “no-breast.” According to Bion the infant’s capacity to tolerate frustration is of great
importance. Supposing that the infant has an adequate tolerance level, then the negative
realization, or no-breast, becomes a thought and the thinking apparatus begins to develop. The
thought and the developing thinking apparatus lead to further frustration tolerance. In this case,
the frustration is modified by the appearance of thought and thinking. If on the other hand
frustration tolerance is inadequate, then the infant experiences the no-breast as a bad object,
which must be evacuated to avoid frustration. The related sense impressions and primitive
emotional experiences lack meaning and are felt as forces or objects, which Bion termed,
“things-in-themselves” (p. 112). Instead of having a thought or representation (modification of
frustration), the thing-in-itself is projected or expelled (evasion of frustration). In severe cases,
Bion writes, “there takes place a hypertrophic development of the apparatus of projective
identification” (p. 112). Ultimately, excessive projective identification interferes with or
impedes the development of thinking and thus, learning from experience.
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Alpha function. Bion (1962b) introduced the abstract notion of alpha function to name
an unknowable (or unobservable) function of the personality that converts raw sense impressions
and emotions into alpha-elements, which are suitable for memory, dream thoughts, images,
dreams, and unconscious waking thinking. Thus, when a pre-conception mates with a negative
realization and a thought forms, the alpha function has converted the raw experience into alphaelements, or mental objects. In this case the infant has adequate frustration tolerance leading to
the development of thought and a thinking apparatus. When we our frustration is intolerable and
we experience the no-thing as a bad object, or a thing-in-itself, the original sense impressions
and emotions remain unchanged. Bion (1963) terms these unchanged, raw impressions
beta-elements; they are experienced not as phenomena, but as “objects compounded of
thing-in-themselves, feelings of depression-persecution and guilt and therefore aspects of
personality linked by a sense of catastrophe” (p. 40). The infant typically relies on projective
identification to cope with beta-elements.
The distinction between alpha-elements and beta-elements is significant. Alpha-elements
can manifest as dream thoughts, images, and memories, and they can be refined into higher
levels thought. Hence, the alpha function makes sense impressions and emotional experiences
into subjective experience, available for further processing and learning from experience. When
the alpha function is impaired or disrupted, sensory impressions and emotional experience
cannot be represented in a meaningful way; instead, they are evacuated via projective
identification. Beta-elements are not stored in the mind as memories, but rather, as “undigested
facts” (Bion, 1962b, p. 7).
According to N. Symington (personal communication, June 27th, 2011), beta-elements,
alpha function, and alpha-elements are theoretical conjecture, and thus are not sensually
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available.23 Thus, a person does not subjectively experience beta-elements. For Bion (1962b),
the beginning of awareness is an act of dreaming. But in order for such dreaming to occur,
beta-elements must be converted by the alpha function into alpha-elements. As alpha-elements,
they may be represented through dreaming. In Bion’s thinking, dreaming does not preclude
waking life or consciousness. Rather, the dream allows a person to remain “asleep” to
unconscious contents. Bion (1962b) writes:
He is able to remain “asleep” or unconscious of certain elements that cannot penetrate the
barrier presented by his “dream.” Thanks to the “dream” he can continue uninterruptedly
to be awake, that is, awake to the fact that he is talking to his friend, but asleep to
elements which, if they could penetrate the barrier of his “dreams,” would lead to
domination of his mind by what are ordinarily unconscious ideas and emotions. (p. 15)
Formation of the Thinking Apparatus
When considering the origins of thinking, specifically of alpha function, Bion (1962b)
begins with the catastrophic moment: The nascent psyche is flooded with beta-elements, raw
materials that require digestion or processing before they can be apprehended. In Bion’s
account, the capacity for digestion (i.e., alpha function) is an outgrowth of normal experiences of
projective identification, whereby undesired parts of the personality are split off and put into an
object.
Based on clinical experience, Bion (1962b) recasts Klein’s notion of projective
identification as an interpersonal process. In essence, a patient relying on projective
identification is able to behave in such a way as to induce feelings in another, which she herself
does not want to experience; hence, the omnipotent phantasy has a counterpart in reality. Bion
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Symington (Symington & Symington, 1996) is a current authority on Bion.
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writes, “the patient is sufficiently adjusted to reality to be able to manipulate his environment so
that the phantasy of projective identification appears to have substance in reality” (p. 32). Bion
proposes a similar process in infancy. That is, the infant is able to provoke the mother in such a
way that she will experience those feelings that the infant wishes to abolish.
“When the mother loves the infant what does she do with it? … my impression is that
her love is expressed by reverie” (Bion, 1962b, pp. 35-36). Bion (1962b) defines reverie as
follows:
That state of mind which is open to the reception of any “objects” from the loved object
and is therefore capable of reception of the infant's projective identifications whether they
are felt by the infant to be good or bad. In short, reverie is a factor of the mother's alphafunction. (p. 36)
A mother that is well-balanced and capable of reverie is able to receive her infant’s projections
and respond in a beneficial manner. She does so through her alpha function, which enables her
to process her infant’s primitive experiences and thereby respond with understanding and care.
In this way, the infant’s frightening experience is returned in a modified form that she can
tolerate. This gives her the experience that something can be done with the raw data. This use
of normal projective identification is not the excessive form that interferes with thinking, but
rather, represents an early form of thinking that requires the mother’s participation.
Container ♀ contained ♂. From the above discussion of normal or realistic projective
identification, Bion (1962b) abstracted the dynamic relationship of container–contained. The
mother capable of reverie is the container of the infant’s expelled, primitive experience, the
contained. Bion uses the sign ♀ for the container and ♂ for the contained. To continue with this
example, the infant’s experience ♂ is projected into ♀. The emotion that permeates ♀ (and so
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♂) is reverie. Both mother and infant benefit and achieve growth from this process. The infant
introjects the ♂♀ apparatus, which becomes part of her alpha function. Consequently, the infant
is increasingly able to do for herself what she had relied on mother to do.
The dynamic relationship between ♀ and ♂ may be commensal, symbiotic, or parasitic,
depending on the quality of the emotion that permeates it (Bion, 1962b, 1970). Bion (1970)
expresses these relationships as follows:
By ‘commensal’ I mean a relationship in which two objects share a third to the advantage
of all three. By ‘symbiotic’ I understand a relationship in which one depends on another
to mutual advantage. By ‘parasitic’ I mean to represent a relationship in which one
depends on another to produce a third, which is destructive of all three. (p. 95)
Normal or realistic projective identification, as described above, is a commensal ♂♀
relationship. The third is represented by the understanding and care that contributes to growth.
A commensal relationship is also apparent in the development of conceptions: A pre-conception,
♀, mates with a realization, ♂, and produces a conception (the third) to the benefit of all. A
symbiotic relationship, while in itself beneficial, does not produce a third that contributes to
mutual growth. For example, in a symbiotic psychotherapy relationship, each participant
depends on the other for well being, but without insight and mental growth (the third).
Projective identification may also represent a parasitic relationship. For example, if the mother
rejects the infant’s projection or attacks it with envy or hate, then the infant’s projection is
returned in the form of nameless dread (the third).
Bion (1962b, 1963) describes the emotional link between two objects in terms of love (L
link), hate (H link), and knowledge (K link), as well as the negative of these, –L, –H, and –K.
All emotions are cataloged according to these six links. The mother’s reverie, or loving
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relationship to her infant, which makes her containing productive is likely an L link. This
relationship could also be a K link, however, as she is trying to get to know both her emotions
and her infant’s experience. Hence, projective identification in L or K is a commensal
relationship between ♀ ♂ (Bion, 1962b).
The K link implies bearing the frustration, or discomfort, inherent in learning. This is
apparent in the formation of a thought, which originates in the frustration of being confronted
with a no-thing or absence rather than a realization. If frustration is avoided and the betaelements are expelled, then this is –K. All of the minus links represent attempts to destroy
meaning and understanding. They operate to negate emotion and understanding. Thus, if the
mother is under great pressure and is severely distressed, she may wish to ignore or not
understand her infant’s experience, which represents –K. The mother’s envy may also contribute
to –K. Bion (1962b) explains,
In — K the breast is felt enviously to remove the good or valuable element in the fear of
dying and force the worthless residue back into the infant. The infant who started with a
fear he was dying ends up by containing a nameless dread. (p. 96)
The concept of ♀♂ is central to mental development in Bion’s (1963) thinking. Thought
emerges from the depths of raw, undigested sense data and emotional experience to form
increasingly abstract, purified, categories of thought.24 Each step in this process may be
represented in the following manner: a pre-conception searching for a realization, or ♀ (state of
expectation) searching for ♂; the mating of ♀♂ forms a conception; the conception, in turn,
becomes a new pre-conception ♀ in search of a new realization ♂, and thus continues to greater
levels of complexity and abstraction. The repetition of this process represents movement to
24

In Bion’s (1963) grid, this progressive movement is represented on the vertical axis from top
to bottom.
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higher levels of thought and thinking. The evolution of thought depends on a commensal ♀♂
relationship, that is, an emotional environment conducive to growth. In a negative environment,
the formation of thought either does not start or moves in the reverse direction, to loss and
destruction of meaning.
The growth of thought as represented by the ♀♂ model, or pre-conception seeking out
and mating with a realization, is about the development of meaning. Bion (1962b) described this
in terms of saturation and naming. When the pre-conception and realization come together, the
pre-conception is saturated, or accrues meaning, through experience. Naming also occurs when
a pre-conception is realized. The naming holds or binds the experience together. The name
accumulates meaning, or saturation, through the continued operation of ♀♂. Still, this process of
binding elements together through naming has a provisional, tentative quality. Further learning
requires that the ♀ remain integrated without rigidity. Bion describes this state of mind in terms
of the individual who can “retain his knowledge and experience and yet be prepared to
reconstrue past experiences in a manner that enables him to be receptive of a new idea” (p. 92).
Ps ↔ D. In addition to the ♀♂ process, the thinking apparatus relies on the co-existing
dynamic relationship between the paranoid-schizoid position (Ps) and the depressive position
(D). Bion uses the symbol Ps ↔ D to designate this movement. In particular, Bion is referring
to the shift from fragmentation and dispersal (Ps) to integration and coherence (D), the back and
forth movement between disintegration and reintegration. The move from dispersal to
integration is precipitated by the discovery of the selected fact. Bion (1963) explains, “by
selected fact I mean that by which coherence and meaning is given to facts already known but
whose relatedness has not hitherto been seen” (p. 19). The selected fact is an experience that
links together elements that had been dispersed, or that were not seen as connected; a selected
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fact could be an idea or an emotion. As the double arrow indicates (Ps ↔ D) it is not just
integration that leads to the formation of knowledge. Integration must be tentative, not rigidly
adhered to. Thus, the move from coherence to dispersal is also integral to mental growth.
Breaking apart allows for new syntheses to form and thus, new ways of thinking. Thus Ps has
creative value.
Bion (1963) is hesitant to give priority to ♀ ♂ or Ps ↔ D, instead suggesting that they
both operate together in a mixed state. The ♀ ♂ process represents expulsion and ingestion,
while Ps ↔ D represents a back and forth between fragmentation and integration. Bion (1963)
would settle on a distinction, however; the recognition of the whole object depends on the Ps ↔
D mechanism, and the accumulation of meaning depends on the operation of ♀♂. Ps is a state of
disorder. The individual tolerates incoherence and doubt, waiting for the selected fact to surface.
The selected fact brings coherence, signaling a move to D. At this point, ♀♂ processes
contribute to the development of meaning. The return to Ps allows for new possibilities and
selected facts to emerge.
Learning From Returns
We may consider Miss A’s integrative return in terms of Bion’s theory of thinking.
Recall that Miss A’s production of an autobiographical artwork enabled her to regain a terrifying
aspect of her history, perhaps a miscarriage. The vivid memory scenes evoked strong feelings
and sensations that give Miss A the sense that she is there again, reliving this event. The revival
itself may be thought of as a selected fact. The beginning elements of Miss A’s artwork (an
image of intercourse juxtaposed with a mother embracing a daughter who looks down, the sea of
red pigments, and the overall despondent mood) all come together, are bound, in the moment of
recollection. The return brings unity to elements that were rather vague to Miss A, thereby

DISAPPEARANCE AND RETURN

90

providing an overall coherence (D). Although the moment of revival from Miss A’s perspective
is initially disorienting and inchoate (Ps), this initial disarray, gives way to an experience of
coherence and overall order (D), as represented by her artwork.
Miss A’s involuntary memory of what she believes was a miscarriage represents a return
to or revival of a powerful emotional experience that had yet to be digested; the undigested
experience was a ♂ in search of a ♀, a thought awaiting a thinker. The raw sense impressions
and emotional experience were banished from her mind rather than converted into meaningful
experience that she could understand. In this case, fear seemed to impair her alpha function and
so, forestall the formation of dreams, thoughts, and images (i.e., mental objects). Yet, these
undigested facts were revived and converted into vivid images and emotions. The return allowed
Miss A to reexperience this catastrophic moment, to hold it in her mind long enough for
conscious reflection, that is, for her alpha function to render it thought and real. As a real event,
Miss A could think further about her experience, could reflect on it, and incorporate it into her
artwork, thereby generating further meaning. Miss A’s conscious reflection, the thinking process
itself, and later the artwork, provided a containing function, that is, operated as the ♀ for the ♂.
What made Miss A open to receiving ♂? While mixing her paints and constructing her
composition, Miss A achieves a meditative state of relaxed attention, approximating reverie or
dream-like thinking. In this state, Miss A is open to receive various images and memories from
her past. Her relationship to these objects is a K link. The ♀♂ relationship is commensal. The
♂ mating with the ♀ produces a beneficial third, the artwork.
In summary, we assume that the mechanism of Ps ↔ D and the operation of ♀♂ are
active in returns that lead to mental growth. Through the mechanism of Ps ↔ D, an individual
may grasp a selected fact; various elements of experience, past and present, cohere through vivid
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recollections and are represented by higher levels of thinking. The psychic present and psychic
past co-exist in self states and experiences common to both. When we enter receptive states of
relaxed attention and reverie, we become more open to receiving undigested facts, and they are
converted into dream-like memories suitable for learning and meaning-making. In this way,
returns provide an avenue for learning from heretofore unprocessed impressions and experience.
For Miss A, the time elapsed likely provided enough experience for the continued development
of her alpha function, specifically, of her capacity to dream her experience (Ogden, 2004). In
this way she is in a better position to process the undigested facts, or beta-elements, that had
escaped conscious reflection.
Transformations
Transformations from O. Bion (1965) introduced a theory to describe the change in
form, or transformation, of an original state or reality during processes of representation. The
concept of transformation applies to many situations. For example, Bion describes a painting of
a landscape as a transformation of the artist’s visual experience of the landscape. A poet’s
process of transformation through language would result in a different transformation of the
same landscape. Despite these differences, however, something of the original is preserved in
the new form. These unaltered features of the original landscape, or invariants, are recognizable
in the end product (whether a painting or poem) despite the change in form. In this way, the new
form provides a reference point for the original fact, which Bion symbolizes as O. Recognition
of O requires that the recipient have sufficient understanding and experience, as well as
motivation. For example, someone who has never seen or been to Venice would not recognize O
in Proust’s descriptions.
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Transformation (T) implies three stages. These are, in order, the initial or original fact
(symbolized by “O”), the process of transformation (symbolized by T α), and the product of
transformation (symbolized by T β). Invariants are those aspects of O that are left unchanged by
T α; they create the possibility for recognizing O in T β. Bion (1965) distinguishes between the
analyst’s T α and T β, (which he symbolizes Ta α and Ta β, respectively), and the patient’s T α
and T β, (which he symbolizes Tp α and Tp β, respectively). For example, Ta β might refer to
an interpretation, and Tp β to free association and various gestures. In analysis, O refers to the
emotionally meaningful events of the session or the emotional truth of a session.
Bion (1965) lists three types or groups of transformations. These are rigid motion
transformations, projective transformations, and transformations in hallucinosis. Rigid motion
transformations display the least amount of deformation. As an example, Bion refers to the
transference (neurosis), whereby feelings and thoughts appropriate to the Oedipus complex are
transferred “with a wholeness and coherence” (p. 19) to the analytic relationship. The transfer of
feelings from one situation (and time) to another involves little deformation, making it
recognizable as transference. By contrast, projective transformations bear significant
deformation, making recognition of O rather difficult. Here, the Tp α involves mechanisms
associated with the Ps position, such as splitting and projective identification. Hence, the Tp β
may lack self-object differentiation and be altogether confused as normal boundaries in time and
space are disregarded.
Finally, transformations in hallucinosis are characteristic of the psychotic part of the
personality–which is theoretically present in all persons, regardless of their level of functioning.
The Tp β may be a hallucination, but need not be. These transformations are related to a
primitive catastrophe, specifically, an original emotional experience that was never contained or
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transformed. The beta-elements were unable to find a container (such as mother in a state of
reverie) and so, were returned and experienced as a nameless dread, or psychotic panic. The
psychotic part of the personality attempts to avoid the beta-elements, or the emotional
catastrophe, by using “his senses as organs of evacuation which are able to surround him with a
universe that has been generated by himself” (Bion, 1965, p. 137). In this way, the patient feels
she is independent from everything but her own creations.
Rigid motion transformations, as in transference neurosis, seem to best describe returns
that are conducive to learning. Recall Ogden’s (1986) description of transference in the
depressive position, “an attempted preservation of a feeling state from a past relationship” (p.
90, italics in original). This preservation facilitates the creation of meaningful personal history.
Miss A’s integrative return seems to fit in this category. That is, the original fact (O) is revived
with wholeness and coherence in the psychic present, culminating in a unitary experience of two
distinct moments in time. The T β is not an exact replica of O, but the invariants make O
recognizable in the end product. Miss A’s painting also represents a transformation. The O
(integrative return) is transformed in her painting T α, which culminates in an artwork T β with
little deformation. The same is true for Proust. His creation of an artwork is a transformation of
his involuntary memories.
Each transformation (rigid motion T, projective T, and T in hallucinosis) is a
transformation from O. As such, they are about knowing O and so signify K or –K links (–K
when obscuring O rather than communicating O is the intention). The analyst’s interpretations
are K links; they are about getting to know the phenomena of O, or the true emotions of the
patient in a session. Bion (1965) wondered whether these interpretations could effect a transition
from knowing to being, from K to O.
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Transformations in O. In Bion’s (1965) thinking, there is a gap, a curtain of illusion,
between phenomena and reality, the thing-in-itself, or noumena (to borrow Kant’s terminology).
Hence, reality is ultimately unknowable. Reality is not something that lends itself to being
known, “It is impossible to know reality for the same reason that makes it impossible to sing
potatoes” (Bion, 1965, p. 148). Potatoes, Bion continues, can be eaten or grown, and reality it
seems “has to be ‘been’” (p. 148). And later, “the point at issue is how to pass from ‘knowing’
‘phenomena’ to ‘being’ that which is ‘real’” (Bion, 1965, p. 148). The former has to do with
transformations from O, the latter with transformation in O, which Bion also describes as
becoming O.
To simply know something, to have understood in an intellectual sense, somehow misses
the point. Bion (1965) likens the difference between transformations in K (or from O) and
transformations in O to knowing about psychoanalysis versus being psychoanalyzed. The
difference is also comparable to accepting an interpretation intellectually versus receiving it in a
manner that resonates emotionally and historically, so that change and growth occur. Resistance
to K, or to transformations from O, arises when becoming O is on the horizon. Overcoming or
mastering the fear of becoming O allows the analysand to experience her emotional reality.
In his next book, Bion (1970) shifts his attention from how to affect the move from K →
O to how O enters the domain of K, or evolves to the point of being known. The critical issue
has to do with being receptive to evolutions of O, to becoming at-one-with O. The experience of
becoming O allows for some acquaintance with O, a knowing of sorts, “[O] can be ‘become’, but
it cannot be ‘known’” (Bion, 1970, p. 26). Bion (1970) explains,
It is O when it has evolved sufficiently to be met by K capacities in the psycho-analyst.
He does not know the ‘ultimate reality’ of a chair or anxiety or time or space, but he
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knows a chair, anxiety, time, and space. In so far as the analyst becomes O he is able to
know the events that are evolutions of O. (p. 27)
By being O, the analyst may intuit the patient’s evolutions of O. In this way, evolutions of O
enter the domain of K, but O in itself, the ultimate reality, absolute truth, or the thing-in-itself
cannot be known. “[O] stands for the absolute truth in and of any object; it is assumed that this
cannot be known by any human being,” Bion continues, “it can be known about, its presence can
be recognized and felt, but it cannot be known. It is possible to be at one with it” (p. 30).
Thus, the progression for the analyst is optimally from evolutions of O → K. That is, she
must first be O in order to communicate or formulate the O of a session through K activity. To
do so, the analyst must rid her mind of desire and memory.
Faith and reception. The analyst, according to Bion (1970), must wait for evolutions of
O to become apparent, or coherent, to her intuition before interpreting. Evolutions of O are
united or bound by the analyst’s intuition, just as the selected fact coheres and unites disparate
parts. In order to intuit evolutions of O, the analyst, according to Bion, must have a particular
frame of mind. Specifically, the analyst systematically avoids memory and desire. What Bion
has in mind is the cultivation of a receptive state of mind, a mind that is unsaturated with
presumptions. Bion illustrates, “I avoid any exercize of memory; I make no notes … I avoid
entertaining desires and attempt to dismiss them … I think it a serious defect to desire the end of
a session, or week, or term” (p. 56). Bion’s avoidance of memory does not extend to
remembering appointments, or a patient’s family members, her age, or medical history, all of
which may be recorded; nor is he advocating simple forgetfulness.
The disciplined denial of memory and desire is an “act of faith” (F) (Bion, 1970, p. 41).
Both memory and desire are based on sense impressions, and as such, their presence prevents the
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appearance of unsaturated preconceptions. Desire and memory “occupy the space that should
remain unsaturated” (Bion, 1970, p. 41). Bion (1970) also suggests eschewing sense perceptions
and understanding (by which I take him to mean dwelling on these activities). In all, this
“artificial blinding” (Bion, 1970, p. 43) is for the purpose of making contact, or intuiting, psychic
reality or evolutions of O. Memory and desire block this contact by saturating preconceptions
with presumptions.
In psychoanalysis, O represents the unknown. Bion (1970) writes, “if it is true that the
proportion of the known to the unknown is so small at the end of analysis, it must be even
smaller during analysis” (p. 69, italics in original). What matters or deserves attention is not
what is known, but what is unknown. F in O represents the belief that there is an ultimate reality
and truth that is recognizable. The intrusion of the analyst’s memory and desire blocks and
obscures her capacity to intuit evolutions of O.
Dream-like memory. Bion (1970) contrasts the experience of remembering a dream
with dream-like memory, which “float into the mind unbidden and unsought and float way again
as mysteriously … thoughts also come unbidden, sharply, distinctly, with what appears to be
unforgettable clarity, and then disappear” (p. 70). He reserves the term “memory” for conscious
attempts at

recall–which Proust (1982a) refers to as “voluntary memory.” Similarly, Bion’s

“dream-like memory” (p. 70) bears a strong resemblance to Proust’s “involuntary memory.”
Bion writes that this is “the memory of psychic reality and is the stuff of analysis” (p. 70). Thus,
the practice of avoiding memory and desire, (F), is meant to facilitate the growth of dream-like
memory.
Bion (1970) remarks further on dream-like memories:
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The experience of the dream seems to cohere as if it were a whole, at one moment absent,
at the next present. This experience, which I consider to be essential to evolution of the
emotional reality of the session, is often called a memory, but it is to be distinguished
from the experience of remembering. (p. 107)
We may liken Bion’s dream-like memories to Proust’s involuntary memories or to Miss A’s
sudden recollection. Such memories seem to facilitate the evolution of emotional reality.
F in O: return to origins. Bion’s (1970) notion of F in O, like reverie, describes an
optimal state of receptivity. These notions depict an openness to experience that is conducive to
the evolution of emotional reality, or O. Recall Dr. Isak Borg’s special sense of self-awareness
(Ekelund & Bergman, 1957). While driving to Lund with Marianne, where he will receive an
honorary degree, he is drawn to visit the summerhouse of his childhood. With Marianne off
exploring, he approaches a familiar wild strawberry patch. He sits down without pursuing
memories or desire; he is in a state of free receptivity. Patiently eating the berries, he lets his
mind wander, “the day’s clear reality dissolved into the even clearer images of memory … with
the strength of a true stream of events” (Ekelund & Bergman, 1957). Isak’s state of reverie and
calm invites dream-like memories, images and feelings from long ago. He is once more living
the emotions of an early, bittersweet romance with a faith that approaches O, allowing him “to
experience the impact of emotional reality in a way which allows the latter genuinely to evolve”
(Eigen, 1985, p. 326). Within this dream-like reverie, Isak re-connects with aspects of himself
long since discarded, his love of poetry and his emotional sensitivity. Isak revisits his past in a
manner that allows him to become O, to experience the evolution of emotional reality. In this
way, Isak is able to expand on his prior experience, to feel again his loss but with enough
reflective distance for him to tolerate his experience and allow it to evolve.
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Turning now to Proust (1982a), it seems that his difficulties with recall during the
madeleine episode are significant. The madeleine cake soaked in tea evoked an exquisite surge
of pleasure that invaded his senses and filled him with a special essence. Thereafter, Proust tried
repeatedly to revive this experience. But his conscious efforts were to no avail. Proust, like
Bion, makes a point of differentiating voluntary memory from dream-like, involuntary
memories. The former represents an act of will and preserves nothing of the past. The images
rendered have no life to them. Involuntary memories, by contrast, are unbidden. They are
evoked by chance happenings, such as the sight and taste of wild strawberries or of a spoonful of
madeleine cake soaked in tea. Proust eventually grows tired of his attempts to restore his
pleasurable experience. He lets his mind wander without the distress of desire. Then, unbidden
and unsought, a fleet of dream-like memories suddenly returns with remarkable clarity and
distinction. He had to achieve F in O, the absence of memory and desire, to be receptive to
evolutions of O.
Through recognition, we may recapture the psychic past, bringing it to life in dream-like
memory. A veritable moment of the past is linked to the present and thereby preserved. Proust
(1982b) writes that that which is “common both to the past and to the present, is much more
essential than either of them” (p. 905). And with respect to the madeleine episode, “this essence
was not in me, it was myself” (Proust, 1982a, p. 55, italics in original). Somehow, the vivid
images and feeling states contained within involuntary memories bear the essence of a person, or
in Bion’s language, evolutions of O. Essence, here, means becoming at one with an emotional
truth that has historical depth, that is, a truth common to psychic past and present that both
preserves what was and expands on it.
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Chapter 7: Regression
This chapter examines different notions of regression to further solidify the distinction
between generative and non-generative returns. I begin with some tentative, exploratory ideas
and propositions. It seems clear that psychoanalysts have long used the notion of regression to
describe a wide range of phenomena in a variety of settings. While this practice may be common
in the early stages of theory building, such as in the stage of description, continuing in this
manner indefinitely will not lead to clearer, more consistent use of the term.25 Rather, it is
something like seeing nails everywhere while learning to use a hammer: Though useful with
learning and mastery in the beginning, it should give way to a more selective and judicious
approach. Likewise, retaining the meaning and value of regression concepts requires further
restriction and precision in usage. To this end, we would gain much clarity if we gave more
weight to contextual factors when applying concepts of regression. For example, whether shifts
in dominance between secondary and primary process thinking are regressive should depend
upon the circumstances. In a creative context, whether in play, music, or art making, this
typically indicates flexibility in the personality rather than a loss or restriction in functioning, as
the term regression implies (Arlow & Brenner, 1964).
Rather than furthering attempts to depathologize the concept of regression (Knafo, 2002),
and in this way extending its application, we may reserve regression concepts for instances that
are truly steps backward in development and functioning; this is consistent with the conclusions
of Arlow and Brenner (1964). Of course, many regression concepts would not qualify as such.
Yet, cataloguing experiences that are not truly steps backward under the wide penumbra of
regression has at least two unfortunate consequences: first, they acquire a pejorative connotation;
25

Freud’s (1915/1957) comments on developing scientific concepts seem to be consistent with
this position.
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second, the meaning of regression becomes obscured and muddled (Inderbitzin & Levy, 2000;
Loewald, 1981; Weissman, 1971). I propose using return, a synonym for regression that has the
benefit of being more ambiguous (i.e., less value laden), as a general category to refer to the
variety of ways in which we revisit, revive, and repeat significant aspects of the past, such as in
regression. Hence, returns may be regressive or progressive; but regression in itself cannot at the
same time be considered progressive.
There are at least two benefits to using the general category of returns: first, regression
concepts will gain in precision, which will increase their communicative value; second, we will
be better able to identify commonalities across theoretical perspectives that have been obscured
by inconsistent use of regression concepts. As it is, similar returns may be described in terms of
regression from one theoretical perspective but not so from another, and this gives the false
impression that such viewpoints are further apart than they actually are.
Concepts of Regression
The notion of regression is ubiquitous in psychoanalytic literature. Freud relied on
regression to describe both normal and pathological processes. With respect to normal activities,
Freud used the concept of regression to explain dreams and daydreams, memory, creativity, and
wit. Later formulations, such as those of Kris (1952) and Anna Freud (1965), further developed
the role of regression in creativity and normal growth processes. Beginning in 1905, Freud
(1905/1953b, 1917/1963) argued that libidinal regression was a central component of symptom
formation in his theory of neuroses. While the concept of regression has been applied to a range
of phenomena and contexts, it is probably as a pathogenic agent in Freud’s theory of symptom
formation that regression was most prominent and clearly defined.
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Defining regression with precision is rather difficult owing to its widespread application:
It may be beneficial or harmful, adaptive or maladaptive, normal or pathological, malignant or
benign, et cetera. The meaning and connotation appears to change according to the
circumstances. Generally speaking, however, regression means to return or revert to an earlier
form, or to retrace one’s steps. Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) define regression as follows: “As
applied to a process having a determinate course or evolution, ‘regression’ means a return from a
point already reached to an earlier one” (p. 386). This definition shows that regression is closely
related to notions of evolution and development.
Regression in Freudian Theories
Several authors (Arlow & Brenner, 1964; Blum, 1994; Inderbitzin & Levy, 2000;
Loewald, 1981) trace Freud’s use of regression to the influence of English neurologist, J.
Hughlings Jackson. Jackson applied Herbert Spencer’s notion of evolution to the development
and functioning of the nervous system. According to this view, there is a progressive movement
from simple, undifferentiated structures to more complex, differentiated, and increasingly
integrated organizations. In the biological realm, regression refers to a backward movement in
development, that is, a reversion to a simpler, archaic stage, which entails a loss of higher levels
of functioning and coordination (Blum, 1994). Hence, with respect to psychological
development Loewald (1981) writes, “regression implies a standard or norm from which one
deviates … in a backward direction … going below a norm that had been reached” (p. 24). As
we will see, however, applying the idea of regression to psychological phenomena is not so
clear-cut in practice.26

26

Loewald of course understood this and often made a point of it.
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In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud (1900/1953) argues that the vivid mental imagery
of dreaming as well as hallucinatory wish fulfillment are the products of a topographical
regression, that is, a reversal of the usual progression of excitation. Thus rather than moving
from the sensory to the motor end of the mental apparatus, as in a typical reflex arc, excitation
moves in the opposite direction, from the motor end towards the sensory end of the mental
apparatus until it reaches beyond the mnemic systems to the perceptual system, resulting in the
mental imagery of dreams or hallucinations. This retrogressive movement is not just a product
of our dream life, but is also an aspect of normal waking life. For example, Freud (1900/1953)
reasons that normal regression is involved in intentional recollection and other forms of complex
thought that return to the “raw material of the memory traces” (p. 543). However, in normal
waking states the backward movement does not go beyond mnemic images to the perceptual
system, which would produce a “hallucinatory revival of the perceptual images” (Freud,
1900/1953, p. 543). In a later paper, Freud (1917/1957) clarifies this distinction: “we are quite
familiar with situations in which a process of regressive reflection brings to consciousness very
clear visual mnemic images [memory-pictures], though we do not on that account for a single
moment take them for actual perceptions” (p. 231). That is, there is a distinction between vividly
recalling memories versus hallucinating perceptions, namely, the testing of reality. Thus, in the
absence of sufficient loss of function, namely, reality testing, topographical regression remains a
normal activity during waking life.
What, if anything, does this topographical account of regression teach us about generative
returns? In Constructions in analysis, Freud (1937/2002) likens his patients’ vivid memories and
heightened imagination to hallucinations, but without the loss of reality testing. The unusual
clarity of the mental imagery is thought to stem from closely linked repressed memories that
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have retained and exert great sensory force. Thus, these returns involve regression to the Mnem.
systems, or the raw data of memory traces. One may entertain this principle in Miss A’s return,
for example. The deep red pigments, the texture of the paints, and the image of a small blot of
white paint within the red, were closely linked with unconscious memories. Thus, the
unconscious memories were able to attract, or draw, her conscious thoughts to the raw data of the
Mnem. system. We may fairly assume that there were also close associations between the
imagery of Moby Dick and Bollas’s (1992) unconscious memories of having met a whale and a
dead woman at sea.
Thus, it seems we are able to gain some clarity on the role of topographical regression in
returns, particularly concerning vivid memories. We can further assume that such returns could
possibly lead to a more integrated personality, given adequate ego support and strength, as
previously isolated islands of experience are integrated.
In a 1914 addition to The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953), Freud further clarified
regression, adding temporal and formal regression to his earlier depiction of topographical
regression. Freud described temporal regression as a harking back to older psychic structures
and formal regression as the return to primitive modes of expression and representation. Freud
synthesized these forms as follows: “All these three kinds of regression are, however, one at
bottom and occur together as a rule; for what is older in time is more primitive in form and in
psychical topography nearer to the perceptual end” (p. 548). Despite this overlap, Freud mainly
referred temporal regression in his clinical formulations.
When Freud (1917/1963) discusses regression in his explanations of symptom formation
and the transference neurosis, he is referring to temporal regression in drive and libidinal
development. In the development of neuroses, “the libido is lured into the path of regression by
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the fixation which it has left behind” (Freud, 1917/1963, p. 359). Freud (1905/1953a) depicts
this in the Dora case as follows, “a stream of water which meets with an obstacle in the river bed
is damned up and flows back into old channels which had formerly seemed fated to run dry” (p.
51). Hence, libidinal regression is closely connected to the inhibition or fixation of libido at
previous stages of development.
Although the drives pass through stages of development, portions remain fixated at
various levels or stages of organization. The proportion of libido fixated has to do with both
constitutional forces and environmental factors, such as trauma. Freud (1917/1963) described
the action of these two factors as a “complemental series” (p. 347). The regressive pull of the
earlier structures is related to the amount of libido left behind. Freud depicts this with an
analogy:
If a people which is in movement has left strong detachments behind at the stoppingplaces on its migration, it is likely that the more advanced parties will be inclined to
retreat to these stopping-places if they have been defeated or have come up against a
superior enemy. But they will also be in the greater danger of being defeated the more of
their number they have left behind on their migration. (p. 341)
Freud described two types of libidinal regression: the return to previous objects and modes of
relating to them, such as incestuous objects, and the return to previous stages in sexual
organization. The former is prevalent in hysterical neuroses and the latter in obsessional
neuroses, where Oedipal anxieties have led to a reversion to the anal stage of sexual
development.
The notion of temporal regression in particular is clearly tied to a linear model of
development and the notion of progression, and apparently to the evolutionary biological ideas
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that J. Hughlings Jackson espoused. It is a regression to simpler, older structures. Here, the
notion of regression seems most clear and straightforward, despite being outdated as a model of
psychopathology. Yet, see Eagle (2011) for an analysis of the similarities between this older
model and contemporary object relations views.
The Usefulness of Regression
Regression as a principle in normal development. Anna Freud (1965) contributed to
our understanding of the positive and normal dimensions of regression by demonstrating that
regression is a necessary part of the normal psychological development. Anna Freud first
reminds us of how we arrived at the expectation of growth as a linear progression. In the body,
and other biological structures, we generally observe straightforward, progressive lines of
growth, from immaturity to maturity, until adulthood is reached; thereafter, we expect decline to
set in. Of course, various illnesses, injuries, or deprivations may interrupt this progressive move
toward maturation. Now, psychological development similarly proceeds in a progressive
direction, but not in the straightforward manner we tend to assume:
While on the physical side, normally, progressive development is the only innate force in
operation, on the mental side we invariably have to count with a second, additional set of
influences which work in the opposite direction, namely, with fixations and regressions.
(Freud, 1965, pp. 93-94)
Anna Freud then translates earlier concepts of regression into structural terms: temporal
regression involves the drives, related objects, and/or methods of discharge; topographical and
formal regressions involve the ego functions and the secondary process. Hence, regression may
occur in the id, ego, or superego, and may involve functioning or psychic content.
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Unlike libidinal or drive regressions, ego regression is free from the influence of
inhibition, that is, “the stubborn adhesion of the drives to all objects and positions which have
ever yielded satisfaction” (Freud, 1965, p. 98). Rather, the regression seems to retrace the order
of progress, step-by-step, beginning with the most recent advance. In ordinary, normal
development, regression in various ego functions is a regular incident. These may include, for
example, ego functions of reality testing, language, secondary process thought, integration,
frustration tolerance, social adaptation, and impulse control. Thus a child’s ability to function on
a mature level will not be without ongoing interruptions. Anna Freud (1965) reassures us,
“according to experience, the slow method of trial and error, progression and temporary reversal
is more appropriate to healthy psychic growth” (p. 99).
With respect to regression in secondary process functioning, Anna Freud (1965) points to
child (and adult) analysis, children’s normal behavior at bedtime, and the culmination of long
and arduous school days. In each of these scenarios, we may observe gradual declines in logic,
coherence, and rationality, as the secondary process gives way to primary process functioning.
Anna Freud continues that the defenses also lead to regression in ego functions. For example,
denial, repression and reaction formation all interfere with improvements in memory, and
projection interferes with the synthetic function as we expel unwanted parts of the self into the
object world. Despite the decline in functioning, these regressions are not pathological, but
rather are normal aspects of development and coping. “They are useful answers to the strain of a
given moment,” writes Anna Freud, “and make difficult situations bearable” (p. 105). In this
way, they both serve adaptation and defense, and are beneficial so long as they are temporary
and naturally reversible. If, on the other hand, regression is permanent and truly interferes with
progressive development, then it becomes a pathogenic agent. When we recognize regression as
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a principle in normal development, then periodic retreats to earlier modes of functioning take
their proper place among the unalarming facets of development.
Creativity and daydreaming. As noted, Freud’s application of regression was not
limited to psychopathology. For example, regression also plays a role in his formulations on
daydreaming and art. Freud (1908/2003) traced the origins of daydreaming and artistic
endeavors, namely creative writing, to childhood. The child at play is busy creating a world
according to his liking, similar to the creative writer. Both take their craft seriously and invest it
with much emotion, but all the while retain the capacity to distinguish their creations from
reality. Moreover, both attach their creations to objects in the real world, the artist to her artwork
and the child to whatever props and people are needed. As the child grows into adolescence, he
renounces the pleasures of play for the solitary activity of daydreaming, thereby forfeiting the
link to external objects. Daydreaming is merely a substitute or surrogate for play, both of which
represent the fulfillment of a wish, either ambitious or erotic. Hence, the motive force of
daydreaming is unsatisfied desire, or frustration.
The backward movement (i.e., regression) in daydreaming becomes apparent as Freud
(1908/2003) raises the issue of time. “Fantasy,” Freud notes, “hovers … between the three
periods involved in our ideation” (p. 28). A current impression or occasion arouses a major
desire, which, in turn, evokes a memory of an earlier experience, typically from childhood, in
which that very desire was satisfied. From this historical reference point, we dream up a
situation in the future that fulfills the desire. Hence, the origins of the daydream are both in the
present experience and the analogous recollection of the past. Freud notes, “past, present and
future are strung together on the thread of one desire that unites all three” (p. 29). And similarly
in artwork, “a potent experience in the present awakens in the writer the memory of an earlier
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experience … from there proceeds the desire that finds its fulfillment in the literary work”
(Freud, 1908/2003, p. 32).
The artist, like the neurotic, returns to earlier forms of gratification; but unlike her
counterpart, the artist finds her way back to reality through her creation. By elaborating on her
daydreams in the creation of an artwork, she withdraws her personal imprint so that others may
share in her satisfaction, thereby earning her praise and recognition. It is worth mentioning that
Freud (1920/1955) would later supplement this formulation to include the motive of mastery,
which helps to explain the repetition of painful experiences (rather than pleasant) in play,
dreams, and artwork.
Regression in the service of the ego. Building on the theoretical contributions of ego
psychologists, such as Hartmann, Kris (1952) developed the idea that the ego may enroll the
primary process for creative purposes through a self-regulated regression. Kris referred to this
process as “regression in the service of the ego.” Kris credits Freud with the idea that the ego
may use the primary process without being overwhelmed by it. Specifically, in his explanation
of wit, Freud (1905/1960) writes, “a preconscious thought is given over for a moment to
unconscious revision and the outcome of this is at once grasped by conscious perception” (p.
166, italics in original). Kris reasoned that a similar process happens in various creative and
inventive processes, such as in caricature, art, and moments of insight.
The process of creation occurs in two phases, inspiration and elaboration. Kris (1952)
explains that these may be “sharply demarcated from each other, may merge into each other,
may follow each other in rapid or slow succession, or may be interwoven” (p. 59). The period of
inspiration is characterized by reception, passivity, the feeling of being driven by an outside
agent, and rapture. Here, the subjective experience may be of receiving a continuous stream of
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thoughts or images accompanied by a desire for expression. Kris notes that the experience of
inspiration has “many features in common with regressive processes: Impulses and drives,
otherwise hidden, emerge” (p. 59). In the phase of elaboration, by contrast, agency and purpose
predominate. The individual works to organize her experience with dedication and
concentration.
According to Kris (1952), these purposive and controlled regressions involve a “shift of
cathexis between the psychic systems and in the function of the ego during these shifts” (p. 62).
The inspirational phase seems to involve the partial withdrawal of countercathectic energies and
a corresponding “relaxation (‘regression’) of ego functions,” which Kris describes as a
“functional regression” (p. 253).27 In this way, “the id impulses, or their closer derivatives, are
received” (Kris, 1952, p. 313). During the phase of elaboration, the countercathectic barrier is
restored along with cathexes of ego functions, including reality testing, formulation, and
communication. Essentially, the shift between psychic systems and psychic levels allows an
interaction between primary and secondary processes.
The complimentary phases of inspiration and elaboration enable communication between
differing levels of organization, and thus, contribute to learning and discovery: “We now
distinguish two stages: one in which the artist’s id communicates to the ego, and one in which
the same intrapsychic processes are submitted to others” (Kris, 1952, p. 61). In addition, Kris
(1952) remarks that, “the integrative functions of the ego include self-regulated regression” (p.
318). It is integrative because the partial reception of unconscious contents is followed by a
reflective phase of elaboration, which brings coherence to the material. In this way, various
memories and associations may reach consciousness and become integrated with, or absorbed
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Functional regression is equivalent to topographical regression.
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into, the ego. These phases seem to bear some resemblance to Bollas’s (1992) distinction
between the simple self and complex self. The simple self conveys deep immersion in self
experiencing, or getting lost in one’s experience, similar to the passive receptivity of Kris’s
inspiration phase. The complex self refers to states of reflection, self-observation, and
understanding, similar to Kris’s phase of elaboration, whereby the individual works to organize
and represent her experience through reflective thinking and evaluation. At the beginning of the
chapter, I suggested the possibility of identifying commonalities across theoretical perspectives,
heretofore obscured by the use of regression concepts. The similarities between the formulations
of Kris and Bollas seem to provide an example.
Regression in Analysis. In his classic paper on therapeutic action, Loewald (1960/1980)
presents a far-reaching account of the psychoanalytic process, “the significant interactions
between patient and analyst that ultimately lead to structural changes in the patient’s personality”
(p. 221). In addition to offering a forceful critique of tendencies to equate the psychoanalyst
with the objective, detached scientist28, Loewald presents a view of the mental apparatus as an
open system and clarifies how interactions with the environment lead to psychological
development and structural change. Moreover, he considers the role of both regression and
repetition in psychological growth.
The overarching principle of Loewald’s (1960/1980) contribution has to do with the role
of interaction in healthy functioning. According to Loewald, Freud’s (1923/1961) structural
model (id, ego, and superego) has led to the erroneous view that psychic structures are isolated
from one another and that the id is isolated from the environment. Rather than viewing the
mental apparatus as a closed system of isolated parts, Loewald contends that in health there is a
28

Relational analysts (Wachtel, 2008) refer to this perspective as a one-person psychology, since
the analyst’s psychology is presumably absent from the treatment situation.
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free interplay both between the structures and with the environment; in topographical terms,
there is a free “interplay between the unconscious and preconscious systems” (p. 240).29 From
this perspective, psychopathology stems from the isolation of psychic structures and systems
from one another as well as from the environment. The psychoanalytic process restores these
interactions, allowing development to recommence.
The core feature of Loewald’s (1960/1980) depiction of the interaction process is the
overcoming of a differential. The differential refers to the gap, or difference between two levels
of psychological organization. The differential between lower and higher levels of organization
is overcome through their interaction, bringing about “the creation of an identity of experience in
two systems, two psychic apparatuses of different levels of organization” (Loewald, 1960/1980,
p. 239). Thus, the interaction process is a unifying experience, or in other words, an integrative
experience.
The interaction process is evident in the infant-parent relationship that is based on
empathy and understanding. Loewald (1960/1980) notes that in the beginning, both recognition
and fulfillment of need are beyond the infant’s ability or primitive level of organization (p. 237).
Thus, the mother’s more advanced level of psychological organization allows her to provide both
recognition and fulfillment of the infant’s needs. Here, the differential is represented by the
different levels of psychological organization between infant and mother.
The understanding recognition of the infant’s need on the part of the mother represents a
gathering together of as yet undifferentiated urges of the infant, urges that in the acts of
recognition and fulfillment by the mother undergo a first organization. (Loewald,
1960/1980, p. 237)
29

Note the similarity here with Kris’s (1952) formulation of regression in the service of the ego
as an interaction between the primary and secondary processes.
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Through empathic understanding, the mother recognizes and fulfills of the infant’s need, and this
has the effect of organizing the infant’s undifferentiated urges. In time, the infant gains
increasing ability to perform these functions (i.e., recognition of need and goal-directed action)
with less dependence of the mothering one. That is, the infant internalizes the interaction
process, through identification with and introjection of the mother.30 In this way, Loewald
writes, “the organization of the psychic apparatus … proceeds by way of mediation of higher
organization on the part of the environment to the infantile organism” (p. 238). Thus, a
differential between infant and environment is a necessary precursor to psychological
development.
Loewald (1960/1980) uses this model of infant development to illuminate the
psychoanalytic process. In any growth process, a differential exists between two levels of
organization. Like the mother–infant pair, the psychoanalyst represents a higher level of
organization as compared to the analysand, at least for the time being and within the boundaries
of the analysis. (In some respects, this differential may be a product of the analytic situation.)
Loewald notes that normal development includes continual, but temporary, “periods of relative
ego disorganization and reorganization, characterized by ego regression” (p. 224). In an
analysis, ego disorganization is induced by the promotion of a transference neurosis, which is
dependent upon a controlled regression and ultimately allows for reorganization. Note that this
controlled regression contributes to the differential between analyst and analysand that is a
precondition for growth. Loewald writes,
The patient can dare to take the plunge into the regressive crisis of the transference
neurosis which brings him face to face again with his childhood anxieties and conflicts, if
30
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he can hold on to the potentiality of a new object-relationship, represented by the analyst.
(p. 224, italics in original)
The new discovery of an object, or new object-relationships, offers the opportunity to rediscover
paths to develop object-relations, “leading to a new way of relating to objects as well as of being
and relating to oneself” (Loewald, 1960/1980, p. 225). “New spurts of self-development,”
Loewald (1960/1980) continues, “may be intimately connected with such ‘regressive’
rediscoveries of oneself” (p. 224).
Loewald describes how this reorganization occurs in the interaction between analyst and
analysand. Whether analysts are clarifying conscious material or interpreting unconscious
material, Loewald (1960/1980) describes their activity in terms of structuring and articulating the
analysand’s productions, verbal or otherwise. If the analyst’s interpretations are on point, they
will be, in Loewald’s words, “recognizable to the patient as expressions of what he experiences”
(p. 238). (Recall the role of recognition in the parent–infant relationship described above.)
Loewald continues, “they organize for him what was previously less organized and thus give him
the distance from himself that enables him to understand, to see, to put into words and to
‘handle’ what was previously not visible, understandable, speakable, tangible” (pp. 238-239). In
this way, the analyst–analysand dyad reach a higher level of organization. Loewald describes
such interaction as an integrative experience, as the creation of an identity of experience in two
individuals, and as an experience of mutual recognition. These interaction processes involve
regression in the service of the ego, or in the service of higher organization. Further
consideration of the interaction reveals the interplay between secondary and primary processes.
Interpretations make the analysand’s unconscious material recognizable and understandable,
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“lifting it to the level of the preconscious system, of secondary processes, by the operation of
certain types of secondary processes on the part of the analyst” (Loewald, 1960/1980, p. 240).
Controlled regression is not applicable to just the analysand. To be in tune with the
analysand, or to recognize what she herself cannot see, Loewald (1960/1980) writes that the
analyst “must be able to regress within himself to the level of organization on which the patient
is stuck” (p. 241-242). Schafer’s (1959) concept of generative empathy is relevant here. In this
way, the analyst too regresses in the service of the ego and in the process “performs a piece of
self-analysis” (Loewald, 1960/1980, p. 243). All of this is to allow for,
Freer interplay between the unconscious and preconscious systems, whereby the
preconscious regains its originality and intensity, lost to the unconscious in the
repression, and the unconscious regains access to and capacity for progression in the
direction of higher organization. (Loewald, 1960/1980, p. 240)
Thus, the integrative experience involves the mutual influence of two psychic systems or
structures as represented by the overcoming of a differential. This mutual influence allows for
both higher organization and “replenishing regression” (Loewald, 1960/1980, p. 241).
Recognition is central to reestablishing lost connections. In Loewald’s (1960/1980)
explication of interaction, health amounts to mutual communication or transformational interplay
between unconscious and preconscious systems. These unifying, integrative experiences are
based upon mutual recognition. Loewald (1960/1980) suggests that structural change involves
the internalization of the interaction process. He continues, “the opening of barriers between
unconscious and preconscious, as it occurs in any creative process, is then to be understood as an
internalized integrative experience” (p. 251). This presents a view of (partial and controlled)
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regression and disorganization as important aspects of psychological growth, health, and
creativity.
There are noteworthy parallels between Loewald’s formulations of interaction in terms of
development and health, on the one hand, and Bion’s (1963) formulations of container contained
and Ps ↔ D, on the other hand. In Loewald’s thinking, the mother’s empathic understanding (or
in Bion’s language, reverie) of the infant’s need and her optimal response lead to organization
and fulfillment (or in Bion’s language, containing). Moreover, Loewald’s formulation that
development involves periods of disorganization and reorganization bears some resemblance to
Bion’s account of growth in terms of Ps ↔ D (i.e., the movement between fragmentation and
integration leading to discovery of the selected fact).
Deprivation Theories: Regression as an Opportunity for Correction
Recall that for Freud (1914/1958), temporal regression leads to reexperiencing in the
transference. With the help of the analyst, this repetition can be transformed into recollection,
and thereby, seen as a reflection of the past. Thus, the reexperiencing is a necessary precursor to
insight, or a means to an end. For Winnicott (1955/1975), the idea of regression, which similarly
leads to reexperiencing, is not only important in terms of being a forerunner to remembering, but
also for the possibility of correcting the original environmental failure and enabling forestalled
aspects of emotional development to recommence. Winnicott views the experience of reliving
itself as crucial to the healing process, no longer merely to be translated back in terms of the past.
To clarify this, we must review some of Winnicott’s developmental theory.
In Winnicott’s (1949a/1975) developmental model, the provision of a good-enough
holding environment allows the infant to experience a continuity of being, which provides the
necessary footing for later stages of growth, especially for true self experiencing. During the
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stage of absolute dependence, the infant needs an environment, “which actively adapts to the
needs of the newly formed psyche-soma” (Winnicott, 1949a/1975, p. 245, italics in original).
From Winnicott’s perspective, the ordinary good-enough mother is capable of adapting to her
infant’s needs due to a temporary state of heightened sensitivity, or primary maternal
preoccupation. When occasional lapses in care occur, as they must, the infant’s mental activity
turns a “relative failure of adaptation into adaptive success” (Winnicott, 1949a/1975, p. 245). In
other words, the infant’s understanding allows the mother to be less than perfect, that is, goodenough. Ideally, the mothering one protects the infant from “complications beyond those which
the infant can understand” (Winnicott, 1949a/1975, p. 245). As the infant’s cognitive abilities
and understanding grows, the mother typically provides a matching “graduated failure of
adaptation” (Winnicott, 1949a/1975, p. 246). “In health,” Winnicott observes, “the mind does
not usurp the environment’s function, but makes possible an understanding and eventually a
making use of its relative failure” (p. 246).
The infant initially needs an environment that actively adapts to her needs to prevent
ongoing disturbances in her continuity of being, or going-on-being. This state of not reacting, of
being, is “the only state in which the self can begin to be” (Winnicott, 1949b/1975, p. 183).
Winnicott (1949a/1975) describes disruptions in continuity of being as impingements. These are
by definition beyond the infant’s comprehension and demand excessive reactions, or over-active
mental functioning. These reactions are excessive because the mind “begins to take over and
organize the caring for the psyche-soma, whereas in health it is the function of the environment
to do this” (Winnicott, 1949a/1975, p. 246). According to Winnicott, the mind can thus become
a thing in itself–a mind-psyche as opposed to a psyche-soma. The mind dissociates from the
soma, or body, thereby leaving the true self hidden. The mind-psyche learns to look after the self
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by reacting to environmental impingements. Winnicott describes such caretaking as the false
self, in part, because this pseudo-independence (i.e., precocity) disguises an underlying
deprivation and emptiness.
As stated, excessive disturbance of continuity may result in over-active mental
functioning. In addition, the infant’s experiences of impingement are catalogued, or
memorialized; that is, there is a “freezing of the failure situation” (Winnicott, 1955/1975, p.
281). Winnicott (1955/1975) suggests further that there is a corresponding,
unconscious assumption (which can become a conscious hope) that opportunity will
occur at a later date for a renewed experience in which the failure situation will be able to
be unfrozen and reexperienced, with the individual in a regressed state, in an environment
that is making adequate adaptation. The theory is here being put forward of regression as
part of a healing process. (p. 281)
Now, Winnicott does not mean that an infant has an unconscious hope for renewed experience,
particularly during or slightly after a trauma, but that such hope may develop over time. In this
way, catalogued impingements are available for later assimilation or processing, made possible
by a regression to dependence. Moreover, Winnicott is not referring to an instinctual regression,
that is, to a personal defense organization. Regression to dependence has to do with the
environmental situation, specifically adaptation to ego and id needs. Thus, it is not a regression
to flee from danger but to repair, or correct, a deprivation. Winnicott points out that the analytic
setting, “reproduces the early and earliest mothering techniques” and thus, “invites regression by
reason of its reliability” (p. 286). As the patient returns to dependence, the analytic situation
adapts to provide the necessary holding environment. From this place, a new sense of self,
previously hidden, may emerge, and the original failure can be relived, “from the new position of
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ego strength” (Winnicott, 1955/1975, p. 287). Winnicott (1986) expresses this eloquently
elsewhere in reference to delinquency, “they cannot get on with their own lives until someone
has gone back with them and enabled them to remember by reliving the immediate result of the
deprivation” (p. 99). Subsequently, a memory follows of "the time before the deprivation . . .
back to a creative relationship to external reality” (Winnicott, 1986, p. 98, italics in original).
Again, Winnicott placed reexperiencing, or reliving, at the center of the healing process.
The patient must reexperience what had once been too much and has since remained frozen to
fill in the gaps–to reestablish continuity with the past. To be sure, in the two papers that I have
mostly relied on, Mind and its relation to the psyche-soma (1949a/1975) and Metapsychological
and clinical aspects of regression (1955/1975), Winnicott is primarily discussing his most
disturbed patients. Even so, the original freezing of the failure situation (i.e., the cataloguing of
unconscious memories) makes possible the hope that an opportunity will arise for a restorative
reliving. The reliving is a growth process from this perspective; it is jointly undertaken with the
hope of establishing further integration and continuity. Winnicott (1955/1975) goes so far as to
say that regression is, “a normal phenomenon that can properly be studied in the healthy person”
(p. 281). From this perspective, we are all destined to search (unconsciously) for new situations
to relive ourselves.
Benign Regression
With respect to regression in the treatment situation, Balint’s (1968) conclusions are
similar to those of Winnicott; both articulated a theory of regression as an important ingredient to
healing and development. Balint argued that interventions primarily suitable for the Oedipal
period, namely those relying on adult verbal communication, did not reach patients with
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pathology originating in earlier periods of development31. Hence, when the analytic work goes
beyond the Oedipal level, the analyst can no longer rely on words as a reliable form of
communication. At these more primitive levels, Balint writes, the patient needs a certain form of
object-relationship to find herself and thereby begin anew.
Balint (1968) distinguishes between three areas of the mind: The area of the Oedipus
conflict; the area of the basic fault; and the area of creation. The area of the Oedipus conflict is
characterized by a three-person psychology. Two parallel objects always accompany the subject,
making it a triangular relationship. This is the area of psychological conflict, typically stemming
from ambivalence in the subject’s relationships with two objects. Balint continues that in the
Oedipal period, “adult language is an adequate and reliable means of communication” (p. 16). In
the area of the basic fault, where two-person relationships dominate, adult language tends to be
unreliable and inadequate. Balint explains, “the analyst’s every casual remark, every gesture or
movement, may matter enormously and may assume an importance far beyond anything that
could be realistically intended” (p. 18). Pathology at the level of the basic fault is not
characterized by conflict, but rather, the individual’s sense that there is a fault within, that
something essential is lacking, due to an early deficiency in care, attention, and affection.
The third, and final, area of the mind is that of creation. In the area of creation, there is
no external object present, “the subject is on his own and his main concern is to produce
something out of himself” (Balint, 1968, p. 24). Such creations (i.e., objects) may include
artwork, literature, gaining insight into oneself or others, as well as philosophical and scientific
contributions. Although there are no organized, whole objects in the area of creation, Balint
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Balint (1968) disliked describing pathology as pre-Oedipal, “[it] should not be called presomething else–certainly not pre-Oedipal, because it may co-exist with the Oedipal level” (p.
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(1968) writes, “the subject is not entirely alone there” (p. 25). He suggests that there are “preobjects” (p. 25) in the area of creation, which he likens to Bion’s (1963) beta and alpha elements.
The process of creation involves the transformation of pre-objects into proper objects.
Balint (1968) does not assume that what is simpler is necessarily earlier in development.
If we were to assume that, then the developmental sequence would presumably move from the
area of creation to that of the basic fault, and on to the Oedipal level. Instead, Balint adopts the
following hypothesis:
The earliest level might be that of primary love and with it the level of the basic fault, out
of which, on the one hand, the level of the Oedipus conflict develops in differentiation,
and, on the other hand, the level of creation by simplification. (p. 30)
Balint is here offering an alternative to the theory of primary narcissism, or the notion that the
entire quota of libido is initially invested in the ego. His starting place is a theory of primary
relationship to the environment, which he terms primary love. Taking the biological situation of
fetal life as a model, Balint describes the first relationship as a harmonious interpenetrating mixup: “Prior to birth, self and environment are harmoniously ‘mixed-up’ … they interpenetrate
each other” (p. 67). The trauma of birth disrupts this initial equilibrium and marks the onset of
differentiation between individual and environment.
Balint (1968) describes the individual’s early attitudes towards the newly emerging
objects, or primary objects, in terms of ocnophilic and philobatic structures. The ocnophil clings
to the emerging objects and is fearful without them, while the philobat prefers objectless
expanses, which she experiences as safe and friendly. In these primitive object relationships, the
object is taken for granted. The subject is only able to consider her own wishes, interests, and
demands, while those of the object are presumed to be wholly compatible. In this way, the
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original harmony of the individual and her environment is partially regained. According to
Balint’s theory, the central aim of human striving is “to establish–or probably re-establish–an
all-embracing harmony with one’s environment” (p. 65). The preservation or restoration of the
original harmony is evident in harmonious partnership, orgasm, religious or spiritual ecstasy
(i.e., the oceanic feeling), sublime moments of artistic creation, and finally, during certain
regressive periods of analytic treatment.
Balint (1968) observed that many patients were not able to make use of therapeutic
approaches suitable for the Oedipal level, which rely heavily on sophisticated language use.
These patients seemed to suffer from psychopathology originating in the area of the basic fault;
specifically, they experienced ruptures in primary love during early development, leading to a
pervasive sense that they were defective or faulty. Hence, interpretations aimed at resolving
conflict at the Oedipal level proved ineffective; at the level of the basic fault, there is no real
conflict to solve. Instead, these patients seemed to profit by a regression that went beyond the
area of the basic fault, allowing them to find a new beginning.
Balint (1968) was primarily concerned with the therapeutic potential of regression to the
“special atmosphere of the new beginning period” (p. 135). This regression purportedly goes
beyond the emergence of primary objects, to the original phase of the undifferentiated
environment, or the harmonious interpenetrating mix-up. Balint describes this atmosphere as
simple, trusting, and unsuspecting; it allows patients to shed their defensive armor. Here, they
seem to need a simple, yielding relationship to their environment, as in the original harmonious
interpenetrating mix-up. This regression restores or re-establishes an object relationship similar
to the primary relationship. Balint describes the analyst’s role during such times as follows:
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He must be there; he must be pliable to a very high degree; he must not offer much
resistance; he certainly must be indestructible, and he must allow his patient to live with
him in a sort of harmonious interpenetrating mix-up. (p. 136)
Essentially, the analyst is unobtrusive; she responds with quiet acceptance and understanding.
As the patient reexperiences the unsuspecting, trusting atmosphere of primary love, she seems to
enter (or withdraw) into the area of creation. The return to origins allows the patient to discover
and experiment with “new forms of object relationship” (Balint, 1968, p. 166). These new
beginning experiences help patients give up old, defensive patterns of object relationships, such
as the ocnophilic or philobatic structures. The new beginning requires a return to a point before
the faulty development began and the discovery of a new, more adaptive way of being and
relating.
Balint (1968) described regression in analytic treatment as a two-person phenomenon,
meaning that both the patient and the analyst play determining roles with respect to the form that
the regression takes. Regression may be benign, and thus function as a therapeutic ally, or
alternatively, it may be malignant and hence disrupt therapeutic progress. In the benign form,
regression is aimed at recognition; it is a “regression for the sake of progression” (Balint, 1968,
p. 132). In the malignant form, regression is aimed at gratification. Balint argues that the
analyst may facilitate a benign regression by offering a particular type of object relationship. In
essence, the analyst should remain unobtrusive and avoid becoming omnipotent.
According to Balint (1968), the benign form of regression has the following features:
1. A mutually trusting and unsuspecting relationship is established, reminiscent of the
original harmonious mix-up.
2. It leads to a new beginning and a new discovery.
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3. It is for the sake of recognition, especially of the patient’s internal problems.
4. There is only a moderate level of demand or “need.”
5. There are no signs of severe hysteria and of genital orgastic elements in the regressed
transference.
Alternatively, the malignant form of regression is characterized by the following:
1. The mutually trusting relationship is precarious and repeatedly breaks down, with the
result that desperate clinging often develops.
2. Attempts at reaching a new beginning are unsuccessful, and there is a constant threat of
spiraling demands and of addiction-like craving.
3. The aim is gratification by external action.
4. There is a high intensity of demands.
5. There are signs of severe hysteria and of genital orgastic elements in the transference.
Khan (1972) describes this malignant regression as a reactive “attempt to avoid and evade
something else that a patient dreads and is threatened by from within: namely surrender to
resourceless dependence in the analytic situation” (p. 225). Alternatively, Khan seems to
consider benign regression as an instance of what Winnicott referred to as regression to
dependence. It is worth reviewing the similar findings that Balint and Winnicott came to.
Both Balint and Winnicott describe a form of ego pathology based on pre-verbal or preOedipal trauma, namely, the basic fault and the false self. A pervasive and underlying sense of
futility and emptiness characterize both forms of pathology. Balint and Winnicott both maintain
that a regression to a pre-ambivalent state in the analytic setting has therapeutic effects for these
patients. Both differentiate this regression from those aimed at instinctual gratification. Both
observe that the analyst should provide a particular object relationship, that is, a holding
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environment that is unobtrusive and accepting. Lastly, both agree that the reestablishment of
these primary states provides healing opportunities for the patient to begin anew and create new
ways of being and relating (Rayner, 1991).
On several occasions, Balint (1968) asks whether his new beginning experiences are
actually regressions or repetitions (see p. 121 or p. 143). Both regression and repetition imply a
return to something that had previously existed. New beginnings, however, involve creation and
new discovery. For this reason, Balint concludes that the terms regression and repetition are
misleading. (Loewald [1955/1980, 1971/1980] comes to similar conclusions with respect to
catharsis and the transference. That is, both Balint and Loewald point out that in addition to
repetition, something new and creative takes place.) The work of Bollas (1987) adds important
elements to this discussion.
Conservation and Resurrection
Bollas (1987, 1989) has extended Winnicott’s ideas considerably, often by drawing on
Bion’s thinking. (Of course, he is an innovative theoretician in his own right.) In particular,
several of his contributions build on the psychoanalytic concept of regression.
Bollas (1987) describes “characterological moods” as “repeated forms of being states” (p.
99). “When a person goes into a mood,” writes Bollas, “he may be some former self” (p. 100).
A mood “may represent some child element in contemporary life” (Bollas, 1987, p. 100).
Finally, being in a characterological mood is a means of “establishing and elaborating elements
of the infant-child self” (Bollas, 1987, p. 100).
Bollas (1987) differentiates between malignant and generative moods. A malignant
mood functions to coerce or manipulate some other, perhaps as in sulking. A generative mood,
in contrast, allows one to go within “to contact the mute, unknown child self and thus has a
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greater chance of generating some knowing of what has been part of the unthought known”
(Bollas, 1987, p. 101). Bollas describes the unthought known as, “a form of knowledge that has
not yet been mentally realized . . . yet it may permeate the person’s being, and is articulated
through assumptions about the nature of being and relating” (p. 246). These assumptions about
the nature of being and relating originate in the interactions between the infant’s idiom, or
inherited disposition, and the maternal process. For a mood to be generative, the person must be
able to, “reflect upon the mood as an object without feeling the migratory effects” (Bollas, 1987,
p. 101). Thus, a mood has potential to be generative if the individual, through her mood,
“reexperiences and recreates former infant-child experiences and states of being” (Bollas, 1987,
p. 102) and thereafter, is able to reflect on and learn from the experience.
Like Winnicott, Bollas (1987) is interested in those experiences that represent failures in
self-development; characterological moods represent a form of cataloguing, that is, of
conserving, such breakdowns for future elaboration. Bollas (1987) refers to experience-memory
that has been stored in the internal world as a conservative object (p. 110). It is a “being state
preserved intact . . . [that] acts as a container of a particular self state” (Bollas, 1987, p. 110). In
this way, the preserved child self may continue to be in contact with the early environment.
Psychoanalysis already had a concept for storing experiences of objects, that of
internalization; Bollas’s (1987) contribution, the conservative object, offers a concept for stored
self states, such as moods, which are repeating forms of being. Being states may be stored
instead of object representations if the child’s capacity for thought or representation is
overwhelmed. What is conserved then is an aspect of the unthought known–since it has not been
symbolized but is felt nonetheless. This is reminiscent of Winnicott’s (1955/1975) notion that
excessive environmental failures may be catalogued (particularly, those which are beyond the
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infant’s comprehension). Bollas holds that characterological moods may be used for further
development, and that this depends on “transformation of what has primarily been mood
experiencing into sentient knowing” (p. 114). Like Winnicott, Bollas posits a wish to transform
the mood into knowledge, as in the form of memory. Characterological moods are a form of
reliving, a repeating form of being, which conserves elements of the unthought known to be
transformed into knowing.
Receptivity. When Proust (1982b) discussed what he termed, “true memories,” he
emphasized that they arise involuntarily. Similarly, when Bollas (1987) describes the “capacity
to receive news from the self,” he declares, “news comes from within the self only on its own
terms” (p. 236). Thus, news from the self arrives spontaneously, and belongs to “the arena of
experiencing oneself which follows recognition of our being” (Bollas, 1987, p. 237). This
“arena” is in contrast to the knowing which may follow such experiencing. (In Bion’s [1970]
terms, the progression is from O → K.) A condition for receiving news from the self (and the
self-analytic function) is receptivity (again, in Bion’s terms, F in O). A receptive space is
characterized by tranquility, relaxation, and freedom from desire. Bollas writes, “dream
recollections, memories and the like will be evoked by this receptivity” (p. 238). One cannot
intentionally produce news from the self, just as one cannot intentionally produce an involuntary
memory.
In his discussion of “ordinary regression to dependence,”32 Bollas (1987) states that if the
analysand hands over aspects of ego functioning to the analyst, the analysand will be more
receptive to receive news from the self, such as prior self states or moods. Analysands may
have, “an eidetic experience, accompanied by intense feeling and a sense of wonder or
32

Ordinary in the sense that Bollas does not limit his discussion to patients with severe
pathology (i.e., borderline-psychotic) as Winnicott did.
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discovery” (Bollas, 1987, p. 271). Bollas (1987) continues that the impression in the mind “has
the integrity of memory . . . the adult is ‘inside’ his childhood” (p. 271). This receptive state is
one of musing and evocation. “Musing is formless, an aimless lingering amidst perceptual
capacities, such as imagining, seeing, hearing, touching and remembering” (Bollas, 1987, p.
272). As in Proustian memories and integrative returns, the senses are of paramount importance.
Evocation is a passive state, “in which the more active elements from the unthought known
arrive” (Bollas, 1987, p. 272). This is similar to Proust’s account of the passive reception of
exceptionally vivid memories and Kris’s (1952) phase of inspiration. Hence, Bollas’s (1987)
descriptions of receiving news from the self are in some ways similar to Proust’s descriptions of
involuntary memories–both of which lead to an “eidetic experience.”
Historical consciousness. Bollas’s (1989) later treatment of the conservative process in
terms of historical sets suggests that, in addition to having healing potential, reliving plays an
important role in normal development. Historical sets refer to “clusters of memories that will
always recur in relation to one another” (Bollas, 1989, p. 196). These memories, or historical
sets, conserve the person’s emotional reality, or lived experience, so that she may return to some
prior experience. According to Bollas, “we create sets in order to preserve the integrity of self
experience, given that we have an acute sense of transformation in our being” (p. 197).
Historical sets provide an experience of continuity by leaving multiple reference points–that is,
areas of experiencing that are recognizable, that we can re-collect and relive.
The creation of a historical set that is available for reliving is, for Bollas (1989), “a
natural act . . . that stores the essence of being” and provides the internal world with “historic
depth . . . that bears the trace of the journey taken by the true self” (p. 197). This description is
reminiscent of Proust’s high regard for involuntary memories as conveyors of the essence of
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things and for their restorative potential. It is particularly noteworthy that Bollas extends his
theory of the conservative process beyond the cataloguing of traumatic experience to encompass
the “conservation of the epochal experience of the true self” (p. 197). Like Proust’s involuntary
memories and our integrative returns, historical sets provide a “link to one’s prior selves through
emotional reality,” so that, “the prior self now becomes an important present self experience”
(Bollas, 1989, p. 199). Bollas describes this as a “dialectic of eras, a psychic dialectic, in which
prior self states encounter present ones” (p. 205). Similar to Proust, Bollas writes that, “the adult
lives again as the self remembered” (p. 200). Moreover, we choose to conserve certain
memories because they capture some aspect of true self experience. Historical sets preserve the
self’s history and true self states, and allow for “contact with our self, connecting our past life
and past selves with what we experience currently” (Bollas, 1989, p. 207).
Summary
The notion of regression is widespread in the psychoanalytic literature. Beginning with
Freud, psychoanalysts have used regression to describe a range of phenomena, from the
everyday stuff of daydreams and memories, to creative processes, to the transference and
symptom formation. In cases of psychopathology or dysfunction, regression indicates a real (i.e.,
problematic) decline in development, that is, from a point that one had reached back to an earlier
one, with the implied loss of function and complexity of organization. This application of
regression is closely tied to ideas of evolution and development. However, within the
psychoanalytic literature, regression often does not imply such declines. In creativity, earlier
ways of thinking (e.g., the primary process) and banished mental contents re-enter consciousness
in moments of inspiration and reach higher levels of organization through purposeful
elaboration. Throughout childhood and in psychoanalytic treatment, temporary and partial ego
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regression is a normal and regular part of growth. Alternating periods of disorganization and
reorganization seem to be the ebb and flow of psychological development. Loewald (1960/1980)
describes this movement in terms of overcoming a differential through an interaction that creates
an integrative, unitary experience of mutual recognition. These returns are integrative
experiences that contribute to development.
Independents, such as Winnicott, Balint, and Bollas, describe a benign form of regression
(to dependence) in the treatment situation that enables patients to resume an otherwise thwarted
development. Balint (1968) questioned whether regression was in fact the appropriate term to
use, as these episodes also involve “new beginnings.” Similarly, in an interview with
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, Bollas (1993) was asked if his depiction of “ordinary regression to
dependence” (p. 417) was in fact regressive. The interviewer even suggests that it bears
“strikingly close resemblance to depictions of enlightenment in Eastern Philosophy” (Bollas,
1993, p. 417). The interviewer continues, “The regression seems to entail the shedding of both
normal and pathological mental activities that interfere with a fuller, richer surrender to selfexperience … Does your description not suggest more of a developmental achievement (of adult
life)?” (Bollas, 1993, p. 417). Bollas affirms that it does, adding that the achievement is
“renewed contact with infant, child, and adolescent parts of the personality that have been split
off and lost to the total personality” (p. 417). Bollas goes on to compare this frame of mind to
what Freud implied by his “complementary concepts of free association and evenly hovering
attentiveness, a kind of abandonment of organization that resulted in a more unconsciously
informed experience” (p. 417). This bears striking resemblance to Kris’s (1952) formulation of
regression in the service of the ego, and Loewald’s (1960/1980) formulation of the interaction
process. Bollas elaborates further on this frame of mind,
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It marks a truly deep return to states of vulnerability and dependence that all people
associate with childlike states … The analyst does not ask the patient to explain his state
of mind: the lack of such accountability further adds to the patient’s movement into this
frame of mind. It is as if a part of the personality that knows what infancy is returns now
to reexperience infantile childlike frames of mind … The analyst will remain present but
does not intrude … both participants re-create something of the nature of what I term
“constitutive object relations:” it is akin to the beginnings of any person’s existence.” (p.
418)
Here, we have the rediscovery of a valuable mode of being through a return to origins. It
is valuable because it allows for a broader range of subjectivity, or self experiencing, for
reestablishing lost connections, and for the beneficial interplay between unconscious and
preconscious systems.
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Section III

Integration and Findings
Section three is comprised of two chapters that review and integrate our findings;
however, they do so in rather different ways. In chapter 8, I identity several core themes in
generative returns, contrast these with the characteristics of non-generative returns, and conclude
by proposing that returning in the psychological sphere is a basic principle of growth. In chapter
9, I identify a typical sequence that is evident in many generative returns. This typical
sequence–from receptivity, to reimmersion, to reflection and reconfiguration–constitutes a basic
model for generative returns.

DISAPPEARANCE AND RETURN

132

Chapter 8: Dominant Themes
This chapter reviews and integrates our findings in accordance with several organizing
themes that are applicable to generative returns; these are contrasted with the characteristics of
non-generative returns. Before presenting these findings, I provide a concise summary of where
we have been throughout this journey. Early on, the experiences of Isak, Marcel, Miss A, and
Bollas helped us recognize and identify integrative returns. Here, encounters with evocative
objects (Bollas, 1992) revive meaningful, personal experiences from the psychic past, which are
thereby available for further elaboration, learning, and integration. The following characteristics
appear to be essential to this experience:
1) Relaxed and receptive frame of mind.
2) Distinct features (e.g., objects, moods, feelings) common to both the remembered
experience and the present situation.
3) Involuntary memories with reimmersion in the original frame of mind and sensibility.
4) Sensation of familiarity or recognition.
5) Self observation and reflection.
6) Learning from or making use of the experience for purposes of creativity or growth.
These integrative returns provided us with a special category (or example) of generative
returns, and served as a point of reference throughout our reappraisal of psychoanalytic theories.
This theoretical reappraisal involved two basic undertakings, namely, the interpretation and
application of theory. With respect to the interpretation of theory, we saw that several familiar
psychoanalytic concepts and practices illustrate generative returns. The application of
psychoanalytic theories, including those of Klein and Bion, to the psychology of returning
helped to clarify and differentiate these phenomena.
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It was reasonable to interpret the following psychoanalytic concepts as instances of
generative returns. From Freud’s early trauma theory, therapeutic recollection or catharsis,
which involves both abreaction and associative absorption, is good example of a generative
return. The same can be said for active or re-creative repetition, particularly as it occurs in the
transference, which leads to higher levels of psychological organization and representation.
Other examples from Freudian theories include his clinical formulation of the repetition
compulsion as an attempt to master difficult experiences retrospectively (albeit cases of trauma
typically obstruct this process), as well as returns that are under the dominance of the binding,
integrating force of Eros. While the work of Klein and Bion provided some examples of
generative returns, these theories mainly served to elucidate our subject. I will come back to this
momentarily. The chapter on regression provided several examples of generative returns, such
as “regression in the service of the ego” (Kris, 1952), “benign regression” (Balint, 1968), and
“regression to dependence” (Winnicott, 1955/1975). Bollas’s (1987, 1989) work on
characterological moods, conservative objects, and historical sets also provided examples of
generative returns.
Applying Klein’s Ps and D positions (as interpreted by Ogden [1986]) to returns allowed
us to better differentiate non-generative returns from generative returns. For example, from the
Ps position, returns have an automatic, immediate quality that lacks historical perspective; these
returns do not lead to integration, but rather serve to keep disparate experiences apart or split.
Generative returns are more apparent from the D position, where the search for integration and
continuity is more prevalent. The work of Bion also mainly served to clarify the nature of
integrative and generative returns, not to exemplify them. For instance, applying Bion’s theory
of thinking to generative returns provided a means of conceptualizing how raw emotional
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experiences can be further processed through moments of reliving. Bion’s conceptualization of
dreamlike-memory, faith, transformations, and O contributed to our understanding and
description of integrative returns. Overall, this interpretation and application of psychoanalytic
theory revealed several main themes that we will now turn to.
Two broad categories of returns are noteworthy according to the experiences illustrated
by the vignettes and our reappraisal of particular psychoanalytic theories. There are generative
returns that lead to psychological growth and creativity, on the one hand, and non-generative
returns that are associated with psychological declines or stagnation, on the other hand. The
literature converges on several basic themes that cohere in each of the two classifications of
returns. To be sure, this is not an attempt to integrate theoretical perspectives, but to show
general theoretical agreement or consistency on this topic.
Generative Returns
The literature that speaks to generative returns converges on several noteworthy themes.
In no particular order, these themes are:
1) Expanded range of experience.
2) Rediscovery and resumed development.
3) Free or open interaction.
4) Disorganization and reorganization.
5) Recognition.
6) Continuity of experience.
7) Sense of individual truth.
8) Increased reflective distance or capacity.
These themes overlap considerably, particularly on the notion of growth, and thus, some
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repetition is inevitable as we explore each in turn. (This survey of the themes is not exhaustive.)
It is worthwhile to begin by noting that generative returns seem to depend on a level of
functioning and mode of experiencing that is characteristic of Klein’s D position, or as Ogden
(1986) prefers, the “historical position.”
Expanded range of experience. Several theories indicate that generative returns involve
a new experience of something old. For example, in Freud’s early trauma theory (Freud,
1894/1962, 1896/1959b) therapeutic recollection expands the range of conscious experience by
making the unconscious conscious. This involves a return to origins, “the original psychical
process must be repeated as vividly as possible, brought into statum nascendi [born again] and
then ‘talked out’” (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1959, p. 28). Here, the notion of origins does not refer
to what objectively happened in the past, but to “the past which the patient carries within him as
his living history” (Loewald, 1972/1980, p. 144). The very ideas and memories that the patient
has resisted knowing are now recognized and made conscious, thus expanding her range of
experience. It is not a replication of the past, but a creative moment in which previously
disavowed experience can be recognized, felt, and put into words for the first time (Eagle, 2011;
Loewald, 1955/1980). Consciously returning to the experience allows it to be gradually
integrated into the individual’s network of associations, thus freeing her from automatic
defensive maneuvers.
Broadening the range of experience is also a feature of Loewald’s (1971/1980)
description of repetition as an active, re-creation. With respect to the transference, for example,
the patient’s conflict is repeated in relation to her analyst, “and through the work of
interpretation, to be repeated in an active way, that is actively taken up by the ego’s organizing
capacity” (Loewald, 1971/1980, p. 89), which includes remembering. The transformation from
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passive to active repetition creates the conditions for experiencing greater agency and choice. In
knowingly repeating, one may begin to experience greater responsibility and self direction, as
opposed to feeling instinctually driven. Loewald explains, “It is repetition with its face towards
the future while aware of the past” (p. 99). Ogden’s (1986) interpretation of the D position as the
birth of the historical self is applicable here as well. From this position, transference allows
important parts of past relationships to be perpetuated and relived in the present, without
forfeiting continuity in self experiencing; the historicity of the self expands as felt links between
present and past accrue in relationship to the analyst. The expansion of the historicity of the self
is perhaps the core generative quality of integrative returns.
Lastly, the application of Bion’s (1963) thought to generative returns also highlights an
expanded range of experience, but not in the Freudian sense of making fully formed unconscious
content conscious. For Bion, expanding consciousness is not a process of uncovering, but of
transformation: The raw sensory experience (or beta-elements) must be converted via the alpha
function into alpha elements to be registered or represented, as in dream thoughts, memories, or
dreams. From this viewpoint, expanding awareness is a developmental process. In generative
returns, preserved traces of undigested emotional experience are revived and elaborated; new
emotional experiences enter conscious awareness and contribute to learning and mental growth.
In Bion’s terms, the undigested experience is expressed as a thought without a thinker, or a ♂ in
search of a ♀. If the preserved raw emotional experience is revived in favorable conditions (e.g.,
a commensal ♀♂ relationship), then it is converted into an experience capable of representation
and conscious reflection, or alpha elements.
Rediscovery and resumed development. Several psychoanalytic concepts and practices
that qualify as generative returns converge on themes of rediscovery and resumed development.
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In the above section, for example, we saw that therapeutic recollection has to do with
rediscovering an experience and resuming the normal process of reaction (Breuer & Freud,
1893/1959). The Independent group’s contributions on the positive uses of regression in the
psychoanalytic situation best exemplify rediscovery and resumed development (Kohon, 1986).
Winnicott’s (1955/1975) notion of “regression to dependence” and Balint’s (1968) notion of
“benign regression” both describe a corrective or healing, non-libidinal regression. In
Winnicott’s terms, the patient rediscovers the relaxation of unintegration, of non-purposive being
or going-on-being, to find the self in creative moments. Similarly, Balint describes a return to a
state reminiscent of the original harmonious interpenetrating mix-up. From this unsuspecting,
trusting environment, the patient may experience a new beginning and discover new forms of
object relationship. Finally, Bollas’s (1993) notion of “ordinary regression to dependence”
involves renewed contact with parts of the personality that have been split off, a reexperiencing
of childlike frames of mind. Each of these concepts of regression describes a process of
rediscovery that recommences psychological development. By rediscovering frames of mind
reminiscent of early childhood or infancy, the patient may discover new ways of being and
relating, and from this position resume a forestalled developmental process. It is noteworthy that
these returns represent greater flexibility and growth in the personality, despite being likened to
childlike states (Bollas, 1993).
Free or open interaction. The interaction of different levels of organization is an
important theme in literature relevant to generative returns. This theme is most pronounced in
the ideas of Kris (1952) and Loewald (1960/1980). In Kris’s notion of “regression in the service
of the ego,” the ego uses the primary process for creative purposes. The two phases of
inspiration and elaboration refer to the interaction of primary and secondary processes, or
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different levels of organization. According to Kris, the inspirational phase allows the id to
communicate to the ego, while the phase of elaboration provides opportunities for integration
and organization. Bollas’s (1992) formulation of the simple and complex selves refers to a
similar interplay. In Bollas’s terms, the interaction is between a phase of deep immersion in
self-experiencing or subjectivity (i.e., the simple self) and a phase of self reflection, observation,
and organization (i.e., the complex self). In these interactions, temporary and partial regression
contributes to integrative experiences.
In his paper on therapeutic action, Loewald (1960/1980) places the free interplay between
different levels of organization at the center of psychological health and development. Such
interaction occurs intrapsychically (between systems or structures) as well as interpersonally
(between an individual and the environment). This interplay involves regression in the service of
growth, or higher organization. Recall that in Loewald’s description, any process of growth
implies a differential between two levels of organization. The prototype for this differential is
the mother-infant pair. The mother’s understanding recognition and response to the infant’s
needs represents an initial organization of undifferentiated urges (see also, Stern et al., 1998).33
In the analytic situation, controlled regression allows the patient to establish renewed contact
with primitive anxieties and conflicts, thus contributing to the differential between the analyst
and analysand. On the analyst’s part, controlled regression allows for identification, empathy,
and a piece of self-analysis. Therapeutic interactions between the patient and analyst create the
conditions for the unconscious to reach a higher level of organization and for the preconscious
system to be replenished by unconscious input. One may note that the integrating force of Eros
is consistent with this formulation. Loewald’s vision of psychic health involves “an optimal,
33

Bion (1962b) describes a similar process in terms of normal projective identification as a mode
of communication and containment, made possible by the mother’s reverie.
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although by no means necessarily conscious, communication between unconscious and
preconscious, between the infantile, archaic stages and structures of the psychic apparatus and its
later stages and structures of organization” (p. 252). These interactions contribute to growth and
organization, and are central to creativity and meaning making.
Bollas (1993) makes a similar point when he likens the frame of mind captured by
“ordinary regression to dependence” to the complementary processes of free association and
evenly hovering attention, insofar as they imply an “abandonment of organization that resulted in
a more unconsciously informed experience” (p. 417). Perhaps it is better to describe free or open
interaction as “unconsciously informed experience” that leads to further integration. Elsewhere,
Bollas’s (1989) notion of a “topographical return” expresses a similar process. The subject sends
a mental object to the system unconscious “where it gathers further and deeper meaning and
returns to the preconscious where it is now available for a new type of consciousness enriched by
the topographic journey” (Bollas,1989, p. 213).34
Disorganization and reorganization. Similar to free or open interaction, the theme of
disorganization and reorganization primarily has to do with processes of integration. Kris (1952)
and Loewald (1960/1980), for example, are both referring to integrative experiences in their
discussions of interaction. Unlike the notion of interaction, however, which describes a
relationship between parts or systems, disorganization and reorganization describes a shift, a
back and forth or fluctuation in states or positions. It may be that these concepts refer to the
same process from different vantage points: Interaction speaks to the observer’s viewpoint, while
the notion of organization refers to the subject’s experience.

34

This is similar to Freud’s (1905b) notion of ‘unconscious revision’ (p. 166) and Kris’s (1952)
‘regression in the service of the ego’. I discussed these ideas above under the heading
Regression in the Service of the Ego.
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It seems reasonable to trace the theme of disorganization and organization to Freud’s
(1920/1955) revised instinct theory. In this scheme, the death instincts represent a disintegrating
force that is set in opposition to the integrating force of the life instincts, which establishes
greater unity. Bion’s (1963) formulation of Ps ↔ D describes a similar dynamic relationship.
Bion is referring to a shift between states of fragmentation and dispersal (Ps) and states of
integration and coherence (D); hence, the Ps ↔ D formulation represents a back and forth
between disorganization and reorganization. The shift from PS to D follows the discovery of a
selected fact, that is, an experience that gives meaning and organization to otherwise dispersed or
disorganized elements. The move from D to Ps, on the other hand, signals the breaking apart or
disorganization of a unity; while the individual experiences confusion and doubt, this state
carries the potential for reorganization and growth. Hence, both Ps and D are necessary for
mental growth. In generative returns, the present psychological organization is disorganized to
enable reconfiguration at a higher level.
It seems that shifts between disorganization and reorganization are a normal part of
development. Loewald (1960/1980), for example, describes normal development as an ongoing
process of relative disorganization and reorganization that results in periods of marked
consolidation of ego organization. Continuing development requires that periods of integration
alternate with temporary ego regression, that is, disorganization, followed by reorganization at
higher levels of integration and differentiation. Moreover, Anna Freud’s (1965) idea of
regression in normal development indicates that temporary periods of ego regression provide
adaptive respite from the everyday demands of living. In this sense, short-lived ego regressions
may serve adaptation.
Recognition. Recognition and the sense of familiarity are regular themes in generative
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returns. In therapeutic recollection, for example, recognition of previously disavowed
experiences, ideas, and memories allows for normal reactions of abreaction and associative
absorption to occur. In therapeutic reexperiencing, Balint (1968) describes a benign regression
that aims at recognition, that is, “regression for the sake of recognition”–as opposed to
gratification. Here, the analyst’s recognition of the patient’s search for new beginnings
facilitates benign regression and growth. Consider also that the analyst’s successful
interpretations are “recognizable to the patient as expressions of what he experiences” (Loewald,
1960/1980, p. 238). This re-cognition is a return on a higher level of organization, that of
symbolic representation. Green’s (2002) reflections on the purpose of producing free
associations are apt as well:
The aim is no other than one of recognition. Notice the prefix of return: re. … I would
say that “knowing oneself is to recognize oneself.” It can be seen then that the
production of associations, which puts one in touch with oneself, that is, which allows
one to reflect on oneself in the presence of one’s own emerging speech, supposes that the
latter is in fact produced by establishing links within the discourse by means of representation divided up into its conscious and unconscious formations … In the final
analysis, it is a question of recognizing, with the analyst’s help, the latent meaning of
one’s discourse … its representative significance. … What the analysand needs is nothing
other than to reintegrate and re-appropriate meaning … Re-cognition is symbolizing by
coupling two stages of cognition: the stage of breaking apart followed by the stage of
coming together. (pp. 57-58)
In this sense, recognition in integral to the process of reorganization that we discussed in the
previous category.
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Lastly, recognition is central to Bion’s (1965) notion of transformations from O, which is
applicable to generative returns. The process of representing O (i.e., original states or realities)
transforms and distorts that very reality. Despite this general transformation, aspects of O are
preserved in the end product, which Bion terms invariants. The invariants provide reference
points that make O recognizable. Hence, the analyst’s interpretations will only be recognizable
to the analysand as expressions (transformations) of her experience to the extent that they
communicate invariants. Bion’s conceptualization of transformation highlights the place of
conscious recognition in returns that lead to integration and knowledge.
Continuity of experience. Generative returns seem both to rely on and to deepen the
experience of continuity. Ogden’s (1986) depiction of the developmental advance from Klein’s
Ps position to the D position centers on a momentous shift from discontinuous self experience to
continuity in self experiencing. This amounts to the arrival of the “historical self” (Ogden, 1986,
p. 79) along with new capacities for self reflection–in terms of recognizing alterations in oneself
and others over time. This developmental achievement rests on the gradual integration of split
representations of self and of object to form more complete images; that is, the move from part to
whole object relations. Conscious reexperiencing, such as occurs in integrative returns, is
possible from the D position, because individuals are able to recognize the passing of time and
loss. Conscious reliving is only sensible from the historical position, which allows past and
present to coexist in a dialectical relationship. These experiences and other conscious memorial
activities contribute to the creation of personal history, or the historicity of the D position.
Bollas’s (1989) formulation of historical sets is also relevant to the experience of
continuity or self-sameness. Historical sets speak to the memorial processes that make
integrative returns possible. According to Bollas, our knowledge that the self is changing over
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time creates the impetus to engage in a particular form of history taking. Historical sets are
clusters of memories that conserve self states. These states contain aspects of an individual’s
idiom and subjective experience of the world. An historical set provides a “holding space in
memory, which stores the child’s experience of being himself at that time in his world … to
preserve the integrity of self experience” (Bollas, 1989, p. 197). Conserving past states allows
one to experience a felt link between past and present in what Bollas terms, “a dialectic of eras, a
psychic dialectic, in which prior self states encounter present ones” (p. 205). Bollas contends
that we create historical sets to ensure continuity in self experience over time, not simply to
remember past experience but to feel ourselves there again. In this way the history of the self
can be rediscovered and to some extent, reexperienced and further elaborated.
Sense of individual truth. A sense of individual, or subjective, truth often accompanies
generative returns. Historical sets, for example, provide a particular form of individual truth, or
self-knowledge (Beck, 2002); that is, they contain self states with elements of personal idiom,
which is Bollas’s (1987, 1989) elaboration of Winnicott’s true self. Idiom refers to the defining
essence or unique nucleus of an individual that seeks expression and elaboration through
experience. It is an inherited potential that evolves through spontaneous and creative acts. In
these alive moments, the individual expresses and experiences something of his essence or being.
Here, truth refers to a particular quality of self experiencing. Perhaps it is because historical sets
seem to store something like the essence of one’s being, or the journey taken by the true self, that
these moments of reexperiencing or reliving convey a sense of individual truth. It may be what
inspired Proust (1982a) to write, “this essence was not in me, it was myself” (p. 54, italics in
original). To be sure, whether or not the individual records the historical events accurately (i.e.,
truly) is not a point of emphasis here. It is certainly feasible that one may store the essence of
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one’s experience without having an accurate representation of the actual (i.e., external) events.
Bion’s (1970) conception of transformations in O (or becoming O) also conveys a sense
of individual truth that is applicable to generative returns. While Bion assumes that ultimate
reality, or O, cannot be known, the cultivation of a receptive frame of mind, characterized by an
act of faith, allows one to become O, to recognize and feel its presence, “to be at one with it”
(Bion, 1970, p. 30). In integrative returns, for example, an emotional truth common to psychic
past and present emerges and evolves. Bion’s idea of faith signifies a particular sensibility of the
mind that is open to receive evolutions of O by way of intuition. 35 This experiencing allows O
to enter the domain of K. That is, O evolves to the point of being known. Generative returns,
such as “dream-like memories” (Bion, 1970), seem to represent a form that evolutions of O may
take.
Increased reflective distance or capacity. Several examples of generative returns
emphasize reflective capacities. For example, consider Loewald’s (1971/1980)
conceptualization of repetition in analysis. As the conflict is reactivated and repeated in
relationship to the analyst, the interpretive work functions to make the return generative by
facilitating the analysand’s reflective distance. Loewald (1960/1980) explains that
interpretations organize “what was previously less organized and thus give him the distance from
himself that enables him to understand, to see, to put into words and to ‘handle’ what was
previously not visible, understandable, speakable, tangible” (pp. 238-239). Reflective distance
also features in the elaborative phase of Kris’s (1952) “regression in the service of the ego” and
in Bollas’s (1987) description of generative, characterological moods36. Characterological

35

For the origins of this formulation see chapter 2 of Kant’s Critique of pure reason (1999, p.
25).
36
See above, pp. 127-130 to refer back to characterological moods.
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moods, or repetitive being states, require reflective distance to become generative; that is, to
generate some knowing of the unthought known.
Ogden’s (1986) interpretation of Klein’s D position as the birth of the historical self is
once more relevant, as reflective capacities depend upon this mode of experiencing and
organization. For example, the sadness and remorse characteristic of the depressive position are
the products of self reflection, a process that implies some degree of reflective distance. Because
generative returns involve reflective distance, it seems fair to infer that they depend upon a mode
of experiencing that is characteristic of the D position.
Non-generative Returns
Naturally, the themes that are pertinent to non-generative or pathological returns are in
many respects the opposites of those that apply to generative returns. Consider some familiar
non-generative returns. These include, for example, the return of the repressed, the repetition
compulsion, and libidinal regression. These non-generative returns are characterized by the
following themes: reproduction rather than representation; fragmentation; repression;
dissociation and splitting; automatic and passive subjective experiencing; lack of meaningmaking; lack of self-reflection; discontinuity and timelessness. There is a static, lifeless quality
to this repetition. In Green’s (2002) words, “the non-elaborate character of what is repeated is
such that, in reproducing itself, it is as if it had never existed and was occurring each time as if it
were the first time” (p. 41, italics in original). The absence of self reflection and historical
perspective is characteristic of Klein’s Ps position. One may repeat the past without recognizing
it as a repetition, as though it was an original event, because there is no integrity to the
experience of time. The origins of such returns remain unconscious and unintegrated despite
continual, automatic reproductions. These returns are consistent with Freud’s (1920/1955)
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formulation of the death instinct as an unbinding force that works to undo connections and break
things apart.
A Principle of Psychological Growth
It seems reasonable to propose that returning in the psychological sphere is a basic
principle of psychological growth. In cases of psychopathology, however, psychological returns
appear to degenerate and are incorporated into pathological processes. Here, returns contribute
to meaningless destruction and psychological pain. Of course, we should not thus equate returns
with psychopathology. We rely on returns to experience continuity, to experience familiarity
and new perspectives, to integrate conflict-prone experiences, for creativity, and to heal from
psychological terror. Identifying integrative and generative returns in human experience and in
our theories provides a wider perspective on an important area of psychological experience.
These concepts allow us to observe parallels across psychoanalytic theories with widely differing
assumptions.
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Chapter 9: A Model For Generative Returns
At this point, it is possible to take a step forward by extracting from our complementary
study of experience and theory a typical sequence that is evident in many generative returns.
This sequence moves from a period of receptivity, to reimmersion, to reflection and
reconfiguration. In addition to articulating a typical sequence or model of generative returns, I
briefly discuss the contribution that such returns make to the ongoing development of selffeeling (Pine, 1982) or the sense of self (Stern, 1985). This will provide us some means for
judging their relevance.
Typical Sequence
Receptivity. Our sequence begins with a period of receptivity. This state of mind is
open to receiving, akin to Bion’s (1962b) “reverie” and Winnicott’s (1958/1965) “going on
being.” There is an absence of goal-directed thinking; it is an aimless, quiet state of attention
approaching free receptiveness. This is not to say that there is a loss of consciousness, or even
drowsiness. It is an alive state of rest, open to spontaneous happenings or “news from the self”
(Bollas, 1987), but without expectation or anticipation. Recall Marcel’s yearning to recapture
that initial surge from the taste of madeleine (Proust, 1982a). He was unable to intentionally
evoke that exquisite pleasure. Yet, after repeated disappointment and failure, he left it alone and
let his mind wander without effort or distress. Only then, without in intent or will, was Marcel
transported in memory and feeling to his distant past. Hence, receptivity seems to rely on the
faith that Bion (1970) described. Eigen (1993) writes, “F in O approaches an attitude of pure
receptiveness. It is an alert readiness, an alive waiting” (p. 219). For Bion, faith is defined by an
absence of desire and memory (of the sort that clutters the mind with presumptions), and this
absence creates an opening for the return of unbidden dream-like memories.
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Reimmersion. The second period, that of reimmersion, is a spontaneous or involuntary
happening. During the period of reimmersion, the present is experienced in the context of a
distant moment (Proust, 1982b). The individual is temporarily reimmersed in the original frame
of mind and sensibility; vivid, dream-like memories arise spontaneously as the original
sensations and emotional states reoccur. Bollas (1992) describes this as a “dialectic of eras … in
which prior self states encounter present ones” (p. 205). The psychic past and present coexist,
creating the experience of a double, as the individual hovers over two corresponding time
periods. The individual feels herself to be both present and past.
Winnicott (2008) used the term “potential space” to refer to an intermediate area between
fantasy and reality. There are multiple forms of potential space, such as the play space, the area
of cultural experience, and the psychoanalytic space. It seems reasonable to consider the period
of reimmersion as an additional form of potential space. The dialectical relationship between
past and present that emerges during such reimmersion is such that the question of which is real
never arises. This space is somehow “outside time” or “extra-temporal” (Proust, 1982b, p. 904).
Hence, it is not a repetition in which the individual fails to recognize the past or to keep hold of
the present. Rather, the simultaneous experience of past and present is tolerated and respected
by a mediating subject. The potential space allows preserved feeling states and memories to
emerge in living form, and thus, to expand and evolve in relation to present experiences. By
allowing past and present to coexist in dialectical relationship, the interpreting self moves toward
integration and coordination.
Reflection and Reconfiguration. The period of reflection and reconfiguration
represents a shift from passive receptivity and reexperiencing to a more active and purposeful
frame of mind. It is a move from experiencing to knowing, or in Bion’s (1970) terms, from O →
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K. The vivid memories and emotions that re-emerged in the present context provide new
perspectives on longstanding themes or perhaps unresolved conflicts in the person’s life. Hence,
during periods of reflection, the individual works to make these themes and connections explicit,
perhaps by remembering further, which contributes to greater understanding and perspective.
There is a desire to put the experience in words, or otherwise represent it, for purposes of
communication and meaning making. Ideally, this contributes to the integration of personality
structure, such as by facilitating insight and greater continuity and coordination of experience.
Examples
We can observe this typical sequence in the integrative returns that initiated our
theoretical reappraisal. The essential features of integrative returns, as discussed in chapters 2
and 8, separate into the periods of the typical sequence (i.e., reception, reimmersion, and
reflection and reconfiguration). The beginning, preparatory period of reception is characterized
by a relaxed state of mind with lowered defenses and free-floating attention. Recall, for
example, Isak settling down at the wild strawberry patch and shortly thereafter, allowing his
mind to drift (Ekelund & Bergman, 1957). The following period of reimmersion includes the
unusually vivid, involuntary memories, the accompanying revival of mood and feeling, and the
sensation of familiarity. To continue with our example, the familiar, evocative setting of the
wild strawberry patch so connected to Isak’s childhood inspires unusually vivid memories. He is
reimmersed in memories and imaginings of an early romance, during his crisis of intimacy
versus isolation; this reimmersion in the original frame of mind and sensibility revives all of the
emotions, vulnerability, and desire that were present the first time. In an important sense,
however, many of these feelings are experienced for the first time and further elaborated during
this period of reimmersion. It is not an exact replica, but a new creation (experience) of an old
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world. Finally, the period of reflection and reconfiguration includes self observation, deepened
self-knowledge and understanding, and the generative use of the experience. Isak senses that
through his dreams he is trying to tell himself something that he resists knowing and feeling
during his waking life. His returns reunite him with abandoned parts of his identity and lost
objects. This reexperiencing yields new perspective, enables him to begin investing more care
and affection in his relationships, and to be more open to experiencing a range of emotions, such
as loss, sadness, regret, warmth, and desire. In short, he shifts from a position of pride to caring.
We can also observe this typical sequence in Freud’s early trauma theory and in the
psychoanalytic process. Freud’s descriptions of therapeutic recollection, or catharsis (Breuer &
Freud, 1893/1959), include the three periods of reception, reimmersion, as well as reflection and
reconfiguration. An initial period of receptivity is necessary to relax the defenses, such as
repression, which have kept the traumatic memories out of consciousness. The significance of
an initial period of receptivity is evident by the early use of hypnosis and subsequently, that of
free association, both of which rely on relaxed frames of mind and lowered defenses. The
following period of reimmersion involves therapeutic recollection, or catharsis. This involves
remembering the traumatic event, experiencing the accompanying affect, and expressing these
feelings in words; “the original psychical process must be repeated as vividly as possible,
brought into statum nascendi [born again] and then ‘talked out’” (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1959, p.
28). The final period of reflection and reconfiguration is apparent during associative absorption,
or as the relived experience is absorbed into the great complex of associations, which allows for
greater perspective and appraisal. In other words, the experience is gradually integrated. To be
sure, it is not an exact reexperiencing, which we would not expect to better the situation but only
to exacerbate it; rather, it is a new version of the past, re-created in the present, so that something
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different can ensue. Unlike the first time, the re-creation allows normal processes of reaction to
occur, namely, the adequate discharge of feeling and associative absorption (Breuer & Freud,
1893/1959).
Schafer’s (1983) lucid writing on transference repetition, interpretation, and
reconstruction complements some of the major points of emphasis put forth in previous chapters,
particularly, with respect to the work of Freud, Kris, and Loewald. Once more, the typical
sequence of reception, reimmersion, and reflection and reconfiguration is observable in Schafer’s
formulations. Schafer’s focus is on the relationship between relived experience and new
experience within the transference, that is, the middle period of reimmersion in our sequence;
however, he also describes a narrative induction37 to the development and elaboration of
transference repetitions that is consistent with our preparatory period of receptivity.
Psychoanalytic reconstruction is the central component of this narrative induction (i.e.,
period of receptivity). In Schafer’s (1983) view, all accounts of the past and present are
reconstructions, analytic or otherwise, and each reconstruction is guided by a narrative strategy
or aim. In the analytic situation, the analyst-analysand pair works to reconstruct a
psychoanalytic account of both past and present. That is, events of the past and present are redescribed and reinterpreted according to psychoanalytic themes and organizing principles, “and
by the analyst’s effort to identify sameness or repetition over the course of a life” (Schafer, 1983,
p. 196). Schafer describes the analytic work as temporally circular; reconstructions of past and
present are interdependent and mutually influencing. The coordination of past and present shows
greater continuity of experience over time. The narrative induction alternates attention from
present to past and back again, gradually blurring the lines between now and then, and preparing
37

I am referring to the gradual introduction of psychoanalytic narratives, principles, and
procedures, primarily by way of interpretation.
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the way for a period of reimmersion. There are, of course, other features of the analytic situation
that are conducive to reception, including the physical ambience of the setting, the couch and
lighting, the analyst’s empathic attitude, the regularity of meetings, free association, et cetera;
Winnicott (1955/1975) expresses much of this in terms of reliability and holding.
Transference reactions and phenomena are both identified and further developed by
interpretations that re-describe them in terms of repetition, that is, transference themes. The
various transference repetitions represent the period of reimmersion. In Schafer’s (1983) words,
“the here and now becomes a condensed, coordinated, and timeless version of past and present”
(pp. 196-197). The analysand relives and reexperiences her forgotten past in relation to the
analyst, and the analyst’s interpretations help to make this repetition a new experience rather
than a mere reproduction. “Far from unearthing and resurrecting old and archaic experiences as
such, it [interpretation] constitutes and develops new vivid, verbalizable, and verbalized versions
of those experiences” (Schafer, 1983, p. 190). A transference repetition unaided by
interpretation, and reflective distance, is a wholly contemporary experience; the repetitive
qualities go unnoticed. Hence, transference phenomena alone are not representative of
reimmersion, as intended in our typical sequence. The interpretive efforts help to bring about the
crucial experience of a double, that is, an identity of perception (present) with memory (past).
This experience of a double, during which one is experiencing both past and present,
encapsulates the period of reimmersion. Schafer remarks, “this timeless mode of experiencing
and understanding is an achievement … a new mode of experiencing” (p. 197). It is both relived
experience and new experience.
It is worth clarifying further how this timeless mode of experiencing is both old and new.
Again, Shafer’s (1983) formulation complements Loewald’s (1960/1980, 1971/1980)
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contributions on the psychoanalytic process and on active, re-creative repetition38. In essence,
the transference interpretation creates a new experience by organizing the raw elements of the
transference repetition in a novel way. Schafer writes, “interpretation is a creative
redescription” (p. 130, italics in original). It is not a paraphrase or simple reflection of feeling,
but a creative rendering that leads to a new mode of experiencing and a further elaboration of the
original. The past is emotionally reexperienced “as it is now remembered” (p. 132, italics in
original). The optimal interpretation, according to Schafer, allows in particular those aspects of
the original that the analysand defensively avoided to be felt for the first time. Describing such
periods of reimmersion solely in terms of regression and repetition is clearly not adequate
(Balint, 1968; Loewald, 1981; Schafer, 1983). These terms fail to communicate the personal
development that is evident during such periods, specifically the new experiences that
reimmersion yields in the presence of the analyst.
The final period of reflection and reconfiguration is represented by working through, or
the gradual integration of psychoanalytically acquired experience and understanding that results
in meaningful change (Freud, 1914/1958; Loewald, 1955/1980). The basic elements of the
period of reflection and reconfiguration, such as representation, self observation, deepened selfknowledge and understanding, and productive use of the experience, are implicit in the above
discussion on transference interpretation. On the function of language, Loewald (1960/1980)
writes,
Language, in its most specific function in analysis, as interpretation, is thus a creative act
similar to that in poetry, where language is found for phenomena, contexts, connections,
experiences not previously known and speakable. New phenomena and new experiences
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I discuss these above on pp. 54-55 and on pp. 116-119.
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are made available as a result of reorganization of material according to hitherto
unknown principles, contexts, and connections. (p. 242)
Hence, the work of putting words to experience is a crucial part of the period of reflection and
reconfiguration. The analysand does not simply experience transference phenomena, but reflects
on this experience, observes the self as an object (Bollas, 1992), and continues coordinating
present and past, through both remembering and the use of language.
Although it is not necessary to go into further detail, it is worthwhile to note that
“generative moods” (Bollas, 1987) and “historical sets” (Bollas, 1992) also illustrate our typical
sequence. Before proceeding further, I consider an objection.
Objection
The observant reader might have noticed that some generative returns involve reliving
and reexperiencing the past (such as those discussed above) while others do not. For example,
regression in the service of the ego (Kris, 1952) and Anna Freud’s (1965) regression as a
principle in normal development need not involve reexperiencing the past. Hence, these
generative returns do not necessarily partake in the period of reimmersion in our typical
sequence. We are left asking whether our typical sequence is in fact typical after all.
This objection brings an important distinction to the fore, that is, between regression as a
diminution in the level of psychological organization (Arlow & Brenner, 1964) and the
subjective experience of reliving distinct, recognizable moments of time in the present. The
former may lack the subjective experience of reliving or the sensation of familiarity, while in the
latter case, these are paramount. The examples of regression listed in the objection arguably
need not include the subjective experience of reliving.
There is significant overlap between this notion of regression and the experience of
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reliving, which is partly to blame for a tendency to conflate them. For example, regression
seems to necessitate some repetition or reexperiencing, even if the individual does not recognize
or feel it as such. Consider Arlow and Brenner’s (1964) definition of regression, “the reemergence of modes of mental functioning that were characteristic … during earlier periods of
development” (p. 71, italics in original). This definition leads one to assume that all regression
includes repetition. This is not necessarily so, however, as regressive periods of disorganization,
such as in psychosis, likely have no counterpart in infancy or childhood (Inderbitzin & Levy,
2000; Stolorow & Lachmann, 1984).
The idea that regression involves a return to earlier periods of development, a repetition
of infantile states or primitive levels of organization, is a useful metaphor; however, taking the
metaphor literally is erroneous (Inderbitzin & Levy, 2000). Stolorow and Lachmann (1984) note
that the archaic modes of psychological organization found in adults are related but not identical
to those found in childhood. Likewise, Blum (1994) writes,
Regression will not reinstate the original infantile state, just as pathogenic regression will
not represent earlier normal development. It is likely that “one can’t go home again” in
regression, though transference regression significantly revives the past in a modified and
ego-edited form. (pp. 63-64)
This statement from Blum indicates that a distinguishing feature of transference regression is the
revival of the past. It seems that partial and temporary regression is a necessary feature of
reviving the past – but not equivalent to it. Hence, reexperiencing previous mental and bodily
states during transference repetition does imply some level of regression in the service of the
ego, or relaxation of controls. Yet, the reverse is not necessarily true. Regression can occur
without reviving the past in subjective experience. Despite the overlap between regression and
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reexperiencing, the distinction between regression as a diminution in psychological organization
and reliving the past in the present is an important one. It is the latter that Schafer (1983) argued
can lead to a new mode of experiencing given adequate reconstructions.
At this point, we have at least two options. On the one hand, we could limit our
discussion points and conclusions to generative returns that involve periods of reimmersion (i.e.,
reliving and reexperiencing). This would allow us to retain our typical sequence, while
restricting its scope. On the other hand, we could modify our typical sequence to allow for a
wider range of experiences, namely, all generative returns. In particular, exchanging the period
of reimmersion with a broader concept, such as a period of experiencing, would suffice. This
sequence would move from reception to experiencing to reflection and reconfiguration. In this
respect, Bollas’s (1992) simple and complex selves would become more applicable, as would
Khan’s (1974) discussion of being, experiencing, and knowing in the analytic situation. While I
am intrigued by the latter option, my inclination is to retain our original sequence, which
emphasizes reliving, or the experience of a double. At the very least, we will avoid criticism of
being so broad in our descriptions as to include everything and reveal nothing. Finally, retaining
our original sequence and emphasis on reimmersion maintains our distinction of regression and
reliving, and ensures that our subject matter involves the subjective experience of reliving.
Expansion of Self-Feeling
In concise terms, I intend to show how the generative returns represented by our typical
sequence contribute to the expansion of self-feeling (Pine, 1982). Pine (1982) describes selffeeling in terms of “ownership, responsibility, and / or familiarity – the “I” or the “me” as the
source of an urge, an effector of action, or a center of experience” (pp. 142-143). When selffeeling predominates, various desires, impulses, and needs are located internally; the individual
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owns the experience, and recognizes it as “mine.” This is in contrast to the “it,” or the
experience of various contents as external, or outside the boundaries of the self. The “it” refers
to experiences, such as socially unacceptable impulses or wishes, that are disowned or
unrecognized. The direction of growth, generally speaking, over the lifespan is towards the
expansion of self-feeling (Pine, 1982). Of course, this does not include taking ownership over
happenings that are clearly outside the realm of one’s control or creation (as in magical or
omnipotent thought).
In discussing how experiences come to be included within the boundaries of self-feeling,
it is natural to focus on those experiences that are in some manner, conflict-prone (Pine, 1982).
It is conflict-prone experience that we are most likely to resist recognizing or including within
the boundaries of the self. Pine (1982) identifies three relevant mechanisms at work during the
integration of difficult feelings and thoughts into self-experience: Holding, appeal, and
repetition. These mechanisms are applicable to our generative returns.
The first, holding, refers to Winnicott’s (1960a/1965, 1960b/1965) concept of the holding
environment. Internalization of the holding environment is likely a precursor to and foundation
of our period of receptivity (i.e., being)–which we may also liken to the capacity to be alone
(Winnicott, 1958/1965). The security and reliability provided by holding appears to be a
necessary condition for the relaxed state of receptivity. It is in this context of ego support or
coverage that the infant begins to build up the strength to feel id-demands–originally located in
the environment–as part of the self. The period of receptivity, reminiscent of holding, is
particularly conducive for experiencing various mental contents and feelings within the
boundaries of the self. As the individual relaxes into a state of “going on being” (Winnicott,
1949b/1975), thoughts, feelings, and impulses arrive spontaneously from within, and are

DISAPPEARANCE AND RETURN

158

experienced as belonging to the “me.” This state of non-reactivity is the “only state in which the
self can begin to be” (Winnicott, 1949b/1975, p. 183).
The mechanism of appeal is also observable in generative returns. The individual finds
those objects and activities appealing that allow conflict-prone experiences to be reworked. In
chapter 2, we observed each of our protagonists intuitively select (appealing) objects and
activities that were crucial to bringing about returns: Isak suddenly decides to drive to Lund
rather than fly, and with Marianne accompanying him, he is moved to return to the summer
house of his childhood (Ekelund & Bergman, 1957); Marcel is uncharacteristically tempted by a
cup of tea and a madeleine cake (Proust, 1982a); Miss A selects subject matter and paints that
appeal to her; Bollas (1992) selects a an object for study that allows him “to be dreamed by it, to
elaborate [his] self through the many experiences of reading it” (p. 52). In this way, it seems that
we are intuitively drawn to objects and experiences that carry unique potential to inspire the
experience of a double.
Repetition is primarily analogous to our period of reimmersion. Repetition enables the
integration of conflict-prone experience by making experience more familiar or known and by
increasing the sense of mastery. In the period of reimmersion, a distant moment is relived in the
present. This relived experience–and many others closely linked–might have been lost to the
personality, forgotten, or repressed, until the moment of reimmersion. The reliving allows one to
see something again by making it present and thus, more familiar. In this way, the past informs
the present, and reminds us of ourselves.
The increasing sense of mastery that stems from repetition can result from familiarity as
well as from taking a more active role in what is reoccurring. That is, mastery seems to increase
as passive experience is transformed into active experience through repetition (Freud,
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1920/1955). Similarly, the typical sequence outlined above progresses from passive experience
to active experience. The mastery gained from this shift contributes to the inclusion of the return
experience within the borders of the self. Miss A’s return seems relevant here as her experience
progressed from passive to active39. Recall that Miss A portrayed her involuntary memory of
(what she interpreted as) a miscarriage in an autobiographical painting. Miss A represents
herself as passive in one image (i.e., the conception) and active in the next (i.e., the experience of
miscarriage). Moreover, the act of painting, of representing and communicating the experience,
is an active one. She assumes responsibility and ownership of this difficult experience (i.e., her
living memory) by actively working on it, holding it in her mind, organizing it in her
representational memory, and by producing a narrative and artistic representation.
Loewald (1971/1980) contrasts passive, automatic repetition with active, creative
repetition within the psychoanalytic situation,
In analysis the conflict is reactivated, is made to be repeated and, through the work of
interpretation, to be repeated in an active way, that is actively taken up by the ego’s
organizing capacity an important element of which is remembering. (p. 89)
Likewise, the generative returns represented by our typical sequence reintroduce a person to lost,
sometimes conflict-prone, aspects of history. These experiences are thereby available for further
elaboration and inclusion within the boundaries of the self. In this way, more memories, mental
contents, feelings and moods enter the realm of self-feeling.
Concluding Remarks
Freud’s discovery and formulation of unconscious mental life invites us to think about
the inevitable gaps in our knowledge and experience of ourselves. At the same time,

39

See chapter 2, page 32.
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psychoanalysis invites us to close the gap, to experience and know more of ourselves, and to bear
the difficult truths that are hard for us to admit or acknowledge. And yet, we cannot know or be
ourselves fully given the implications of unconscious processes. Perhaps more accurately,
psychoanalysis has generated avenues for revisiting or recreating what we failed to see the first
time. It seems we are destined to approach being fully ourselves, to narrowing the gaps, only
retrospectively. But this is a bit of a paradox, for this retrospection is also a reliving, a distant
moment that is simultaneously a present experience.
I began to divine as I compared these diverse happy impressions, diverse yet with this in
common, that I experienced them at the present moment and at the same time in the
context of a distant moment, so that the past was made to encroach upon the present and I
was made to doubt whether I was in the one or the other. The being within me which had
enjoyed these impressions had enjoyed them because they had in them something that
was common to a day long past and to the present, in some way they were extratemporal, and this being made its appearance only when, through such identification of
the present with the past, it was to find itself in the one and only medium in which it
could exist and enjoy the essence of things, outside time. (Proust, 1982b, p. 904)
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